


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Centrum Badań
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Państwa na Uchodźstwie
KUL

THE EXILE HISTORY REVIEW



**Centrum Badań
nad Historią Polskiego
Państwa na Uchodźstwie**
KUL

The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Centre for Research on the History of the Polish Government in Exile

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Preface

It is with pleasure and satisfaction that we present you with the first issue of *The Exile History Review*. This annual is one of the most important ventures carried out by the History of the Polish State in Exile Research Centre of the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), a research, coordination and popularisation centre established in 2021 at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, undertaking interdisciplinary research on the Polish State in exile, which functioned between 1939 and 1991.

The Exile History Review focuses on the theme of the European migration in the 20th century. Given the nature of the Centre, the editors of the EHR wish to devote special attention to issues concerning independence migration from Central and Eastern Europe during World War II and the Cold War. This topic, although present in the Polish and foreign scientific literature, still requires in-depth, multifaceted analyses, for instance with regard to the attitude of refugee groups to the socio-political situation in Europe, the infiltration of these circles by the services of communist states or the cooperation of refugee circles from individual countries. We believe that the members of international scientific community will use the pages of our annual to share the results of their research. With the desire to fill a big research gap and, at the same time, provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and the presentation of research findings on European migration in the 20th century, we invite scholars from all over the world to collaborate and publish in *The Exile History Review*. It is not only the historians that the invitation is addressed to; we will equally value texts discussing the issues of interest from a sociological, legal or political perspective.

Enjoy reading the inaugural volume of the annual. The first issue of *The Exile History Review* features eight articles by researchers representing Polish and foreign research centres. The *Articles* section comprises six texts. Prof. Arkadiusz Indraszczyk discussed in a multifaceted manner the history and significance of the *European Press* periodical, the press organ of the Central European Federal Youth Movement (since 1959, Central European Federalists), an organisation of federalists in exile. Dr Paweł Gotowiecki took

up – as he emphasised in the title of his article – a rather exotic problem of relations between the Polish government-in-exile and the Republic of South Maluku. Dr Martin Ne-kola examined the topic of Czechoslovak refugees housed in camps for displaced persons (“DPs”) during the early Cold War period. Dr Kristina Burinskaitė devoted her article to the efforts of the Soviet services to infiltrate Lithuanian migrant circles. Dr Magdolna Baráth analysed the actions of János Kádár’s government towards the refugees after the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. Dr István Csonta discussed the topic of post-1956 Hun-garian student refugees at the Catholic University of Leuven.

The *Materials* section features a text by Prof. Rafał Łatka concerning the relationship between Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński and General Władysław Anders. The published se-lection of correspondence provides the background for the analysis of those relations. In the *In memoriam* section, we present a text by Dr Katalin Kádár-Lynn, who outlined the profile of György Schöpflin, a professor at universities in the UK and an active politician, a Member of the European Parliament, who passed away in autumn 2021.

We wish you good and inspiring reading.

Jarosław Rabiński (Editor-in-Chief)
Kamil Świdorski (Member of The Editorial Board)

Articles

János Kádár's Government and the Refugees of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956

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Abstract: During and following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, approximately 200,000 people fled the country, the majority of them to Austria and others to Yugoslavia. After the suppression of the Revolution, the Hungarian authorities targeted the refugees with two simultaneous measures: on the one hand, they sought to persuade those who were willing and those whom the official propaganda considered as “misguided” to repatriate; and on the other hand, the said authorities did everything in their power to compromise “hostile” emigrant circles and persons, thereby weakening their influence among the refugees. In order to encourage and facilitate the repatriation, Hungary proclaimed amnesty and established a Hungarian–Yugoslav joint committee as well as a repatriation office in Vienna; however, the widespread repatriation propaganda of the Hungarian government was largely unsuccessful. Moreover, those returning after 31 March 1957 were meticulously screened and many repatriation requests were rejected, mostly for fear that Western intelligence might have planted spies among the applicants and repatriates. Initially, Hungarian leaders regarded the emigration of 1956 as a threat for fear that Western propaganda might use the migrants to influence Western public opinion and the foreign policy of other governments towards Hungary; they only changed their stance in the summer of 1958, when the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party established a commission in charge of emigration affairs, which was to pay particular attention to financially supporting the repatriation of certain categories of 1956 emigrants. In 1960, “consular passports” were introduced to enable the relatives of “dissidents” to go abroad for family visits, and under certain conditions, “dissidents” were also allowed to visit Hungary. In 1963, the Hungarian repatriation policy reached a turning point with János Kádár's proclamation of a general amnesty. From that period onward, maintaining relations with Hungarian emigration became an integral part of government policy, and the political system made concessions with regard to the perception and treatment of emigration circles, which were also showing signs of division.

Keywords: Hungarian Revolution of 1956, refugees, emigration, amnesty, repatriation propaganda, state security bodies

Following the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, approximately 200,000 people chose to expose themselves to all the uncertainties of escape and fled Hungary through Austria and Yugoslavia; they thus became the third wave of refugees to leave the country since the end of World War II, and this wave was even more heterogeneous than any other

before it, as 1956 saw the departure of not only those who had participated in the Revolution and rejected the communist system but also people whose prospects in Hungary had been bleak for some time.¹ Unlike the first two waves of 1945 and 1947, the third wave of dissidents, to use a contemporary term, could no longer be labelled “fascist” or “reactionary” masses, especially considering the large number of young emigrants who only reached adulthood after World War II. Beyond having social and demographic consequences in the long run,² the third wave of emigration caused considerable problems in the short term due to the great number of specialised workers and university students leaving the country; therefore, it was in the best interest of communist leadership to convey the impression of consolidation by persuading these refugees to repatriate.

After the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the communist authorities targeted the third wave of refugees with two simultaneous measures: on the one hand, they sought to persuade those who were willing and those whom the official propaganda considered as “misguided” to repatriate; and on the other hand, they did everything in their power to compromise “hostile” emigrant circles and persons, thereby weakening their influence among the refugees.

As early as its 19 November 1956 session, the Hungarian government issued a decision on devising measures that would facilitate the repatriation of those who had fled abroad following the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution. Hungarian leadership also decided to establish a Hungarian–Yugoslav joint committee to manage the affairs of Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia, as well as establish a repatriation office in Vienna to facilitate the return of Hungarian refugees from Austria.³

Three days later, on 22 November 1956, the Hungarian–Yugoslav Joint Committee initiated negotiations in Zagreb, and as early as 29 November, the relevant protocol was signed in Belgrade, resulting in an agreement that regulated the return of those wishing to repatriate and recorded the intentions of those wishing to travel onward. The Joint

¹ Julianna Puskás, “Elvándorlások Magyarországról 1945 óta és a magyar diaszpóra néhány jellegzetessége az 1970-es években,” in *Tanulmányok a magyar népi demokrácia negyven évéről*, ed. János Molnár, Sándor Orbán, and Károly Urbán (Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó, 1985), 236–259. Julianna Puskás pointed out that “according to social psychological studies by Western researchers, the percentage of those who had participated in the armed struggle and therefore fled to escape the reprisals was less than five per cent. Political motivations arising from the general situation before the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 were more common, such as the fear or actual experience of social and economic discrimination, persecution, and incarceration”. See: *Ibid.*, 251.

² László Hablicsek and Sándor Illés, “Az 1956-os kivándorlás népességi hatásai,” *Statistikai Szemle* 85, no. 2 (2007): 165–166.

³ Magdolna Baráth, ed., *Kádár János első kormányának jegyzőkönyvei. 1956. november 7. – 1958. január 25.* (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár 2009), 59–60.

Committee also arranged a meeting with the refugees and attempted to persuade them to repatriate by promising impunity, with no great success.⁴

At its 6 December 1956 session, the Council of Ministers entered on the agenda a proposal for granting amnesty to persons who had left the territory of Hungary after 23 October 1956, which was submitted by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs István Sebes on the grounds that it was in Hungary's best interest to repatriate "the persons deceived by hostile propaganda and those fearing reprisal" and set them to "work in production". The first prerequisite of granting amnesty was ensuring the impunity of the repatriates, and it was likewise proposed that the government should order the directors of corporations and the management of offices, factories, and institutions to reinstate in their original positions any workers who had left Hungary between 23 October 1956 and that the relevant Decree Law on Amnesty would be proclaimed if they returned by 15 March 1957. They also suggested that those who repatriated by the designated deadline should be restored to their dispossessed apartments or agricultural property.⁵

The abovementioned proposal was debated and rejected by the Hungarian government because on 1 December 1956, the Presidential Council issued Decree Law no. 27 of 1956 which granted impunity to those who had left the territory of Hungary by 29 November 1956 and would return by 31 March 1957.⁶ The suggestion to reinstate workers in their former positions was also rejected on the grounds that at a time when people who remained in Hungary and wanted to work were dismissed from their jobs en masse due to the lack of raw materials and electricity, any positions could not be reserved for dissidents or ensure their return to their former place of employment.⁷

At the 28 December 1956 session of the Council of Ministers, the members issued the decision that in order to accelerate the process of repatriation, the Hungarian foreign representations in the countries concerned should increase their efforts to facilitate the repatriation of refugees.⁸ Accordingly, at the beginning of 1957, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the then Independent Help Desk for Hungarians abroad comprised of employees from the Ministry of the Interior.

Following the proclamation of Decree Law no. 27 of 1956, which was issued to grant refugees the opportunity to repatriate quickly, collectively, and without formalities, Hungarian political leadership expected refugees to return en masse, and the Hungarian

⁴ Enikő A. Sajti, "Ötvenhatos menekültek Jugoszláviában. A magyar-jugoszláv hazatelepítési bizottság tevékenysége 1956–1957-ben," in *Az 1956-os forradalom visszhangja a szovjet tömb országában. Évkönyv XIV. 2006/2007*, ed. János M. Rainer and Katalin Somlai (Budapest: 1956–os Intézet, 2007), 205–206.

⁵ Baráth, *Kádár János első*, 107–108.

⁶ *Hungarian Gazette*, no. 98/1956, December 1, 1956, 1.

⁷ Baráth, *Kádár János első*, 97.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 137.

press continuously reported on the increasing number of applicants. However, when these efforts failed, the Hungarian government sought to blame the Western countries, and in particular the Austrian government, for throwing impediments in the way of free repatriation.⁹

On 1 January 1957, the Hungarian Mission to the United Nations submitted a memorandum to the Secretary–General of the organisation on the issue of Hungarian refugees, requesting that the Secretary–General forward the memorandum to all Members and to call the attention of their governments and of the Commissioner for Refugees to the severity of the issue. The memorandum contained the Decree Law on Amnesty issued by the Presidium and pointed out that several receiving countries were actively hindering Hungarian citizens from repatriating, taking retaliatory measures against those wishing to return, and failing to facilitate the repatriation of minors who had left Hungary without their parents. The memorandum stated that the initiatives of the Hungarian government to resolve these problems had not yet produced results, and considered it desirable that the receiving countries should facilitate the repatriation of Hungarian citizens and especially of minors.¹⁰ The memorandum also provided examples of the receiving countries hindering the repatriation of refugees, and the various retaliatory measures taken against those wishing to return, particularly in Austria.¹¹

One of the speakers at the session of the Executive Committee of the United Nations (UN), High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva, was Hungarian delegate József Marjai, and in the spirit of the memorandum discussed above as well as the propaganda issued by communist leadership, he first enumerated the measures taken by the Hungarian government to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of refugees, and then talked of the Western states hindering the repatriation efforts of refugees. Marjai claimed that among other measures, these countries prevented the Hungarian foreign representations from contacting the refugees.¹²

On 29 March 1957, two days before the deadline for repatriation stipulated by Decree Law no. 27 of 1956, the *Hungarian Official Gazette* proclaimed Decree Law no. 24 of 1957 of the Presidential Council “on facilitating the repatriation of persons who illegally left Hungary”. This Decree Law granted impunity to those who had illegally left

⁹ Ferenc Cseresnyés, “A nemzetközi menekültjog alkalmazása: Ausztria és az ’56-os menekültek,” *Múltunk* LII, no. 1 (2007): 184–185.

¹⁰ “A magyar ENSZ–küldöttség memoranduma a menekültek kérdéséről,” *Népszabadság*, January 17, 1957, 9.

¹¹ Memorandum on the issue of Hungarian citizens fleeing abroad due to the events that began on 23 October 1956, Issued on 15 January 1957. [Copy], OL XIX-J-36a. 13. d., Documents of the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna, National Archives of Hungary [Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár – MNL].

¹² “Marjai József nyilatkozata az ENSZ menekültügyi bizottságában a hazatérni vágyó menekültek visszatartásáról, a kiskorú menekültek helyzetéről,” *Népszabadság*, February 2, 1957, 1, 4.

the country between 23 October 1956 and 31 January 1957 if they applied for repatriation at any Hungarian foreign representation or any repatriation body established by the Hungarian People's Republic by 31 March 1957. The Decree Law also granted impunity to minors under the age of eighteen who had illegally crossed the border in the period between 23 October 1956 and the proclamation of Decree no. 24 of 1957. As for those who decided to apply for repatriation after 1 April 1957, the Decree Law stated that they might be granted impunity based on individual assessment of their cases.¹³

In January 1957, due to the closing of the Hungarian–Austrian border, the number of refugees fleeing to Yugoslavia increased significantly, which prompted the representatives of the two countries to resume negotiations and their joint repatriation efforts. Minister of Foreign Affairs Imre Horváth appointed a repatriation commission headed by Miklós Barity, the Embassy Secretary of the Hungarian Embassy in Belgrade and consisting of two representatives sent by the Ministry of the Interior and another two representatives by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹⁴ The Commission, which operated until 31 March 1957 and was overseen by the Yugoslav internal affairs bodies as well as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, spent three weeks visiting refugee camps in order to persuade “dissidents” to repatriate. However, their repatriation propaganda failed for several reasons, including the fact that at one of the refugee camps, one of the members of the Commission was recognised as a state security officer, who was an interrogator at the former State Security Authority which cast serious doubt on the Commission's credibility.¹⁵ Nevertheless, according to the reports of Lajos Cséby, the Hungarian Ambassador to Belgrade, 2,124 persons had repatriated by 6 April 1957, and between April and September, an additional 203 persons chose to return as well.¹⁶

In August 1957, to facilitate the repatriation of refugees returning from Yugoslavia, a new commission was established headed once again by Barity and tasked with supporting the repatriation of refugee applicants under the provisions of Decree Law no. 27 of 1956, but through a more accelerated procedure. In their case, the Hungarian government refrained from submitting their repatriation requests to the Ministry of the Interior for prior approval and allowed them to return collectively after making a declaration in front of the Repatriation Commission; however, only 30–35 persons took advantage of this opportunity.¹⁷ According to Yugoslav internal affairs data from the beginning of December 1957, there had been 19,851 Hungarian refugees in the country following the

¹³ *Hungarian Gazette*, no. 37/1957, March 29, 1957, 1.

¹⁴ Sajti, “Ötvenhatos menekültek Jugoszláviában,” 207.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 209–210.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 210–211.

Hungarian Revolution of 1956, of which 2,327 persons repatriated, while most refugees travelled on towards the Western states, and 620 persons settled in Yugoslavia.¹⁸

Unlike in Yugoslavia, where the efforts of the Repatriation Commission of the Hungarian government were supported by the local authorities, in Austria Hungary found it more difficult to pursue its repatriation policy. On 29 November 1956, the Hungarian government requested permission from the Austrian government to send a repatriation commission to manage the repatriation affairs of refugees, and after lengthy negotiations and with the approval of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, a joint repatriation commission was established in Austria, with an Austrian official serving as Chair of the Commission, two members delegated by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and one member representing the UN High Commissioner. The two members appointed by Hungary were Embassy Secretary Ferenc Esztergályos and Attaché József Hámori, both of whom were covert state security officers. The commission was also assisted by an interpreter and an employee from the Directorate of Public Security of the Austrian Ministry of Internal Affairs.¹⁹

In accordance with the decision issued on 28 December 1956 by the Hungarian government, the Hungarian Embassy in Vienna also designated the facilitation of the repatriation efforts of Hungarian refugees as one of its key tasks. According to Envoy Frigyes Puja, “the Embassy must support the work of the Repatriation Commission and play an active role in the repatriation of Hungarians. At the same time, the Embassy must also devote greater attention to the discovery and repatriation of more prominent Hungarian persons. To this purpose, we must develop appropriate plans and ensure the appropriate human resources.”²⁰

On 15 January 1957, after some difficulties regarding Austria’s approval of the requests of the Hungarian members of the Repatriation Commission to enter the country, Esztergályos and Hámori arrived in Vienna. With regard to their plans, Esztergályos, the Head of the Commission informed the correspondent of the daily newspaper *Népszabadság* that they intended to visit camps housing Hungarian refugees in order to inform them of the Decree Law on Amnesty and “give a completely honest account of the current state” of the country, including their difficulties. They also professed that they wished for the refugees “to make their decision on a completely voluntary basis, and return home

¹⁸ Ibid., 211–212.

¹⁹ Ibolya Murber, “Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956,” in *Die ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956*, ed. Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy (Vienna: Czernin Verlag, 2006), 363–364.

²⁰ “Puja Frigyes követ jelentése a magyar-osztrák kapcsolatokról, Bécs, 1957. január 24,” in *Iratok Magyarországon és Ausztria kapcsolatainak történetéhez 1956–1964*, ed. Geccsényi Lajos (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2000), 49.

with all their heart".²¹ According to Esztergályos, 50–60 refugees applied for repatriation at the Hungarian Embassy every day, and their numbers were bound to increase.

Regarding the procedure of repatriation from Austria, Esztergályos told *Népszabadság* that those wishing to repatriate had to fill out a questionnaire to receive the necessary Hungarian travel documents, after which the Commission would secure exit permits from the Austrian government. According to their plans, the repatriating refugees were collected by the Austrian authorities at a designated place, from whence they started their journey to the Hungarian border and to the first Hungarian train station, where their travel documents served as valid train tickets to their final destinations.²²

A few days later, the Hungarian Embassy issued another statement on the procedure of repatriation to refute the claims of the Austrian press that Hungary imposed various conditions on the reception of refugees and emphasised that the operation of the Repatriation Commission served to accelerate the process.²³ Understandably, the Embassy omitted to mention that the repatriates would be registered by the internal affairs bodies and then subject to observation for years following their return.

On 7 February 1957, the members of the Repatriation Commission visited the refugee camp in Mödling, and on 9 February, they also visited a camp in Stockerau. In Mödling, the residents of the refugee camp hurled insults at the Hungarian members of the Commission, waved banners with skulls on them and threw rocks at cars with Hungarian license plates until the local gendarmerie arrived and restored order.²⁴

The processing of repatriation requests usually took six to eight weeks, during which time every single person concerned was obliged to appear before the Repatriation Commission. According to Austrian information, approximately 500 Hungarian refugees had applied for repatriation before the Repatriation Commission had arrived, and the Austrian state acknowledged their requests.²⁵ After these preparations and despite their lengthy course, the Commission managed to repatriate almost 4,000 persons by 31 March 1957. According to the data of the Hungarian Refugee Service for the year 1958, 8,109 persons had repatriated from Austria by that time, and 3,774 persons had repatriated from other countries and through Austria, adding up to a total of 11,883 repatriates. According to the data of the Central Statistics Office, however, the actual number was 11,447 persons, of which 9,126 had repatriated from Austria.²⁶

²¹ "Hogyan működik majd Ausztriában a magyar hazatelepítési bizottság? Beszélgetés a bizottság vezetőjével," *Népszabadság*, January 20, 1957, 6.

²² Ibid.

²³ "A bécsi magyar követség nyilatkozata a magyar menekültek hazatéréséről," *Népszabadság*, January 24, 1957, 8.

²⁴ "Provokáció a magyar hazatelepítési bizottság ellen egy ausztriai táborban," *Népszabadság*, February 8, 1957, 6.

²⁵ Cseresnyés, "A nemzetközi menekültjog," 184–185.

²⁶ Murber, "Ungarnflüchtlinge in Österreich 1956," 366.

During the early stages of the repatriation process, the Hungarian government's propaganda efforts intensified with a strong appeal to emotions. For instance, the National Council of Hungarian Women addressed a letter to the Women's International Democratic Federation, in which they requested the Federation's help so that their "sons and daughters could return to their homes, to their families." And it continued with the appeal, "please help them learn the truth: let them know that they are anticipated and shall come to no harm, just as those who had already returned came to no harm (...) We promise to help build a country that the best of them would want".²⁷ The letter primarily referred to minors under the age of eighteen who had left without their parents, and whose fates were the subject of years of lengthy and ultimately futile debates between the governments of Hungary and Austria. In September 1957, the Inter-Parliamentary Union organised a conference in London, where Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs János Péter appealed to the humane instincts of his hearers by saying, "let them decide freely whether they want to go home or not".²⁸

The decisions issued by the Hungarian government and their widespread repatriation propaganda gave the impression that communist leadership was actually interested in facilitating the repatriation of refugees regardless of their motives for leaving the country. In practice, however, those returning after 31 March 1957 were meticulously screened and many repatriation requests were rejected, mostly for fear that Western intelligence might have planted spies among the applicants and repatriates. At any rate, it was evident that the refugee propaganda of Hungarian party leadership was not much influenced by First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's remark to Envoy Puja during his visit to Vienna, which Puja had relayed to Budapest as follows: "Comrade Mikoyan also noted that we should not bother so much with the refugees and whoever goes out should stay out".²⁹

Initially, Hungarian leadership regarded the emigration of 1956 as a threat for fear that Western propaganda might use them to influence Western public opinion and the foreign policy of other governments towards Hungary. When the discussion of tasks related to the Hungarian emigration were placed on the agenda of the 15 October 1957 session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the proposal claimed that those who were not "won over by the Motherland or, at the very least, neutralised" would "go down the pipeline of the imperialist spy organisations and serve their propaganda

²⁷ "Segítsetek, hogy fiaink és lányaink visszatérjenek otthonukba," *Népszabadság*, January 18, 1957, 2.

²⁸ "Péter János felszólalása a menekültekről," *Népszabadság*, September 19, 1957, 6.

²⁹ "Puja Frigyes követ jelentése az Anasztasz Mikojan szovjet miniszterelnök-helyettes bécsi látogatása alkalmával folytatott beszélgetéséről, 1957. április 26," in *Iratok Magyarország és Ausztria kapcsolatainak történetéhez 1956–1964*, ed. Gecsényi Lajos (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2000), 56.

machines, and shall be used against [the Hungarian regime] at every opportunity”.³⁰ It was no coincidence that those attending the meeting, including the representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, were in a hurry to know the stance of political leadership on the issue. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior claimed that they only rejected the repatriation requests of criminals and those who had actively participated in the “counterrevolution”; however, these rejections contradicted the statements made by the diplomats delegated to international organisations, who claimed that in theory, every single Hungarian citizen would be allowed to repatriate.

The heads of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs accepted the fact that the measures taken by the Ministry of the Interior regarding refugees “played a role in purging society”, but they objected to the exclusive competence of the Ministry of the Interior on the issue of Hungarian emigration and of “dissidents”. According to József Első, a state security officer and head of the Independent Help Desk for Hungarians Abroad, resolving these issues was one of the most important tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies abroad, and István Sebes was also of the opinion that most of the “dissidents” were not hostile and therefore might be persuaded but in the course of their repatriation efforts, they would have to take into account that the majority of refugees had no wish to return to Hungary.³¹

The issue of refugees was also placed on the agenda of the envoy meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held between 8 and 11 July 1958, where several speakers, including Oslo Envoy János Beck and Stockholm Envoy Lajos Bebrits, emphasised that handling the issue of the Hungarian emigration and “dissidents” belonged to the competence of foreign affairs, and it would be a mistake to confine the issue and the approval of repatriation requests to the scope of internal affairs only. According to Bebrits, that was an eminent foreign affairs task and should have been treated as such; and a definite plan should have been presented to the envoys as to what policies they should pursue in that regard.³² Meanwhile, the Hungarian diplomats serving in the Western states believed most of the “dissidents” were not consciously hostile, but if left to themselves, “they would drift over to the conscious counterrevolutionary factions” and the Hungarian authorities would be

³⁰ Juliet Szabó, “Fellazítási politika a Kádár-rendszerben. Az MSZMP propagandatevékenysége 1958 és 1963 között,” *Múltunk* LIV, no. 2 (2009): 184-185.

³¹ October 1957 session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OL XIX-J-1-o 5. d. 17, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MNL.

³² Minutes of the envoy meeting of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic, 8-11 July 1958, OL M-KS 288. f. 32/1958/7. ő. e., Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. The International Relations Department of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, MNL.

“serving them to the enemy on a silver platter,” and that would also affect their relatives and friends in Hungary.³³

Recalling their earlier request at the October 1957 session of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the heads of the Ministry repeated the request for a political statement regarding Hungary’s policy towards Hungarian emigrants and dissidents, but one of the participants, Dezső Szilágyi, Head of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party more or less echoed the opinion of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan when he said he did not understand why the issue had been given so much importance:

The issue of counterrevolutionaries is not a central problem for our government and for our Party. To my mind, it was unexpected that the comrades had made such a critical issue of a matter that is not an actual problem to us or merits hours of debate. The agenda of the Hungarian dissident press is to send these people home. “Do you want to liberate Hungary? You can only do that at home.” That is their motto, and we have no right to fail to take this into consideration. We have paid quite enough in October for having been so naive. Our Party has no interest in escalating the class war on the home front (...) There are plenty of recruited individuals who are trying to mislead us. Therefore, everyone must be individually screened, and then you must decide whether they can come home or not.³⁴

Dezső Szilágyi’s opinion was shared by the heads of the Ministry of the Interior, and as it was also supported within the ranks of Hungarian leadership, it determined the perception and treatment of the Hungarian emigration for years to come.

Although the issue of Hungarian emigration was not central to Hungarian party leadership, its significance is evident from the fact that between 1958 and 1963, the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party placed the issue of propaganda efforts targeting the Hungarian emigration on its agenda four times in total. Initially, the “target groups” were almost exclusively the “fifty–sixers” or “dissidents”, which caused the political organs dealing with emigration affairs – and particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee – to believe that “analysing the situation, influence, and flow of counterrevolutionary dissidents” was the only way to “realistically assess the situation of the emigration” and designate all relevant tasks.³⁵

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Proposal on the propaganda activity targeting the Hungarian emigration. Appendix 35R. / Debate on the proposal on the propaganda activity targeting the Hungarian emigration, OL M-KS 288. f. 5/88. ő. e., Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Minutes of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, MNL.

The first revival of the issue of Hungarian emigration was at the 29 July 1958 session of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, where a proposal previously submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee served as the basis for examining the situation of Hungarian emigration and designating the aims and principles of propaganda efforts targeting the emigration. By that time, Hungarian leadership had accepted that most refugees would remain abroad for a longer time or permanently and therefore sought to seize every opportunity of increasing the ranks of emigrants who remained loyal to Hungary. According to the authors of the proposal, the World Federation of Hungarians (which was supposed to implement the emigration policy of the Hungarian government through social means) had to carry out its propaganda efforts in a way that would win "dissidents" over to progressive movements, thereby reducing as much as possible the ranks of the emigration that "could serve as a base for incitement by the enemy's intelligence bodies and rightwing emigration".³⁶ At the abovementioned session, the Political Committee decided to appoint a commission tasked with devising a detailed plan for propaganda efforts targeting Hungarian emigration, keeping in mind that due to the revolutionary events of 1956, most "dissidents" were "misguided but honest people," therefore the need to assess the means available for financially supporting the repatriation of certain categories was emphasised.³⁷

It was János Kádár himself who suggested the possibility of offering financial support to refugees who wished to return to Hungary and raised the question of reintegrating repatriates according to their respective categories, and the tone of the Political Committee's decision was largely set by his remark that dissolution was the natural development of the emigration, and so whatever dissolved them had marked out the correct policy for the authorities while "baiting them with the question of repatriation and offering opportunities for it" would have been "the most disruptive thing". In the following years, repatriation requests continued to be assessed individually, and as per Kádár's suggestion, approval was more readily granted to skilled workers, engineering intellectuals, doctors, and "public figures" who could be "constructively utilised from a political perspective".³⁸

³⁶ The situation of Hungarians residing in capitalist countries and the social and political work to be carried out among them. Proposal submitted to the Political Committee, OL M-KS 288. f. 32/1958/11. ő. e., Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. International Relations Department of the CC of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, MNL.

³⁷ Proposal on the propaganda activity targeting the Hungarian emigration. Appendix 35R. / Debate on the proposal on the propaganda activity targeting the Hungarian emigration, OL M-KS 288. f. 5/88. ő. e., Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Minutes of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, MNL.

³⁸ Ibid.

In the wake of the decision issued in July 1958, a commission was established, and on 3 February 1959, the Political Committee discussed the commission's proposals. At that session, the Political Committee issued a decision to foster distrust in the honest and "recoverable" ranks of the emigration towards dominant emigrant leaders and support the repatriation efforts of those with "good intentions".³⁹ To this end, on 18 October 1960, the Political Committee issued a decision on issuing consular passports and granting exit permits to the relatives of "dissidents".⁴⁰ According to the decision, to gain the loyalty of as many emigrants as possible, the authorities had to pay special attention during the assessment of passport and visa requests not to reject the requests of persons showing a friendly disposition. When the time was deemed right from a foreign affairs perspective, they would publish a call to the effect that if any persons who had left Hungary without permission – including the refugees of 1956 – wanted to retain their Hungarian citizenship, they were to apply at a Hungarian embassy for registration within the next two years. Applicants who had not committed any crimes and whose conduct did not injure Hungary's interests would receive Hungarian travel documents, which could be used within one year of the date of their application to visit their relatives in Hungary.⁴¹

The decision of the Political Committee and the decision issued by the Presidential Council based on the former were implemented starting April and May 1961 and following Government Decision no. 3082/1961 on the passport and visa system of the Hungarian People's Republic, the assessment process for visa applications had to take into consideration the motivation and circumstances of the applicant at the time of leaving Hungary. In other words, they had to determine whether the applicant was a member of some hostile emigrant group or organisation, and if they showed a favourable disposition towards the Hungarian People's Republic.⁴² In 1961, only 65 individuals applied for a consular passport, but in the following year, an additional 719 took advantage of the opportunity.⁴³

³⁹ Ibid., 116.

⁴⁰ The first item on the agenda: A report on certain issues of the passport and visa system of the Hungarian People's Republic, OL M-KS 288. f. 5/205. ő. e., Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. Minutes of the Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, MNL. Consular passports were accepted as valid Hungarian travel documents by the majority of capitalist countries (such as England, Italy, France, Belgium, and Austria), but in certain countries (such as Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States), those arriving with consular passports were sometimes faced with threats from the authorities that their refugee rights would be revoked should they use their consular passports to travel to Hungary.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Non-public Regulation no. 3082/1961 of the Council of Ministers, OL XIX-A-83-b-3082/1961. 285. d., Materials of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, MNL.

⁴³ Report of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Central Committee on the execution of the Political Committee Decision of 6 June 1957 on emigration propaganda, OL M-KS 288. f. 5/300. ő. e.,

In 1963, the history of Hungarian emigration reached a turning point: simultaneously with the thaw in internal affairs policy in Hungary, maintaining relations with the Hungarian emigration became an integral part of the government's policy, and after 1963, the political system also made concessions regarding the perception and treatment of emigration circles, which were by this time showing signs of division. At any rate, it was evident from the changes discussed above that the Political Committee was not only determined to increase the number of Hungarians visiting or returning to Hungary but also that it assessed the means of enabling the children of Hungarians abroad – including those who emigrated in 1956 – to vacation or study in Hungary.⁴⁴ And these efforts marked a new phase in emigration policy.

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⁴⁴ Ibid.

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Czechoslovak Refugees in the Displaced Persons Camps in the Early Cold War

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Abstract: The paper deals with various aspects of the life of Czechoslovakian refugees at the displaced persons camps in Allied-occupied Germany and Austria. About 60,000 people left the country within a few years following the Communist takeover in February 1948. The first steps in the “free world” brought them behind the walls and fences of the camps, where accommodation met only very basic needs. Wooden shacks, former prisoner-of-war camps, military barracks, schools, factories or even more primitive housing, such as tents or train cars. The atmosphere in the camps was extremely tense because of the widespread belief that the Cold War would quickly change into an armed conflict between the USA and the USSR. But as time passed, people remained long months or even years in the camps, sending visa applications, waiting for work permits and transport to a new home. The camps could be likened to a unique microcosm, with prostitution, black market, subversive activities of Communist informants, violent and boozy clashes as well as churches, chapels, libraries, schools, kindergartens, shops, craft workshops, sports associations, scout troops or even the recruitment offices for Western armies. Moreover, the first magazines, brochures and leaflets were published there, and the first seeds of political activity were born. Nevertheless, their existence and everyday operations are almost forgotten by contemporary historiography.

Keywords: Communism, Czechoslovakia, displaced person, exile, International Refugee Organization (IRO), migration, United Nations

Spring 1945. The Third Reich fell apart, and the Allies liberated Czechoslovakia. The communists returned much better prepared from exile in Moscow, where they had spent World War Two. They learned how to penetrate all critical sectors, occupy crucial positions in the regional and local governmental bodies, work with propaganda and convince voters with endless promises to vote for them. After winning the election in May 1946, they gained control over the coalition government’s most important ministries (defence, interior, information and agriculture). They were preparing themselves, step by step, for the inevitable conflict with their coalition partners, the non-communist parties and pro-Western politicians, biding their time until the right moment to seize

absolute power. It happened to be a governmental crisis, which developed in late February 1948.¹ Altogether twelve members of the government representing three non-communist parties announced their resignations in protest against the illegal activities of the Communist-controlled State Security Police (StB). According to the Constitution, the president would have to accept the resignations and set up new elections. The Communists saw the crisis as an opportunity to take absolute power. They used Soviet support and labour unions that occupied the streets of Prague and other major cities: a general strike was organized, and any resistance by democratic elements of the Czechoslovak society was eliminated. President Edvard Beneš wanted to avoid civil war or even a Soviet invasion, capitulated and met all Communist conditions. That was the beginning of forty-one years of oppression. The Intelligentsia, Catholic clergy, Jews, pro-West citizens and farmers – especially wealthy ones referred to as “kulaks” – became enemies of the new regime.² From the moment of the coup, the floodgates of communist oppression opened, and the first politicians, journalists, and academics, who had criticized the methods of the “Reds” did not linger; they fled Czechoslovakia to avoid imprisonment.

The main direction of emigration from Czechoslovakia led through the Šumava mountains in the southwest to Bavaria, part of the American occupation zone of Germany. People from Moravia and Slovakia used the southern route to Austria, especially to the western sectors of Vienna. The StB estimated that about 8,614 people left the country illegally by the end of 1948. Between 1948 and 1953, State Security indicated a total number of 43,612 refugees.³ Manual workers accounted for almost one-third of this number, while farmers, students, soldiers, tradesmen and clerks made up some ten per cent.⁴

After their crossing, refugees usually reported to the Bavarian Border Police, were registered, issued ID cards with a photograph and stamp “der illegale Grenzgänger” (illegal border crosser) and handed over to the US intelligence service CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps). Afterwards, they were transported to a detention camp at the Goetheschule grammar school complex in Regensburg, where they filled out the necessary forms, underwent interrogations and continued to a camp under German administration deeper inland after a few days. As 50–100 people from Czechoslovakia came to

¹ Karel Kaplan, *The Short March. The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1987), 174–188.

² For more about the development of Czechoslovakia after 1948, see Josef Korbela, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, 1938–1948: The Failure of Coexistence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

³ Annual reports, 333/14: Emigration, Archiv bezpečnostních složek Praha (Archives of Security Services Prague – ABS).

⁴ Czechoslovak Escapees, December 1948, AG-018-007: Records of the International Refugee Organization 1947–1952, Box 23, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Archive Geneva.

the American zone in the spring of 1948 every day, the reception centre in Regensburg ceased to have sufficient capacity in May, and two more were established – in Schwabach and Deggendorf, both in Bavaria. At the end of 1948, many Czechs and Slovaks were dispersed in a dozen facilities.⁵

International help

Millions of Europeans lived outside their home countries in the late 1940s. The continent lay in ruins, needing time and peace for recovery, but had to deal with a massive humanitarian crisis and increasing tension instead. The International Refugee Organization (IRO), an intergovernmental body of the UN, was founded on 20 April 1946 to deal with the new wave of refugees from dozens of nations.⁶ It assumed most of the tasks of the earlier United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which had existed since 1943. The headquarters of IRO was in Geneva, but it had twenty-five regional offices all over the world, employing 4,000 people, both international and local staff. UNRRA's eligibility policy can be described as chaotic at the beginning. Its activities were primarily dictated by the demands of occupation authorities and were, to a great extent, designed to identify the displaced persons (DPs) in its care. These included Holocaust survivors, former forced labourers returning from Germany, expelled German minorities from Eastern Europe and, above all, people escaping from Stalin and his Communist regimes or those refusing to be repatriated behind the Iron Curtain.⁷ However, the great emphasis of its successor, the IRO, was placed on the registration, identification and classification of persons placed under the care of the organization. The purpose was to establish those eligible to receive assistance from the organization from those not entitled to receive it (people leaving only for economic reasons, not due to political or ethnic persecution, war criminals, Nazi collaborators etc.). The IRO's most urgent task was to keep the DPs alive: feed, lodge and clothe them. The next thing to do was to determine the type of assistance the DPs were entitled to receive: voluntary

⁵ There is a number of personal memoirs on time spent in the camps available in the Czech language, while in English, there are just a few, such as Camp Lechfeld, Hochfeld – Sandra Novacek, *Border Crossings* (Detroit: Ten21 Press, 2012), 157–177; Camp Schwabach – Charles Ota Heller, *Prague: My Long Journey Home* (Annapolis: Abbot Press, 2012), 127–146; Camp Jägerhofkaserne in Ludwigsburg – Miroslav Rechcigl, *Czechmate: From Bohemian paradise to American Haven* (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2011), 100–110.

⁶ See Louise Holborn, *The International Refugee Organisation: A Specialised Agency of the United Nations, Its History and Work 1946–1952* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).

⁷ See Kim Salomon, *Refugees in the Cold War* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991); cf. Mark Wyman, *DP: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–1951* (Philadelphia: Balch Institute Press, 1989).

repatriation, resettlement in a third country or settlement in the local economy, i.e. in the countries which hosted the DP camps, mainly Germany and Austria. Repatriation was to be offered to all individuals. However, if any individual feared persecution in the home country, said person could then be resettled in a third country. Another duty of the IRO was to accord legal and political protection to the DPs, a task which UNRRA had performed in only a limited capacity. In order to facilitate the movements of DPs, the IRO was equipped with transportation services by land, sea and air. During its operation, the IRO became the largest mass transportation company in the world.⁸

People from Poland, Hungary, Baltic countries and the Balkans were telling gruesome tales of Communist terror and persecution and asking the IRO for protection. The US and the British governments, the major contributors to the IRO budget and the ones whose occupation armies controlled large regions in Germany and Austria, facing this considerable influx of refugees from the East, were sceptical at first and did not want to take full responsibility. On 21 April 1947, they even closed the gates of the IRO camps to the newcomers. Due to this “freeze order”, the first several thousand Czechoslovak refugees after the Communist takeover in February 1948 were placed in facilities under the German/Austrian administration. Hygienic conditions and accommodations met only very basic needs. Many were little more than wooden shacks, former prisoner-of-war camps, military barracks, schools, factories or even more primitive housing, such as tents, train cars and various provisional accommodations. Every day, about 200 refugees arrived in the US zone of Germany alone, and their presence was becoming a serious political issue. Finally, in late summer 1948, after months of negotiations, the American military authorities in Germany fully recognized the Czechs and Slovaks as political refugees, escaping their homeland because of fear of persecution and thus allowed them to move to IRO camps gradually. This happened thanks to a lobby among influential British politicians and pressure from the US Department of State, considering that the United States was morally and politically obligated to afford maximum assistance to these refugees. However, the IRO camps remained open to them only until 15 October 1949 (31 August 1949 in Austria). Until then, they were admitted to IRO care and maintenance. For such refugees, the organization would pay for transport to third countries in the case of admittance for immigration. However, not everyone was able to meet the deadlines and arrived later.

In addition, the security screening procedures served as a “sieve”. Newcomers filled out lengthy forms and endured a detailed interview led by IRO officials or CIC operatives, asking the refugees about their past, career, family background and opinion

⁸ *The refugee in the post-war world: preliminary report of a survey of the refugee problem*, directed by Jacques Vernant (Geneva: United Nations, 1951), 45–61.

of the Communist regime. Persons suspected of being communist spies or those considered by IRO as not being in imminent danger became “ineligible for the protection from IRO”. Those who convinced the IRO reviewers that they fled Czechoslovakia due to serious political, moral, ideological or religious reasons and showed sincere willingness to live and work in another country received the stamp “eligible” in their documents and headed to the newly established DP – transit centres, from which led a straight path to freedom.

Living conditions in the camps were challenging; in some cases, there was a lack of drinking water and a permanent lack of fuel and coal for heating during winter, and the need for supplies became more and more urgent. The camp authorities appealed for help from the International Red Cross, CARE, YMCA, International Rescue and Relief Committee, National Catholic Welfare Conference and many Czechoslovak auxiliary committees established in practically every Western European country. Despite these combined efforts, coordinated and fully effective assistance was not provided for several months before the diplomat Jan Papánek (1896–1991) stepped in. He was a man with a detailed knowledge of the USA. He had served as Consul General in Pittsburgh before the war and, since 1945, had held the office of Czechoslovak Ambassador to the United Nations. The new Communist government unsuccessfully tried to force him to resign. Nonetheless, he was able to keep this important position thanks to his contacts in the UN. He arranged the admittance of 2,000 Czechoslovak refugees into the USA, beyond existing strict immigration quotas. He also protested against the Prague coup in the UN Security Council, accusing the Soviet Union of interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia, thus endangering world peace and security. The proposal for an independent investigation into events in Czechoslovakia was, to no one’s surprise, vetoed by the Soviets, and the matter remained on the agenda unresolved. In early May 1948, Papánek took the initiative to establish a new humanitarian organization in New York, the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees (AFCR), which focused on taking care of Czechoslovak refugees.⁹ Thanks to Papánek, it received significant financial support for its start-up from Eleanor Roosevelt, governors, senators, businessmen, journalists and other important figures. The headquarters in New York City functioned with skeleton staff; regional offices were opened in Germany, Austria, Norway, England, France and, shortly thereafter, in Canada. Due to limited funds for paid staff, dedicated volunteers did most of the work. During four decades of the Cold War, AFCR assisted about 130,000 people during their stay in the displaced persons camps and, later, during their

⁹ Slavomír Michálek, “The American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees and Its Leader Ján Papánek,” in *East Central Europe in Exile Volume 1: Transatlantic Migrations*, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 49–64.

resettlement into host countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, it also assisted refugees from Southeast Asia.¹⁰

Life behind the walls and fences

I would liken it to a unique microcosm, where you could have found prostitution, a black market, violent and boozy clashes between the members of nations, as well as churches, chapels, libraries, schools, kindergartens, sports associations (in the Czechoslovak case, it was the famous *Sokol*), scout troops and also nascent political organizations and political parties. The representatives of political parties at home, either dissolved or morphed into harmless satellites of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, tried to pick up their activities in exile and rebuild their shattered structures.¹¹ They worked in modest conditions, with minimal funds and a lack of human apparatus. The internal organization, daily operations, publishing of official party materials and ways of communicating with the member base had to be radically adapted. The first party units had begun at first in the camps by organizing meetings and assemblies. Even the camp administration was usually built on a party key, not based on the capabilities and authority of the candidates. Each party had to have representatives in this administration, and the party composition of this body, acting as the communication link between the inhabitants of the camp and IRO authorities, caused the first controversies and quarrels, which would become so typical of exile politics in subsequent years.

A considerable journalistic activity developed early in the camps, even though conditions were far from favourable. There was a lack of paper, printing-ink and printing machines. At first, word of mouth spread the news about developments outside the camps. It was customary to call a weekly meeting where journalists informed the audience about the latest events. The first newspaper-like publication, *Deník* (Daily), appeared in May 1948 in the Dieburg camp. Its editor, Emil Lašák, always prepared several copies on a typewriter. The length of each issue was determined not by the number of news items

¹⁰ Voluminous AFCR archives are deposited at various locations: Jan Papanek Papers at the New York Public Library, at the archives of the Bohemian National Hall in New York City, in the National Czech and Slovak Museum and Library in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Smaller ones are to be found in a number of personal collections of Czechoslovak émigrés (Josef Pejskar, Bořivoj Čelovský, Hubert Ripka, Adolf Procházka, Pavel Tigrid, Ota Hora, Martin Hrabík, Otakar Machotka, Helena Koželuhová, Marie Provazníková etc.) at the National Archives of the Czech Republic in Prague.

¹¹ Martin Nekola, "Czech Political Parties in Exile in the Early Cold War," in *Cold War: Global Impact and Lessons Learned*, ed. Alison Palmadessa (Hauppauge [NY]: Nova Publishing, 2019), 107–126.

but by the quantity of paper on which the editor could lay his hands. There were similar papers like *Hlas tábora* (Voice of the Camp) in Unterjettingen, *Čechoslovák* in Wiesbaden. *Svoboda* (Freedom) in Frankfurt, with its first issue in September 1948, was the very first weekly periodical, published by Pavel Tigríd, later an editor at Radio Free Europe, publisher of a well-known quarterly *Svědectví* (Testimony) and after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Czech Minister of Culture. After 1949, there were many new titles like *Československé noviny* (Czechoslovak News) in Pforzheim, *Doba* (Epoch) in Ludwigsburg, *Tribuna* (Tribune) in Murnau and many others.¹² Upon closer examination of the content, we see all kinds of contributions: political news, practical advice for newcomers related to life in the camp, poetry, jokes, quotations from the speeches of exile leaders and helpful information about visa applications and resettlement.

The Czechs and Slovaks stayed in various displaced persons camps.¹³ The refugee community in each of them was individual in many ways, and each deserves separate research. Two camps, however, can be considered exceptionally important. First, Camp Valka near Nuremberg had served as a Soviet prisoner-of-war camp. After the war, the Americans converted it into a shelter for Latvian and Estonian refugees. From this period comes the name itself – Valga is also the name of the border town between these two countries and a symbol of good relations and cooperation. In October 1949, the first 400 Czechs and Slovaks, who had failed the security screening for various reasons, were transferred there. At its maximum occupancy, there were about 1,200 Czechs and Slovaks out of 7,000 inhabitants.¹⁴ Valka was a rather small town, consisting of hundreds of wooden huts arranged in blocks. There were six small rooms in each hut, equipped only with hard beds with straw mattresses, a table and chairs and a small iron stove.

Life in the camp was harsh. Refugees sent to Valka had little hope of finding a job in Germany or emigrating unless friends abroad could arrange it for them. A distressing situation of this sort can bring out the worst in people, from stealing the post to falsely denouncing visa applicants – an anonymous denunciation sent to a foreign embassy or consulate was enough to scupper any hope for a visa. There was a wide variety of people: youngsters – recruited by the French Foreign Legion and sent to Algeria or Vietnam – but also the ill, drunkards, petty and serious criminals, single mothers or families with small children. A steady rise in the number of criminal cases gave Valka a bad reputation which German newspapers liked to dwell on. The camp was also infiltrated

¹² See Vojtěch Nevlud–Duben, “The journalistic Endeavors of Czech and Slovak Exiles (1945–1964),” in *Czechoslovakia past and present*, ed. Miloslav Rechcigl (Hague: Mouton, 1968), 844–847.

¹³ Germany: 70 camps in the US zone, 9 in the French zone, 12 in the British zone; Austria: 19 in the US zone, 8 in the French zone, 5 in the British zone; Italy: 16 camps.

¹⁴ More about Valka, see Martin Nekola, *Na cestě za svobodou (On the Way to Freedom)* (Prague: Universum, 2020), 29–34.

by Communist agents sending regular reports back to Czechoslovakia about living conditions. These were later used – together with horror stories by repentant returnees – as propaganda to show the rottenness of the West and warn against leaving the Communist paradise. The mission of the infiltrators was simple: spread disinformation, false accusations and fear, criticize life in the Capitalist West, divide the émigré community and undermine people's common sense.

Rudé právo (Red Justice), the most widespread daily newspaper in Czechoslovakia during the Communist era, included remarks about suffering children, German terror and crimes against the refugees in virtually every issue from the early 1950s. At the end of 1954, Czechoslovak State Security launched a project called *HEPND – Hnutí exulantů pro návrat domů* (Movement of the Émigrés to return Home).¹⁵ Officially, it appeared to be a citizens' initiative to organize the return of those who had changed their minds, were dissatisfied with the living conditions in the West and decided to return. HEPND published a magazine called *Hlas domova* (Voice of Home), which the infiltrators distributed to the camps, primarily to Valka. It contained pieces attacking the exile leaders, accusing them of profiting from and abusing poor people in the camps for their political goals. The authors carefully selected rhetoric, language and the phrases they used, avoiding ideological background or praise of the Communist regime; instead, they emphasized patriotism, sentiment, family, homesickness, even religious elements and poetry. The HEPND campaign culminated in May 1955, when presidential amnesty was announced in Czechoslovakia, and the authorities promised everyone who came back from the West would not be prosecuted. However, only 1,169 people out of tens of thousands took the opportunity and returned. They were immediately used for propaganda – their testimonies – in fact, pre-prepared scenarios – were broadcast on Czechoslovak radio and served as a warning and prevention measure.

For the émigrés who gained visas and started a new life in different parts of the world, the memories of the time spent in Valka remained vivid even after decades. In all recent oral history projects focused on the émigrés after 1948,¹⁶ Valka's misery, hopelessness and bad reputation played a significant role. Valka is still perceived as a dark side of emigration. The camp existed until the late 1950s; it was demolished due to the construction of the new Langwasser housing estate. The remaining refugees were sent to the nearby camp in Zirndorf.

¹⁵ Monika Mandelíčková, "Repatriace československých exulantů po roce 1948 a komunistická kampaň za návrat domů (Repatriation of Czechoslovak Refugees and the Communist Campaign to Return Home after 1948)," in *Studia z dějin emigrace. Sborník studentských prací*, ed. Karel Konečný, Tomáš Motlíček (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého, 2003), 9–19.

¹⁶ For example, the oral history project at the National Czech and Slovak Museum and Library in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Between 2010 and 2014, more than 300 interviews with the Czechs and Slovaks who had arrived in the USA as refugees were recorded.

The IRO camp No. 646 at Ludwigsburg north of Stuttgart consisted of three connected camps housed in former Wehrmacht military barracks: Krabbenlochkaserne, Jägerhofkaserne and Arsenalkaserne. The buildings themselves were more than 150 years old. Most of its residents were Polish and Czechoslovak, and the camp was also a student centre, equipped with a large meeting hall and basketball and volleyball courts. The conditions for its inhabitants, in general, were much better than in Valka. During the day, the behaviour of refugees was carefully monitored by the camp police, and any violations were punished according to IRO guidelines. Again, the long period of waiting for visas in uncertainty was depressing, regardless of the attractions of sports activities, spiritual care in the wooden church and manual work in craft workshops. The students in Ludwigsburg were missing regular daily exercise, education and activities to increase their skills, which would improve their chances as visa applicants and job seekers. That was the main reason to establish The Masaryk's University College of Czechoslovak Students in Exile on 28 October 1948, the Czech national holiday and the 30th anniversary of the foundation of Czechoslovakia. The college was named after the first Czechoslovak President, Tomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937). A number of former university professors, who also stayed in the Ludwigsburg camp, started teaching economy, philosophy, sociology, literature and international relations lessons on a daily basis in Czech, Slovak, English, German, French and Spanish, enabling the students to carry on their research and academic work. Professor Vladislav Brdlík (1879–1964), one of the leading Czechoslovak specialists on economy and agriculture, became the moving force and the college's rector. He tried to get exiled Czechoslovak professors, residing in German camps at the time, to Ludwigsburg as visiting lecturers. The club of spouses of US soldiers serving in Stuttgart offered to give free lessons in English conversation and also supported the college with instructional materials and professional literature from the USA. There was an avid interest in studying at Masaryk College. In the early 1950s, the number of students, who took part in the classes, passed exams, wrote seminary works and got a certification at the end of the semester peaked at 250. The IRO recognized Masaryk College as an official education facility, and secondary school diplomas and vocational certificates issued by the college were taken into account in the immigration proceedings of the applicants to various countries. The disadvantage was a permanent fluctuation of students. In 1951, the majority successfully resettled, including the professors, and the college and its programmes were discontinued.¹⁷

¹⁷ More about Ludwigsburg camps in NACR. See: Bořivoj Čelovský Papers, box 12, Národní archiv České republiky (National Archives of the Czech Republic – NACR).

Conclusions

In January 1950, 33,570 people from Czechoslovakia were in the care of the IRO, of which 19,271 were in the American occupation zone of Germany alone. At the same time, statistics indicated that the IRO had mediated the emigration of 12,281 Czechs and Slovaks.¹⁸ The European continent was still painfully recovering from World War Two. Cities lay in ruins, and factory production halted. For example, France was plagued by constant political turmoil and high unemployment, and rationing schemes operated in Britain until the early 1950s. Suddenly, the slowly emerging economies of Western European countries were to be hit by an influx of massive migratory waves from Eastern Europe, which they were indeed unprepared for, and the population did not hide their concerns. Due to the difficult situation, the refugees were pinning their plans and hopes beyond Europe.

The United States of America stood on the pedestal of the dream countries, but it adopted stringent immigration quotas and waiting periods extended up to eight years. More and more people were leaving for Latin America. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela offered cheap land for farming and abundant work for technology and civil engineers, medical doctors and skilled craftsmen. Australia and New Zealand also needed young blood and experts in various fields. Still, the six-week voyage to the other side of the world and the obligatory two-year working commitment to any position assigned by the government discouraged many. Canada accepted factory, mining, forestry and agriculture workers with open arms. The administrative process usually took several months, and each country could set different conditions. In some places, only young and single people were accepted; some countries preferred families and the elderly, too. People dreaming of America had a hard time finding a US citizen or company to provide them with an affidavit confirming accommodation and employment for the applicant. Various forms, invitations and reference letters, stamps and confirmations accompanied daily life in the displaced persons camp. With each refused visa request, frustration deepened, people stopped believing, became demoralized and disappointed by the “free world”, feared the future, missed the relatives they had left behind the Iron Curtain and felt trapped in a vacuum of uncertainty.

Every camp that hosted the Czechoslovak exile community after February 1948 was unique in many respects and deserves a separate study. This paper can be considered a brief introduction, an attempt to stimulate a new wave of interest, motivate students and inspire research projects, spark a debate on how to elaborate on the topic and place it into the broader framework of migration and exile research in post-war Europe. Now is probably the best time to do so. Many witnesses can still be interviewed, and archival

¹⁸ Council of Free Czechoslovakia. *In Search for Haven: The Story of Czechoslovak Refugees* (Washington D.C.: Council of Free Czechoslovakia, 1951).

documents are being declassified. Moreover, the phenomenon of migration as such resonates with unprecedented intensity in Czech society due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine.

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Hungarian Refugee Students in Belgium after the Revolution of 1956: The Leuven Case

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Abstract: Students played a prominent role in the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and after its bloody suppression, many of them emigrated to the West from November of the same year to save their lives. This article presents the fate of a small Hungarian refugee community of the 1956 revolution, focusing especially on those students who arrived in Leuven, Belgium. Since the Catholic University of Leuven gave an outstanding opportunity to those refugee students who intended to pursue their already started studies in Belgium, it is not a coincidence that many have chosen Leuven deliberately. The present article discloses the different institutes and prominent persons who contributed considerably to the success of the refugee students.

Keywords: Hungarian revolution of 1956, refugee students, Leuven, *Collegium Hungaricum*

Introduction

When one mentions the year 1956 in Eastern Europe, many think of the Hungarian revolution which ended with a bloody suppression by the Soviet army. As a consequence, a great wave of Hungarian emigrants left the country, heading to one of the western countries. The elderly generations have numerous personal experiences with Hungarians who were integrated into the society of one of the western countries. Though the revolution and its consequences were well-known to many, the fate of refugees in their new societies started to interest Hungarian researchers only recently. This is, however, a natural process since any scientific research on the topic was forbidden until the collapse of the Iron Curtain. After 1990, the preserved sources documenting the Hungarian revolution had to be processed first, and only afterwards was it possible to start broader research on the so-called Hungarian refugee colonies in the West. In this article, the author focuses on a small group of Hungarian students who

arrived in Belgium, more precisely on those who eventually stayed in Leuven after the autumn of 1956. Of primary interest for the author is whether the different Belgian institutions and the society as a whole created an atmosphere of hope for the refugees and if yes, which institutions and prominent persons did contribute to this? How did the students who arrived earlier help each other? How much did the local initiatives contribute to facilitating the integration of the newcomers?

The refugees and Belgium

As it is widely known, barely one decade after the end of WW II, Hungarian students and workers launched a series of protests against Soviet-style communism. These protests were fuelled by both the methods and results of the new society. The prerequisite of implementing communism was the systematic destruction of traditional societal pillars, such as family and its old traditions, Christian denominations, and of whatever was associated with any type of religious beliefs. Different churches and people connected to these were, however, only one of the segments that communism tried to eliminate. Those who protested against the transformation of the society on communist principles were regularly terrorised. After the death of Stalin in 1953, signs of easing were perceivable, nevertheless, this was to be treated with high cautiousness: communism did not cease to exist. It only changed its method from an inhuman terror to a somewhat bearable but still dictatorial system. The relative relaxation of the regime on the one hand, and the constant pressure on the other, made the outbreak of strikes in Hungary possible.

In the summer of 1956, workers made clear that they were not satisfied with the communist system, and a strike broke out at the Rákosi Mátyás steel plant on 12 July.¹ At the University of Szeged, active resistance gave birth to growing protests in the autumn of 1956 which spread swiftly also to other major cities of the country, such as Debrecen, Miskolc and, of course, Budapest.² Active participants of the events did not realise when was it exactly that they crossed the hardly perceivable boundary between protest and revolution. The western powers did not interfere in the revolution, apart from the media campaign led by Radio Free Europe and the later humanitarian help of the US and other Western countries. At that time, England was busy with the

¹ Moritz Poellath, "Agents, Fascists and Provocateurs: Disinformation as an Instrument to Delegitimize Uprisings in Eastern Europe (1953, 1956, 1968) and Its Impact on the Politics of Memory," *Journal of Intelligence History*, 2021, 1–23.

² For a thorough account on the topic, see Jancsák Csaba, *A Magyar Egyetemisták és Főiskolások Szövetsége (1956) életinterjúk tükrében* (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2016).

Suez Crisis that broke out exactly in those days,³ and the US had clearly no interest in a new proxy war.⁴ Seeing the lack of interest on the part of the western world, the Soviet troops invaded Hungary and that ended the revolution at the beginning of November. The balance of the revolution was shocking: more than 2,700 persons were killed, about 25,000 were detained and 200,000 left the country.⁵ The proportion of the young was considerably high among the refugees since they played an active part in the revolution. Due to that ‘exodus’, Hungary lost an entire generation and the hope for any change for decades.

Hungarians participating actively in the revolution and as a consequence becoming refugees had two options for leaving the country. They could cross either the Austrian or the Yugoslavian border. Out of these two, the Yugoslavian border proved to be uncertain since the country, at a crossroads between East and West, was randomly switching its attitude from welcoming to rejecting refugees. The latter option meant sending them to death or long years of prison. Sometimes refugees tried to cross both borders.⁶ The numbers show clearly that refugees preferred the Austrian border at the expense of the Yugoslavian one: while there were about 180,000 Hungarians crossing the former, there were less than 20,000 crossing the latter.⁷ Though Austrian refugee camps were secure places, their capacities, however, were rapidly exceeded and the country was constantly sending calls for help to other Western countries. Several of them were ready to help whatever their motivation was. Belgium offered to accept a quota of 3,000 refugees which almost doubled at the end of 1957.⁸ Since many of the refugee Hungarians were students (whether high school or university students), some of them were consciously looking for possibilities to pursue their studies. Considering the opportunities offered by the Catholic University of Leuven (KU Leuven), many of refugee students came to Belgium with the hope of a possible continuation of their studies. Life, however, was not giving equal opportunities to all.

³ On the influence of the Suez Crisis to the revolution, see Peter G. Boyle, “The Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis,” *History* 90, no. 300 (2005): 550–565.

⁴ Steve Long, “The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and the Shortcomings of U.S. Strategy Towards Eastern Europe,” *49th Parallel—An Interdisciplinary Journal of North American Studies* (22 July 2014).

⁵ Poellath, “Agents, Fascists and Provocateurs.”

⁶ Csaba, *A Magyar Egyetemisták*, 118.

⁷ James P. Niessen, “Hungarian Refugees of 1956: From the Border to Austria, Camp Kilmer, and Elsewhere,” *Hungarian Cultural Studies* 9 (11 October 2016): 123.

⁸ Marlies Segers, “Oost-Europese Vluchtelingen in België (1951–1982) Een Warm Onthaal Tijdens de Koude Oorlog?,” (master’s thesis, KU Leuven, Faculty of Arts, 2013), 33.

New country, new challenges: coal mines or studies?

The hope refugee students cherished was not unrealistic since Hungarian students were present at KU Leuven from the very beginning of the university's history throughout the modern period.⁹ In the 20th century as well, refugees were coming from Hungary in different waves. The first wave reached Belgium at the end of WW I: even though Belgium and Hungary were fighting on different sides in the war, Belgium (and the Netherlands) received thousands of Hungarian orphans and poor children for months.¹⁰ As a matter of course, there were children who never returned to Hungary and those who, after returning to Hungary from their Belgian 'holidays,' emigrated to Belgium as adults.¹¹ After WW II, and especially from 1949, there was already an official Hungarian student organisation officially established by students who were leaving Hungary in the aftermath of the communist takeover in the years 1945–49. This small student community took the name after the imprisoned Cardinal Primate of Hungary, Home Card. Mindszenty.¹² The members of the student organisation lived according to rules similar to those of an ashram or a kibbutz community, sharing all financial sources they managed to obtain. For instance, the student community, which had about 15–20 members, rented a house in the suburb of Leuven, more precisely on the Capucijnenvoer, no. 252, until 1951. They paid the rent first of all from the scholarships that a few of them received. Since the house was far from the city centre, they decided to move closer to the university and the city centre. As a result, they found a house in the neighbourhood of the main library (Blijde–Inkomststraat, no. 18). The community was led by different clergymen, such as Dominican, Franciscan, and Jesuit priests who left Hungary before the revolution. Jesuits were in a particularly difficult situation in Hungary since as a reaction to their clear refusal to cooperate with the communist regime, their novitiate in Szeged was closed in the autumn of 1948 and gradually, all their activities were forbidden. As a consequence, the elderly members of the province – in fact, those who were not imprisoned – started to help the emigration of those young Jesuits who were still in the process of their for-

⁹ On this topic, see István Muzslay, *Magyar diákok a Leuveni Katolikus Egyetemen: 1532–2000* (Budapest: Márton Áron, 2000). See also Éva Mária Fülöp, "Hungarian Students at Leuven (Catholic) University 1425– (1532)–1914," in *Universitas Budensis 1395–1995: International Conference for the History of Universities on the Occasion of the 600th Anniversary of the Foundation of the University of Buda*, ed. László Szögi (Budapest: Archiv der Loránd Eötvös Universität, 1997), 277–286.

¹⁰ For an outstanding account on the topic, see Vera Hajto, *Milk Sauce and Paprika: Migration, Childhood and Memories of the Interwar Belgian–Hungarian Child Relief Project* (Leuven: University Press, 2016).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 112–113.

¹² István, *Magyar diákok*, 16.

mation.¹³ This was also the motivation for the young Jesuit, István Muzsly and many others who were secretly leaving Hungary already from the early 1950s. Muzsly left the country in 1952 and went to the Netherlands to pursue his studies at the University of Nijmegen. Since in Eindhoven, near Leuven, there was a Jesuit centre and formation house, Muzsly moved to Leuven in 1954. Almost immediately upon his arrival, he was elected the head of the Hungarian students.¹⁴ During the revolution, the members of the Hungarian community followed the radio news day and night. Muzsly formulated a desperate call on the Belgian radio and television in the Netherlands to the western countries to protest against the invasion by the Soviet army. Since none of the Western countries showed reactions of support, there was no other task than to assist the refugees.

Of note, fellow students, the Catholic Church, and especially the Caritas Catholica in Belgium were helping these refugee students. First of all, the students of KU Leuven took their side exemplarily. In the days of the revolution, they organised protests both in Leuven and Brussels. Upon the request of the rector, on the 28th of October, a mass for the casualties of the revolution was celebrated in Leuven, attended by residents from all parts of the city. In the following days, as the events were going from bad to worse, the student protests escalated swiftly, and Belgian police had to intervene to prevent students from breaking into the Soviet Embassy in Brussels. As the Soviet troops invaded Hungary and refugees started to arrive in Leuven, local students organised different programs to give them a warm welcome. The knowledge of the language also played an important role at that point as in every society. Since the Catholic University of Leuven was bilingual until 1968, Hungarian refugee students had two possibilities, as they could study either in French or Dutch. Because there were only a few Hungarian–Dutch dictionaries and grammar handbooks at that time, the majority of the refugee students started their studies in French. To support students who tried to learn Dutch and pursue their studies among Flemish students, Father Muzsly with a couple of devoted Flemish friends set up a Hungarian–Dutch pocket dictionary.¹⁵

¹³ For a thorough account on the topic, see Ferenc Szabó, *Jésuites hongrois sous le pouvoir communiste*, trans. Thierry Monfils (Paris–Bruxelles: Éditions Jésuites, 2012).

¹⁴ Without the outbreak of the Hungarian revolution, his life might have continued in Indonesia at the University of Jakarta. Several Belgian Jesuits were serving there as professors and since Muzsly studied applied economics, a place was prepared for him too as future professor. The events on the autumn of 1956 have, nevertheless, totally changed these plans. See István Csonta, “Egy magyar sziget Nyugaton: A leuveni Mindszenty–kollégium megalapítása,” in *Muzsly István munkássága*, Szent Ignác Jezsuita Szakkollégium (Budapest: Magvető, 2017), 120–121.

¹⁵ *Hongaars–nederlands en nederlands–hongaars woordenboek* (Leuven: Hulp aan de hongarse jeugd in ballingschap, 1957).

Refugees, upon their arrival to Belgium, first settled in one of the five refugee camps of the country: Spa, Verviers, Tongeren, Saives or Seilles.¹⁶ The first main goal was to find a job for those over 18 years. Inability to speak western languages, unfortunately, made the situation hard because after WW II, and especially after the communist takeover, only a few Hungarian schools had the privilege to teach one of the major western languages, i.e., French, English, or German. It should also be considered that four of the five refugee camps already mentioned were in the French-speaking parts of Belgium and only Tongeren was in the Flemish region. In these circumstances, the knowledge of German helped only those who arrived in Tongeren. French would have been a real advantage but there were not many refugees who were fluent in it, which is why manual labour was the only solution for the majority. The coal mines in the Charleroi basin and in Limburg were welcoming all those refugees who arrived in Belgium after WW II and wanted to work,¹⁷ therefore many Hungarians stayed there. As it turned out that companies recruit mine workers among the refugees, Muzslay tried to convince the authorities to let the young come to Leuven to pursue their studies at the KU Leuven even if they have already signed a work contract.¹⁸

Institutions helping reintegration

The period from November to December of 1956 was increasingly intensive for the Hungarian student community in Leuven. Muzslay was sending students from the community to refugee camps to help the Belgian authorities by translating for the newly arrived Hungarians. In this way, Muzslay tried to estimate the number of young refugees who were willing to continue their studies. Therefore, with the help of the local Hungarian students, Muzslay had a clear picture of eligible future students. Having this information at hand, Muzslay went to the rector of the KU Leuven to request his support. First of all, he asked for shelter for the refugees because the house that served as the home of the community of 15–20 Hungarian students, could not accommodate hundreds of

¹⁶ Laurent Waelkens, “Hungarian Students in Leuven in 1956,” KU Leuven, 2016, 3, <https://lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/512746>.

¹⁷ Though the time span of the article does not include the Hungarian refugees of the 1956 revolution, it gives an outstanding example of the challenges refugee workers faced: Frank Caestecker and Lieselotte Luyckx, “Hoe de Belgische mijnindustrie een nieuw thuis aan vluchtelingen–mijnwerkers aanbood (1947–1951),” *Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire* 97, no. 4 (2019): 1310–1315.

¹⁸ Interview with Muzslay István SJ conducted by the student community of the Collegium Hungaricum, Leuven, 22 April 2005.

refugees.¹⁹ Msgr Honoré van Wayenbergh, the rector of the KU Leuven in response to Muzslay's request, lent the *Collegium Falconis*, an old building used as a military hospital since the Napoleonic era, to be used for that purpose.²⁰ The refugee students renovated the rooms in the building before they moved in. The College they received from the rector was, nevertheless, much more than a simple place to stay: it was a dining and meeting place, a cultural centre, and for many, a fragment of home.

In a letter sent to the rector on 8 December 1956, Muzslay reported that there were already 63 students in Leuven. Their number would reach 110 by the summer of 1957. There were 164 Hungarian students registered for the academic year 1957–58 at KU Leuven.²¹ It is important to mention that not all the students found accommodation in the College – many of them were hosted by local families in the town and the villages nearby. Not only the rector but also the entire society was helping. In this regard, there are some prominent Belgians that should be mentioned, such as Pieter van Gestel, professor of law at the KU Leuven, Msgr Jozef Cardijn, the diocesan priest, founder and leader of the Young Christian Workers movement, or Msgr Gérard Philips, professor of theology and senator of the Belgian parliament. They, and many others, were actively involved in safeguarding refugee students. The name of Nathalie Fineau, adjunct secretary of Caritas Catholica in Belgium, also has to be mentioned. As a member of a noble family, she made a considerable contribution not only during the first period of the revolution by going personally to Hungary with the collected donations but she was also a sponsor of the later projects of Father Muzslay. And there were many such projects. First of all, when in October 1960 the KU Leuven asked Muzslay for the restitution of the *Collegium Falconis*, Hungarian students needed to find another secure place to move into. For this purpose, with the financial contribution of Fineau and other generous donors, Muzslay bought a house on the Blijde–Inkomststraat that he was renting before. At the beginning of the 1970s, he extended the house with a new wing in which he built not only new student rooms but also a new kitchen, chapel, and conference room. With her many contributions, Fineau deserved the title of the greatest benefactor of Hungarian refugees.²²

¹⁹ Archief van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, Leuven, 1956, box III, folder 4, Archives Kadoc – Archive of the Home Card. Mindszenty–Colegium Hungaricum Lovaniense.

²⁰ For a good summary of the history of the college, see Laurent Waelkens, Fred Stevens, and Joris Snaet, *The History of Leuven's Faculty of Law* (Brugge: die Keure, 2014).

²¹ István, *Magyar diákok*, 23.

²² This title was given to her by the Hungarian refugees, as commemorated by a marble plaque inside the building of the Brussels Hungarian House at the Rue de L'arbre Bénit, 123 in Ixelles.

Conclusion

The revolution of 1956 was a tragic event for Hungary not only because the Soviet army invaded the country and suppressed the revolution causing thousands of casualties but also because the events launched a new wave of refugees who left the country just a decade later than the refugees of WW II. Among Hungarians that fled to Belgium, there were many university students who would try to continue their studies in their new homeland. This would not have been possible without the invaluable help of the young Jesuit, István Muzslay and the Hungarian student community who were systematically building up a network of donors to facilitate the studies of the refugees of 1956. The Catholic University of Leuven as a whole, its rector, professors and students also held a prominent place in helping refugee students. The Belgian Caritas Catholica and its adjunct secretary, Nathalie Fineau, made a substantial contribution to meeting the needs of those students. The fact that Belgian society benefitted from accepting the Hungarian refugees of 1956 is unquestionable since numerous professors, medical doctors, engineers, and specialists in many fields, all rewarded their new country with their remarkable scientific careers after graduating. It turned out to be a win-win situation, but with their welcoming attitude, Belgians gave new hope and, consequently, also new life to an entire generation of Hungarians.

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The Efforts of the KGB to Use the Emigree Organisation Santara-Šviesa to Maintain Contact with Occupied Lithuania¹

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Abstract: Legitimacy at the international level was important for the Soviet occupation regime in Lithuania and they also wanted to achieve it with the help of the emigrants. Cultural relations were dilemma question for soviets and emigration. Culture had to attract emigrants to their side, to distract from resistance activities, to set emigrants against each other and thus to undermine all Lithuanian liberation activities. However, emigrants were seen as a danger due to the possible influence on the locals, but at the same time they were considered an opportunity to achieve political and propaganda goals. Also it influenced negatively relationship with other emigree organizations, but KGB could not make damage to their relationship remarkably. This publication reveals how and by what means Soviet security sought to use the plans of the liberal emigrants to establish personal and cultural relations with Soviet Lithuania for propaganda, agency, and political purposes of the Soviet regime. It is also important to evaluate whether the KGB has achieved its goals. Official cultural contacts were under full control of the soviet side. They were a cover for the KGB agency and propaganda activities. Despite huge efforts soviet security only partially managed to take advantage of closer contacts between emigrants and Lithuania. It can be said that emigrants only partially knew and evaluated the capabilities and methods of the KGB. They did not know how widely the KGB sought to use these connections to harm emigrants. It is believed that personal contacts were safer for emigrants' organizations. Perhaps the KGB was most fortunate to use these contacts while performing discreditation and promoting the achievements of the soviet regime.

Keywords: KGB, émigré, agents, culture, propaganda

The culture was an important part of the implementation of Soviet propaganda. Cultural relations had to attract emigrants to their side, distract them from resistance activities, set them against each other and thus undermine all Lithuanian liberation activities. The intentions of the liberal part of expatriates to communicate with Soviet Lithuania both on personal and cultural levels created preconditions for the Soviet regime and the

¹ This topic is analysed by the author. See: Kristina Burinskaitė, "Face to Lithuania' role of the program in the activities of the KGB against 'Santara-Šviesa,'" *Genocide and Resistance* 27, no. 1 (2010): 106–123.

KGB to use this for their purposes. However, they were aware of emigrants' potential harm and, in principle, considered the emigrants a hostile force.

Legitimacy at the international level was necessary for Lithuania's Soviet occupation regime, and they also wanted to achieve it with the help of the emigrants. The most important goal of Lithuanian emigration was to raise the issue of the occupation of Lithuania on the international level and to deny the myth of voluntary accession to the USSR. Therefore, the position of the expatriates was undesirable and undermined the plans of the Soviet government. The emigrants were the enemy of the Soviet regime throughout the Soviet occupation. This issue was also addressed by the USSR KGB. The activities carried out by the 1st (Intelligence) Division of the LSSR KGB also contributed to the implementation of the political tasks of the USSR and the goals of the USSR KGB in the West, and occupied an exceptional place among other units of the LSSR KGB.

Lithuanians, who fled to the West in the post-war period, did not recognise the Soviet occupation regime. Up to the 6th decade, there were no relations between Lithuanian expatriates and the occupied land due to the Iron Curtain, so the question of contact was irrelevant. However, during the 6th and 7th decades, as the Soviet system gradually opened, the emigrants faced a dilemma regarding relations with occupied Lithuania. There was some variance between the conservative part of the emigrants, who categorically spoke against any official ties, and the representatives of the liberal younger generation of emigrants, who called for closer relations, not limited to personal contacts, with Lithuanians in the occupied country. According to them, cultural ties had to help expatriates get to know Lithuania better and encourage Lithuanians to engage in resistance activities in Lithuania. Different approaches brought some friction to the relations between the emigrants. For the Soviet regime, the strained relationship with the West was also a dilemma. Expatriates were seen as a danger due to the potential influence on the locals, but at the same time, they were considered an opportunity to achieve political and propaganda goals. Although the Communist Party of Lithuania (hereinafter the LCP) regarded all resistance emigrants' organisations as hostile, it wanted to use these opening relations to establish cultural ties and encourage expatriates to form a closer relationship with Soviet Lithuania, thus seeking a certain legitimacy to the end of the isolation. Since the position of the emigrants caused friction between the organisations, which did not last long, the KGB sought to add further discord and division between the emigrants and thus undermine Lithuania's liberation activities. The KGB also wanted to exploit cultural and personal connections to carry out propaganda and recruitment actions.

This publication aims to reveal how and by what means Soviet security attempted to use the plans of the liberal emigrants to establish personal and cultural relations with Soviet Lithuania for propaganda, agency and political purposes of the Soviet regime. It is also important to note whether the KGB has achieved its goals.

The relevance and originality of the topic

The theme of Lithuanian emigrants, in the context of other historical themes concerning the second half of the 20th century, receives a lot of attention from historians. A lot of discussions were sparked by the position of the emigration organisation Santara–Šviesa towards Soviet Lithuania. Did it damage Lithuania's liberation activities, or was it a cunning tactic? To what extent was it vulnerable to the KGB's intentions? Thus, the chosen topic is yet another opportunity to reveal the ideological attitude of the KGB towards the organisation of emigrants considered hostile, including the goals and forms of Soviet propaganda, which could be very subtle, and how the KGB harmed, but at the same time, wanted to use a certain part of the expatriates for its purposes. This article, as opposed to others, pays more attention to the agent activity and shows how close, according to KGB documents, it was to this organisation. Also, new KGB documents reveal its policy and actions from different perspectives because this article focuses not only on the cultural aspect, but also on tourism as a way to implement various KGB propaganda tasks. New documents show that the attitude of this organisation towards Lithuania made the country more vulnerable to the KGB's intentions and recruitments.

The KGB's objectives and forms of activity against the emigration

The objectives and principles of the KGB operation. In the fight against the emigrants, the KGB did not have the same opportunities and resources as the resistance fighters in Lithuania. Therefore, the agency's activities and discrediting, often carried out by agents, were used against the expatriates during the entire period of the Soviet occupation. During the detente period, this was done more intensively and in a more organised fashion because there were more opportunities to develop propaganda activities in the West. These means were employed to divide emigrants among themselves, discredit the activists and their events, and discredit and compromise the liberation movement of Lithuania in the eyes of the international community.

The KGB's fight against resisters and emigrants can also be seen in the context of soviet propaganda and indoctrination. The KGB's contribution to soviet propaganda actions was the application of methods, which in historiography are called "active measures", both by disseminating ideas suitable for the soviet system and discrediting people and organisations hindering the implementation of these plans.

The KGB's actions against emigration organisations were influenced not only by political and ideological goals but also by the situation in the emigration: the nature of the

activities of organisations, historical circumstances (people, who operated in Lithuania during the German occupation and later emigrated to the West, were an excellent target for the KGB's discrediting actions), the relations with Soviet Lithuania. The KGB focused on the VLIK (Supreme Committee for the Liberation of Lithuania), which claimed to lead Lithuania's liberation activities. However, its reticence limited the KGB's ability to carry out recruitment actions or infiltrate it; thus, various acts of discrediting were carried out against it. Another target was Santara–Šviesa. The KGB believed that Santara–Šviesa transferred the “ideological diversion” to Lithuania, supposedly taking care of the Lithuanian nation, but it was hostile towards Soviet Lithuania.² This organisation is a gathering of liberal thinking young generation emigree established in 1957 in the USA. It is unique because it did not have a formal structure or leadership and was not attached to one political ideology. This informality was an obstacle of sorts for the KGB because they did not know its true numbers or leaders, making it harder to plan actions against it. Members of other organisations could be part of Santara–Šviesa. Their position and various attitudes were represented in their magazines *Akiračiai* and *Metmenys*. Even interviews with soviet Lithuanians could be published there. It differed from other more conservative organisations due to its declared idea to maintain relations with Lithuania and the potentially “negative” impact on Lithuanians residing in Lithuania through cultural contacts. This position led to conflict with more conservative organisations that KGB wanted to use to harm the Lithuanian freedom movement.

Why did the KGB target Santara–Šviesa?

The emigrants' activities were seen as an expression of ideological confrontation between the East and the West. Lithuanian expatriates were treated as agents of Western countries and implementers of their policies. In the KGB textbook for chekists, the threat of Santara–Šviesa is explained as follows: “The masked anti-communist activity of Santara–Šviesa is dangerous because it is based on a Marxist–Leninist revision, covered with pseudo-socialist slogans”. However, all the anti-sovietism of the federation leaders is revealed in their statements that “they do not raise a direct task to fight against the Soviet government, because it is doomed to inevitable failure”.³ In the opinion of the LCP, the United States, like the entire Western world, tried to transfer ideological diversion inside

² Plan of KGB measures against emigree organisation Santara–Šviesa in 1972–1974, 1972–08–14, K–41, ap. 1, b. 689, l. 264–265, Structural unit LSSR (NKVD, KGB), Lithuanian Special Archives (LYA), Vilnius.

³ Henrikas Vaigauskas, “Lietuvių nacionalistų kenkėjiška veikla ir kova su ja,” *LTSR KGB Specbiblioteka* 1245, 1986: 11.

the USSR (to have negative ideological and political influence through the support and promotion of resistance forces and thus raise the USSR). At the same time, the desire of Santara–Šviesa to establish relations with Lithuania was viewed as an intention to have ideologically harmful influence⁴ and be hostile towards Soviet Lithuania.⁵ Such an ambivalent position of this organisation complicated the operation of Soviet propaganda against Santara–Šviesa.

Despite such a negative attitude to this emigration organisation, the KGB saw the organisation's position regarding relations with Lithuania as an opportunity to implement its tasks. The Soviet regime sought to exploit tourism and culture for propaganda purposes. Thus, culture was leveraged to maintain relationships with the emigrants, as the propaganda and political motivations are not so blatant there and therefore less likely to provoke resistance and hostility. According to the government and the KGB, involving some expatriates in cultural relations was easier because politics was less important to them than art⁶ and thus encouraged them to form closer ties with Soviet Lithuania.

The tourist, cultural trips of expatriates, excursions to Lithuania or Lithuanian trips abroad were the medium for both dissemination of information about the progress of Soviet Lithuania in various fields and thus encouragement for closer cooperation and distancing from resistance activities. They had to refute the myth spread by emigrants that Lithuanians should not travel to the West and freely communicate with foreigners.⁷ The KGB also solved its problems, i.e. recruiting expatriates, which was easier when they arrived in Lithuania, as shown in the KGB documents.

Culture became a bridge between Lithuanians residing in Lithuania and the emigration. The trips of Lithuanian artists to the USA were a great medium to show the achievements of Lithuanian culture, establish relations between artists and provide an excellent opportunity for propaganda messages. Artists did not travel alone; they were accompanied by officials, agents and undercover staff. They were used for propaganda purposes. For example, in 1985, Lithuanian writers and other artists travelled to the USA at the invitation of Santara–Šviesa. They participated in the congress and literary events. The KGB evaluated their participation as a success because there were no anti-Soviet statements due to their involvement in said congress. And during the literary events, Lithuanians talked about Lithuania's achievements. However, this trip received mixed

⁴ Report about Lithuanian SSR KGB activity in 1969, K-51, ap. 1, b. 372, l. 34, LSSR NKVD (NKGB, MGB, KGB) Secretariat Fund, LYA.

⁵ Plan of KGB measures against emigree organisation Santara–Šviesa, Structural unit LSSR (NKVD, KGB).

⁶ Arūnas Streikus, "Sovietų valdžios darbas su išsivija": manipuliacijos kultūriniais ryšiais," *Naujasis Židinys – Aidai*, no. 4–5 (2006): 166.

⁷ KGB article Santara–Šviesa and others, 1986–10–01, f. K-35, ap. 2, b. 323, l. 67, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

reception and criticism. Some articles accused Santara–Šviesa of collaborating, betraying the ideas of the struggle for independence and dividing the emigrants.⁸ During the trip, the artists were accompanied by a reliable emigrant source of the KGB “Mark”.⁹ Agent “Algirdas” also recorded that the concerts of opera soloists Virgilijus Noreika and Nijolė Ambrazaitytė in the USA in 1986 provoked a violent reaction among the expatriates.¹⁰ Seeing such a reaction, the KGB continued to create division among the emigrants to discredit “reactionary” ones. This way, the communist government and the KGB exploited famous artists and public figures, who supposedly did not know what propaganda games they were involved in and sought to divide the emigration organisations and distract the younger generation of the expatriates from political resistance activities.

Tourist trips: from recruitment opportunities to propaganda campaigns. The KGB controlled all contacts with foreign countries. Therefore, the chance to leave or come to Lithuania was a great incentive to force a person to cooperate with the KGB or establish contacts between agents and emigrants. In many cases, expatriates were recruited upon their arrival in Lithuania.

For example, one of the plans of the agency’s operational measures against Santara–Šviesa recorded that a relative of the KGB agent is an active figure of Santara–Šviesa and is close to its leaders. The KGB wanted to invite him to Lithuania through this agent and introduce him to a supposedly existing group that allegedly supported the Santara–Šviesa cause. After the success of this plan, the KGB sought to get closer to the organisation’s leaders.¹¹ Agent “Kalvis” had to take advantage of the trip of Santara–Šviesa member Vytautas Vepštas to Lithuania in 1978. The KGB prepared an action plan and a legend to help approach the necessary person. He had to present himself as a representative of a supposedly existing group of dissidents and ask him to hand over the documents of this organisation to Santara–Šviesa. Model conversations, how to behave and what to answer his questions were prepared. For example, if asked for the names of other members of this group, he would refuse to do so and justify doing so for conspiratorial reasons. If he did not want to communicate with him, Santara–Šviesa should offer another person for further communication.¹² This is how agent „Kalvis” was instructed to act. The KGB considered the operation successful because contacts were made. However, he refused

⁸ KGB report on visits of Lithuanian cultural figures to the USA, 1985–12–18, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 306, l. 30, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

⁹ *Ibid.*, l. 29.

¹⁰ Report of KGB agent „Algirdas”, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 306, l. 104, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

¹¹ Plan of KGB measures against emigre organisation Santara–Šviesa, l. 270–271, Structural unit LSSR (NKVD, KGB).

¹² KGB task for agent “Kalvis”, 1978–03–31, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 203, l. 44–45, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

to take the documents because he was afraid,¹³ so the question is whether it was really a successful action.

It is difficult to evaluate KGB recruitment actions because the agency's employees tended to overestimate their success or even fake them to boast before their leaders. Therefore, it is necessary to be careful while evaluating successful cases of expatriate recruitment since terms such as the agent or the source, which are found in documents, do not necessarily mean that the person was recruited. In most cases, it is believed that informal contacts were maintained without a written pledge, which facilitated the establishment of a relationship. However, there were also cases when a person might not have known that they were being recruited or that the KGB treated them as an agent, but the person was not one. This happened to Violeta Kelertas, a researcher at the University of Illinois. The KGB operative, who worked under the pseudonym "Tėviškė", named her as a person with whom trust-based contacts were established. They agreed that she would send information about Santara–Šviesa events to the given address. However, she cut off contact when she discovered its actual purpose.¹⁴ Thus, although a connection was established, she was not trusted because she was tracked and discriminating information was collected. This is a common practice when communicating with agents.

Not only was the recruitment of emigrant agents important, but also the activities of Lithuanian agents among the expatriates in the West. They were tasked with establishing contacts with people associated with emigration organisations or those from their environment. The main purpose of the KGB was to collect information about the organisation, members and events so that they could be neutralised and discredited. Such information could be obtained by recruiting a person and talking to them without mentioning working for the KGB.

For example, some undercover collaborators were lucky enough to attend the annual Santara–Šviesa congress in Tabor Farm (USA). The agent, who participated in the 1981 event, provided information about people who attended the congress, where prominent participants delivered speeches.¹⁵ Agent "Dekan" was not present at the congress but received information from participants and the press whose speakers were in favour of closer ties with the intelligentsia in Lithuania.¹⁶ The expatriates declared that they suspected persons connected to the KGB but hardly knew all of them. Participation in the congresses of Santara–Šviesa was an excellent opportunity to make acquaintances and

¹³ Letter of LSSR KGB to USSR KGB about agent "Kalvis" actions against emigree Vytautas Vepštas, 1978–04–24, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 203, l. 53, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

¹⁴ Arvydas Anušauskas, *KGB. Visiškai slaptai* (Vilnius: Versus aureus, 2015), 149–150.

¹⁵ KGB agent report, 1981–11–19, f. K–35, b. 302, l. 171–182, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

¹⁶ KGB report on information received from agent "Dekan" during his visit to Lithuania, f. K–35, b. 309, l. 117–119, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

collect information about their plans and disagreements between emigration organisations to escalate them further.

The tourist trips of expatriates to Lithuania were used as another means of propaganda. They had to refute the negative information about the Soviet system disseminated by the expatriates and increase the number of its supporters. The Soviet government and the KGB wanted famous emigrants with significant influence on the expatriates' community to visit Lithuania. They were especially open to trips by the press. However, it prevented or even forbade fierce critics of the Soviet regime from coming to Lithuania. For example, Zenonas Rekašius and Romas Sakadolskis, expatriates associated with Santara–Šviesa, were not welcome in Lithuania for some time because of their anti-Soviet statements. The expatriates, knowing such cases, would think about what they say about Soviet Lithuania, which is what the Soviets wanted so that there would be as few anti-Soviet statements as possible. However, emigrants and artists, who were not actively involved in resistance activities, were deemed “harmless”, so they had more opportunities to visit Lithuania. However, the KGB was also aware of the threat posed by their trips. The arrival of expatriates was a great opportunity to exchange illegal literature, information and self-indulgence. Therefore, although emigrants were welcome in Lithuania, they were monitored throughout their stay.

The KGB documents clearly show how important it was for them to “lure” famous expatriates to come to Lithuania. The KGB wanted to take advantage of the relatives, friends and acquaintances who lived in Lithuania and encourage the expatriates to go to Lithuania through them. The trips of tourists from the West and especially famous emigrants were specially prepared: various agency, operational and propaganda plans were developed. Soviet security sought to reveal their views and attitudes towards Soviet Lithuania, which determined whether they would be able to come. They had to be tracked throughout the trip (the KGB was particularly interested in potential meetings with “anti-Soviet elements” or the dissemination of literature, what they were talking about and with whom they were communicating). But this did not always work out, especially if trips were personal. The KGB associated certain goals with more famous expatriates, which depended on the person's tendency to communicate their attitude towards the Soviet system with Lithuanians. Recruitment, discrediting or exploiting in propaganda campaigns were the most important tasks of the KGB in relation to every famous expatriate who came to Lithuania.

Father and son, Karolis and Mykolas Drunga came to the attention of the KGB due to their authority among emigrants and their activities. M. Drunga was noticed because of his activities in Santara–Šviesa, his work with *Metmenys* and *Akivačiai* and favourable statements about relations with Soviet Lithuania. In 1987, he and other expatriates planned to come to Lithuania. While preparing for his trip, information about him was

collected. The source, “Mark”, provided information about M. Drunga activities in emigration and contacts with Lithuanians. KGB units in various cities watched him closely when he visited different Lithuanian cities.¹⁷ During his trip, a journalist, who was an agent of influence, was assigned the task of showing the achievements of the Soviet system with specific examples. It was not only during this trip that information about him was collected. Secret collaborators continued to gather information about his family, contacts, attitude to soviet reality and achievements.¹⁸ Agent “Kalytis”, who had been in contact with M. Drunga during his trips to the USA, provided information about them and their opinion about Lithuania in his agency report.¹⁹ The Soviet government was very keen to get favourable feedback and articles about Soviet Lithuania from famous emigrants. Since M. Drunga worked in publishing, they wanted to get an interview with him. The KGB had such plans towards M. Drunga: “If it is not possible to use him in operational actions, at least he will be used in propaganda campaigns, by subduing him to speak to the Soviet press. If this fails, his presence in Lithuania is undesirable.”²⁰

Valdas Adamkus, one of Santara–Šviesa leaders, remembers his trip to Lithuania in 1972 as follows: he was welcomed at the airport by them and then taken to the hotel by their car, not by relatives. He was arrested on the way from Trakai because he was not allowed to go there.²¹

It can be said that the tourist trips of expatriates to Lithuania were vital for implementing the KGB operational plans. They were used to collect information about emigration organisations. When it was possible, emigrants were recruited as agents and provided an opportunity to visit Lithuania more often. However, not every expatriate was recruited. The propaganda effect of these trips was no less important. They had to show the achievements of the Soviet system and encourage further cooperation of expatriates with Lithuania, thus depoliticising, i.e. withdrawing political resistance activities.

The KGB wanted both to take advantage and harm the emigrant press. Both local and emigrant press played a special role in the propaganda plans of the Communist Party and the KGB. Like other mass media, it was a potent tool for shaping public opinion of one kind or another. Expatriates used the press to actualise the issue of the occupation of the Baltic States and to form a favourable view of the international community and receive

¹⁷ KGB plan against tourists from the USA, 1987–05–15, K–35, ap. 2, b. 323, l. 124, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

¹⁸ Report of KGB agent “Kazys”, 1987–06–09, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 72, l. 33–35, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

¹⁹ Report of KGB agent “Kalytis”, 1987–10–03, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 72, l. 39–40, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

²⁰ Plan of KGB means against Mykolas Drunga during his trip to Lithuania, 1987–05–21, f. K–35, ap. 2, b. 72, l. 30, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

²¹ Valdas Adamkus, *Likimo vardas – Lietuva* (Kaunas: Santara, 1998), 120–129.

its support in the fight for Lithuania's freedom. However, the KGB utilised the press to harm emigrants by discrediting the main emigration organisations, their activists and, finally, all Lithuanian liberation activities. They also looked for opportunities to publish articles in emigration publications favourable to the USSR. To do so, it was necessary to have access to these publications. The KGB closely monitored publishers and collaborators of emigration magazines and gathered information about them. For example, how much and what information was reprinted from illegal Lithuanian press brought from Lithuania. When collecting such information, the KGB was looking for chances to access, infiltrate, influence and control them. They often used advanced, i.e. pro-Soviet, emigration newspapers published in the United States. The fact that the publications attributed to Santara-Šviesa, such as *Akiračiai*, attracted increased attention from the KGB indicates that people related to these publications, such as Zenonas Rekašius, Liūtas Mockūnas, Tomas Remeikis, were monitored in operational cases or otherwise. This press publication declared that it wanted to receive official information from Lithuania but also sought to provide alternating information so that the reader could compare it and draw conclusions. The newspaper *Akiračiai* certainly showed a lot of information about Soviet Lithuania, which, in Mockūnas' opinion, tried to present an objective picture of Lithuania.²² Of course, such articles were not considered propaganda, but it was not excluded that such pieces may have misled the expatriates of the younger generation. Thus, the KGB wanted to use the emigrants' desire to know as much as possible about Lithuania from first-hand sources. But they, i.e. the Soviet side, understood the notion of objective information somewhat differently: "to them (*Akiračiai* – author's note) objective, i.e. *useful to us information* (highlighted by the author) must be placed, which was supposed to prevent the ideological diversion of the members of Santara in the country".²³ Information from Lithuania published in the emigration press was evaluated ambiguously by expatriates. For example, *Laisvoji Lietuva* criticised *Akiračiai* for an interview with P. Anilionis, Commissioner of the Council for Religious Affairs of the LSSR.²⁴ This institution, together with the Communist Party and the KGB, was involved in persecuting the Catholic Church and spreading anti-religious propaganda in Lithuania. Although it cannot be said that *Akiračiai* contained only favourable articles about the Soviet system, there was also a lot of criticism in them. Information is a very powerful weapon, and it is crucial for what purposes it is used. Emigrants' desire to know as many primary sources as possible from Lithuania, which were carefully filtered by Soviet censorship, could have been manipulated to be used for Soviet propaganda.

²² Liūtas Mockūnas, "Lietuvių išėivijos ir krašto santykių dinamika," *Baltų forumas* 2, no. 1 (1985): 56.

²³ KGB article Santara-Šviesa and others, l. 62, LSSR KGB 1st (Intelligence) Division Fund, LYA.

²⁴ Marijus Blynas, "Pasitarnavo sovietų politikai (Apie religiją ir bažnyčią Lietuvoje)," *Laisvoji Lietuva*, August 21, 1980, 3.

The evaluation of the KGB activities and their consequences for emigrants

The documents of the KGB perfectly reveal that the Soviet regime endeavoured to use the intensified contacts not only to improve its image but also to undermine emigrants and liberation activities in Lithuania. The KGB paid more attention to Santara–Šviesa and their programme “Facing Lithuania” (“Veidu į Lietuvą”) because they saw an excellent opportunity to carry out activities against expatriates freely. The KGB turned to the young generation of expatriates because they were not afraid of Soviet security as the older generation, who fled Soviet repressions in the post-war period.²⁵ It is not easy to assess the effectiveness of propaganda, discrediting and agency actions of the Soviet government and the KGB while using “Facing Lithuania”, but the KGB documents, the emigrant press and memoirs allow us to draw certain conclusions.

Official cultural contacts were under complete control of the Soviet side. They were a cover for the KGB and propaganda activities. Of course, these contacts opened new areas of activity for emigrants. Under the disguise of these official relations, expatriates tried to import literature and press illegally, but they did not always succeed. Considerations of former emigree R. Sakadolskis show that they realised the dangers of such activities, possible sanctions and security risks but still attempted to cross those boundaries. The expatriates solved the dilemma. They knew that they must pay some tribute to the authorities and that security agents would supervise them. Romas Sakadolskis admits that there was a threat and danger in these contacts, but these inconveniences were compensated by communication with compatriots.²⁶

It can be said that Soviet security only partially managed to take advantage of closer ties between expatriates and Lithuania. The reviews in the emigration press about the trips of Lithuanian artists to the USA at the invitation of Santara brought suspicion and friction between individual organisations of expatriates representing different generations. Valdas Adamkus remembers that Santara–Šviesa “was called the maid of the Bolsheviks” and was accused of being “seriously ill, infected with the bacillus of communism”.²⁷ Conservative magazine *Dirva* evaluated Santara’s activities harshly: “The federation’s collaboration with agents of occupants neither honours them nor shows their wisdom”.²⁸ The KGB continued only to promote such a negative opinion about this organisation. However, this confrontation was not so great and decisive as finally dividing the emigrants, as the KGB admitted.²⁹

²⁵ Kazys Almenas, “Šiek tiek apie agentus ir jų verbuotojus”, *Akivačiai*, 6/7, 2008, 6, 16.

²⁶ Kristina Burinskaitė, interview by Romas Sakadolskis, December 2, 2009.

²⁷ Adamkus, *Likimo vardas – Lietuva*, 73–74.

²⁸ “Santariečiai ir svečiai iš okupuotos Lietuvos”, *Dirva*, September 26, 1985.

²⁹ Plan of KGB measures against emigree organisation Santara–Šviesa, 1970–03–05, f. K–41, ap. 1, b. 674, l. 66, Structural unit FLSSR (NKVD, KGB), LYA.

Feedback from expatriates about trips to Lithuania shows that the propaganda effect of travel was not very significant.³⁰ Romas Sakadolskis also doubts the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. People came to Lithuania with a preconceived position about the Soviet system, and participating in various events was a kind of obligation. After all, if you openly refused to participate, you might not be allowed to enter Lithuania next time.³¹ Although it cannot be excluded that there were absolutely no individuals on whom Soviet propaganda would not make any impression. Favourable statements by expatriates in the Soviet and emigrant press about visits to Lithuania can be interpreted differently. Their articles in the Soviet press could only be a gesture of courtesy to have a chance for future trips to Lithuania. However, idyllic-looking publications from Lithuania in the emigration press may have misled emigrants. Of course, not all “honour” is due to Soviet security. Some articles by expatriates indicate that their authors behaved somewhat irresponsibly, frivolously and short-sightedly. The KGB was not omnipotent, but such careless activities created another opportunity, though a small one, to undermine Lithuania’s liberation activities.

It is difficult to say to what extent the security managed to use these connections to recruit and infiltrate agents. Opening contacts was a very favourable medium for the operations of agents and recruitment in emigration. The opportunity to travel abroad was often a considerable motivation for recruitment, which could be tempting to Lithuanians residing in Lithuania and expatriates. The KGB documents reveal that tourism was the most important medium for recruitment. However, organising and carrying out agency activities was much more difficult among emigrants, who were against official contacts. Santara-Šviesa made itself a little more vulnerable than other organisations and advocated only personal connections.

In conclusion, it can be said that emigrants only partially knew and evaluated the capabilities and methods of the KGB. They did not know how widely the KGB sought to use these connections to harm emigrants. It is believed that personal contacts were safer for emigration organisations. Perhaps the KGB was most fortunate to use these contacts while discrediting certain individuals and organisations and promoting the achievements of the Soviet regime.

Conclusions

Legitimacy at the international level was important for the Soviet occupation regime, which wanted to achieve it with the help of cultural relations with expatriates. Various

³⁰ Vytautas Gedrimas, “Gimtasis kraštas ir bumeranginė propaganda,” *Akiračiai*, 1, 1986, 3.

³¹ Burinskaitė, interview by Romas Sakadolskis.

institutions and tools were employed to achieve these objectives. Soviet security, by implementing operational and agency measures, performed the political and ideological tasks of the party. All emigration organisations, except the pro–communist ones, were considered hostile. However, the liberal emigrants intended to communicate with Soviet Lithuania not only on a personal but also cultural level. These ties, despite all threats, were seen by the Soviet regime as a great opportunity to use for propaganda purposes, whereas travels to Lithuania were an excellent recruitment opportunity. Moreover, an equally important goal was to undermine the emigrant activities of liberation by destroying their unity and distracting young people from political resistance. It is difficult to assess the damage caused by the KGB's efforts to exploit these connections and the position of expatriates. The KGB was prone to overestimate its success stories. Although expatriates seemed to understand the threat and for noble goals, they admitted that they had paid some tribute to the regime. The KGB documents show that such a position of expatriates made them more vulnerable and caused even more disagreements among emigrants in addition to those they already had.

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Exotic Diplomacy. Relations between the Polish Government–In–Exile and the Émigré Authorities of the Republic of the South Moluccas

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Abstract: This article is dedicated to the diplomatic relations between the Polish government–in–exile and the émigré authorities of the Republic of the South Moluccas. It presents the genesis of mutual contacts, their initiation, nature and course. The author discusses the level of joint initiatives and the importance of mutual communication for both emigrations.

Keywords: emigration, Polish government–in–exile, Republic of the South Moluccas, Republic of the South Maluku

On 18 December 1955, *Głos Powszechny*, a magazine that was an unofficial press body of the Polish government–in–exile in London, published a rather surprising announcement on its front page. The article stated that on 30 November 1955, a delegation of the South Moluccas, led by Minister E. A. Kayadoe, paid a visit to the official seat of the Polish government–in–exile. According to the head of the delegation’s statement, the reason for the visit was “the desire to establish bonds of friendship with the brave Polish nation, whose proud history is so remarkably similar to the history of the South Moluccas.” This declaration met with a courteous response from Aleksander Zawisza, the émigré Minister of Foreign Affairs.¹ It also initiated a mutual contact over several years between the two emigration centres, surprising due to the complete divergence of political interests. On the other hand, due to their “exoticism”, these relations are worth getting to know more closely.

The creation and short life of the South Moluccas are related to the process of decolonisation of the Dutch East Indies. After the war, the Netherlands was among those countries that did not want to give up easily having strategically and economically important colonies. The efforts of the Dutch authorities, which hindered the creation of an

¹ “Delegacja z Południowych Moluków,” *Głos Powszechny*, December 18, 1955.

independent Indonesia, included inspiring the secessionist actions of over two million ethnic Moluccans living in the Maluku Islands. With the support of the Netherlands, on 25 April 1950, the Moluccans announced the creation of the Republic of the South Moluccas (South Maluku), headed by President Johanis Manuhutu, soon replaced by Chris Soumokil. The republic, however, turned out to have a short political existence. In October 1950, Indonesian troops occupied Ambon, the capital of the state. Some of the Moluccans, headed by President Soumokil, took up the guerrilla fight.² More than 12,000 Moluccan soldiers and their families found refuge in the Netherlands. With time, the Moluccan authorities in exile also formed there, headed next by President Johan Alvarez Manusama after Soumokil's death. Initially, the government was represented by the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Republic of the South Moluccas abroad.³

For Polish emigrants, busy with their own affairs and the progressive Stalinisation of Poland, the disintegration of the Dutch colonial empire was of little interest. Although the Polish press sporadically reported on the events in Indonesia,⁴ these events had virtually no significance for the Polish émigré policy.⁵ It is not fully known in what circumstances the politicians of the South Moluccas established contact with representatives of the Polish government-in-exile. However, the first official document exchanged between both emigrant groups is known. In a letter of 14 February 1955, J. P. Nikijuluw, Plenipotentiary Representative of the Republic of the South Moluccas abroad, expressed in a highly courteous manner the hope of cooperation between the two emigrants and invited the representative of the President of the Republic of Poland to visit the Netherlands and participate in the 5th anniversary of the creation of the South Moluccas.⁶ Perhaps the initiative to establish cooperation came from some Dutch citizens supporting the independence of the South Moluccas while maintaining relations with Poles, for example, J. H. Ritzema Bos or Hendrik Pieter Coertzen de Kock.

However, it is not difficult to indicate the reasons why emigrants from Asia wanted contact with Poles. Several countries still recognised the Polish government-in-exile,⁷

² Soumokil himself was taken prisoner in 1962 and executed in 1966.

³ S-0681-0013-00010-00001: J.P. Nikijuluw, Republic South Moluccas, The UN Archives; Artur Patek, Jan Rydel, and Janusz Węc, *Najnowsza historia świata 1945-1995* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2003). To this day, about 45,000 Moluccans and their descendants live in the Netherlands. There are still émigré authorities (the current president in exile is John Wattilete). Currently, the emigration authorities of the South Moluccas focus on political activity, although in the 1970s, the emigration from the Moluccas was also active in the field of terrorism.

⁴ For example, an article in the *Orzeł Biały* weekly from 1951 critical of Sukarno's politics.

⁵ Stefan Rokita, "Wpływ Indonezji na stosunki w Holandii", *Orzeł Biały*, April 7, 1951.

⁶ Letter from J.P. Nikijuluw to A. Zaleski, February 14, 1955, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM).

⁷ In 1955, these were the Vatican, Spain, Ireland, Cuba and Lebanon.

and in many other countries the government maintained unofficial representations at a fairly high level.⁸ Emigration from Poland to the *European continent* was relatively numerous and well organised. There was still a discussion in the public space about the reconstruction of the Polish Armed Forces. In addition, a group of the highest–ranking Polish politicians and military had contacts in the political circles of Western countries. There was indeed a split among Polish emigrants in 1954. Many of the aforementioned assets were on the side of the so–called National Unification Camp, a centre competitive with the Polish government and the President of the Republic of Poland. Still, indeed, the politicians of the South Moluccas were not that well–versed in the internal situation of Polish emigration. Anyway, even taking into account that the centre with which they were trying to establish contact was of less importance and influence, the relations with Poles seemed potentially beneficial for the Moluccans.

The benefits that the Polish government–in–exile could gain from establishing contacts with the emigration of Moluccas are less apparent. The Polish government generally, relying on legalistic doctrine, avoided establishing official relations with refugee committees not recognised in the international arena. Such was the nature of the authorities of the South Moluccas, a state that never existed *de iure* and was not recognised by other states. In addition, there was the issue of the position of the South Moluccas at the periphery of Polish geopolitical interests.

The first reactions of the Polish authorities in exile were not enthusiastic. In a letter of 18 February 1955, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksander Zawisza, asked Stefan Łubieński, the Representative of the Government of the Republic of Poland in the Netherlands, to provide basic information on the nature of the Moluccan emigration and the attitude of the Dutch government towards it. The issue of sending Łubieński to the Republic of the South Moluccas anniversary celebrations depended on this.⁹ He also included his reservations in an official letter before the expected visit of the Moluccans to London. He wrote to B. Włodarczyk, intermediary in relations between emigrants:

In this letter to you, the representatives of the South Moluccas inform you that they have prepared a draft of some kind of agreement (treaty) between the two governments. Well, I kindly ask you to inform to whom it is appropriate that the Polish Government, in the current situation, has not concluded any international agreements and currently does not see the purpose of concluding such agreements. They cannot be clear and may not relate to any specific issues. The inadvertent preparation of such an act could jeopardise the seriousness of the ideas represented by the governments of enslaved nations.¹⁰

⁸ Krzysztof Tarka, *Emigracyjna dyplomacja. Polityka zagraniczna rządu RP na uchodźstwie 1945–1990* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza RYTM, 2003), 159–183.

⁹ Letter from A. Zawisza to S. Łubieński, February 18, 1955, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

¹⁰ Letter from A. Zawisza to B. Włodarczyk, no date, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

Ultimately, despite some reservations, the contact was established. Arguably, the sympathy of Polish refugees with the national liberation movements and sharing the grim fate of the refugee played an important role. Probably not without significance was also the fact that the emigration centre around the Polish government and the President of the Republic of Poland was going through a deep internal crisis. For this reason, every element of external recognition had a propaganda dimension. After short negotiations, the visit of the South Moluccas delegation to the London seat of the President of the Republic of Poland on 28–30 November 1955, mentioned in the introduction to this article, took place. The South Moluccas side was represented by a four–person delegation headed by Dr E.A. Kayadoe, representing the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Republic of the South Moluccas abroad, J.P. Nikijuluw. On 30 November, Prime Minister Antoni Pająk, accompanied by Minister Zawisza, received the delegation on behalf of sick President Zaleski. The three–day visit ended with the adoption of detailed arrangements. Among other things, the Delegation of the South Moluccas undertook to host Polish political refugees in the territory under its control and grant economic privileges to potential Polish settlers in the future. Mutually, the Polish side undertook to provide consular protection to the citizens of the South Moluccas residing in the countries with which the Polish government–in–exile maintains diplomatic relations. Both sides were also obliged to cooperate in the fight against communism.¹¹

The visit of the South Moluccas delegation was discussed in more detail at the meeting of the Government of the Republic of Poland on 7 December 1955. Minister Zawisza explained the issue of recognition by the Government of the Republic of South Moluccas. Zawisza informed that despite the fact that the delegation of the South Moluccas asked for *de iure* recognition, the government decided that such a form was not possible but proposed the exchange of declarations and mutual information campaign and consular assistance.¹² Stefan Talmon, an expert in international law, calls it “some unspecified recognition”. Oxford professor points out that this was the only form of recognition of the South Moluccas in the international arena.¹³

In the second half of the 1950s, the contacts between the Polish government–in–exile and the emigrants from the South Moluccas were quite intense. In February 1957, during a tournée of the capitals of several European countries, Minister of Foreign Affairs

¹¹ Visit of the South Moluccas delegation. Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 December 1955, A.44.49/27: The Polish Embassy to the Holy See, PISM; “Wizyta delegacji Południowych Moluków”, *Polska Agencja Telegraficzna*, December 21, 1955.

¹² Protocol No. 63 from the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, December 7, 1955, 2376/61: Files of Antoni Pająk, Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN).

¹³ Stefan Talmon, *Recognition of Governments in International Law With Particular Reference to Governments in Exile* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 305–306.

Aleksander Zawisza, at the invitation of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Republic of the South Moluccas abroad, also visited the seat of the Republic in Rotterdam, meeting with politicians from the South Moluccas and several parliamentarians from the Netherlands. Moreover, Zawisza visited a camp for refugees from the islands of Ambon, Buru, Seram and others.¹⁴ Museum Maluku in Utrecht retains a photo of this visit of the Polish minister in its collection.



Aleksander Zawisza, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish government–in–exile, visits the South Moluccas refugee camp. Third from left: Johan Alvarez Manusama, President of the Republic of the South Moluccas (between 1966 and 1993), Aleksander Zawisza in the centre.

Source: F 99.9126, Museum Maluku (Utrecht).

The politicians of the South Moluccas saw representatives of emigration as intermediaries in political contacts with Western politicians and structures. They needed this mediation because the official policy of Western countries was very conservative, if not reluctant, in terms of the aspirations of the Moluccans. This is well illustrated by the Memorandum

¹⁴ A. Zawisza's Expose, April 26, 1958, A.44.49/35: The Polish Embassy to the Holy See, PISM; Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government–in–Exile, London, December 14, 1955, A.44.49/27: The Polish Embassy to the Holy See, PISM.

by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumwright) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs of 13 April 1954:

The Department has no evidence which would positively identify Nikijuluw or the 'Republic of the South Moluccas' with the actions which Indonesia alleges. However, as the group is an insurgent one inimical to the interests of the Republic of Indonesia, I have recommended against granting interviews to Nikijuluw or other persons identifiable with the 'Republic of the South Moluccas' since to do so might embarrass US–Indonesian relations and seriously hinder the achievement of our objectives with respect to that country.¹⁵

At the beginning of 1956, a representative of the South Moluccas turned to the Polish government with a proposal for the participation of Polish lawyers in creating a memorandum on the occupation of the South Moluccas by Indonesia.¹⁶ A few months later, the authorities of the South Moluccas turned to the Polish government for support in contacts at the UN forum.¹⁷ Yet another initiative was to allow the delegation of the South Moluccas to visit Ireland and use Polish diplomatic and consular assistance. The mentioned event took place in early 1957, and it seems to be one of the few occasions for the emigration of the South Moluccas to manifest its formal character.¹⁸ Polish emigration also helped to publicise the issue of the South Moluccas. An example may be the initiative of Marian Szumlakowski, the Legate of the Republic of Poland to Spain, who, on his initiative, sent a Spanish–language brochure on the South Moluccas to Spanish politicians and public figures.¹⁹

In April 1960, Minister Zawisza visited the Netherlands once again, participating in the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Republic of the South Moluccas.²⁰ In the following years, occasional contacts were still maintained. There were several visits of the South Moluccas to the seat of the Polish government. In 1966, Johan Alvarez Manusama sent a commemorative letter on the occasion of the Millennium of the Polish State.²¹

It is difficult to precisely determine when the relations between the Polish government–in–exile and the Republic of the South Moluccas expired. It probably happened in the late 1960s. What were the reasons for this? We can guess that there were several.

¹⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific*, Volume XII, Part 2, ed. Carl N. Raether, Harriet D. Schwar (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1987), 418–419.

¹⁶ Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government–in–Exile, February 3, 1956, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

¹⁷ Letter from J.H. Rintzema Bos to A. Zawisza, December 9, 1956, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

¹⁸ Letter from J.H. Rintzema Bos to A. Zawisza, January 16, 1957, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Letter from J.A. Manusama to A. Zawisza, May 12, 1960, A.11.E.1302: South Moluccas, PISM.

²¹ Telegram from A. Zawisza to J.A. Manusama, May 4, 1966, A.11.E.1352: South Moluccas, PISM.

First, the presidential centre in the structures of Polish emigration was experiencing a crisis caused by isolation and internal conflicts. In 1970, Aleksander Zawisza, undoubtedly one of the promoters of contact with emigrants from the South Moluccas, resigned from the posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister (between 1965 and 1970) of the Polish government-in-exile. Finally, it should not be forgotten that in 1970 terrorist actions against Indonesia were initiated by a young generation of Moluccas emigrants. Polish partners certainly did not welcome it, as they avoided this type of political demonstration.

After 1970, the issue of the South Moluccas was occasionally raised in the Polish émigré debate as part of the review of the geopolitical situation in the world. Such was the nature of, for example, an article by Jędrzej Giertych in the *Opoka* journal, which showed sympathy for the Moluccans.²² Probably, however, political relations with the government of the South Moluccas were no longer maintained by Polish émigré diplomacy.

To conclude, it should be stated that the relations between the Polish government-in-exile and the South Moluccas emigration authorities had no significance for the Polish emigration policy. However, they had something of romanticism, expressed in the traditional Polish 19th-century insurgent slogan "For your freedom and ours". Their true character is well defined by the words of Minister Aleksander Zawisza, spoken on 28 January 1956 during an exposé to the Council of the Republic of Poland (Polish quasi-parliament in exile):

If I have allowed myself to pause for a moment, the attention of the High Council on this part of the work of my ministry, it is only to illustrate the general attitude of the government to the efforts of nations fighting for their freedom, regardless of their power, their degree of ties to business with us, or their geographic location. Our attitude towards them is based on our understanding of their longing for freedom and on our national tradition.²³

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²² Jędrzej Giertych, "Moluki", *Opoka*, June 1977, 102.

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***European Press* – Press Organ of the Central European Federal Youth Movement and the Central European Federalists**

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Abstract: *European Press* was a periodical coming out in the years 1951–1980, published by the Central European Federal Youth Movement (since 1959 the Central European Federalists). It was an organisation of federalists-emigrants from Central European countries who considered it necessary to establish a Central European federation. Such a federation was supposed to be a way to improve the development of Central European countries and also a method to free them from the yoke of communists. *European Press* was a press organ which propagated this idea. The information contained in the journal remains valid today, especially in relation to the ideological layer of European integration and its political and social foundations.

Keywords: *European Press*, Central European Federal Youth Movement, Central European Federalists, European integration, Central European emigration, Central European Federation

Introduction. Characteristics of the Central European Federal Youth Movement and the Central European Federalists

In April 1951, the first issue of *European Press* magazine came out. It was a press organ of an organisation called the Central European Federal Youth Movement (CEFYM). CEFYM was established in 1948 and was an international organisation founded by young students (emigrants from Central European countries politically dependent on the USSR), including Anzelm Jerzy Cydzik, K. Mochliński, J. Opolski, J. Krok-Paszkowski. It was a pro-independence organisation whose aim was to fight for the rejection of communism by the homelands of its members and the independence of these countries from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The goal was therefore the same as that of all national and international organisations of Central European pro-independence emigration after World War II (e.g. International Peasant Union – IPU,

Polish People's Party – PSL, National Party – SN, Croatian Peasant Party and many others). However, unlike these political parties and organisations, CEFYM was founded with the aim of propagating one method only to liberate the homelands subjugated by the communists – it was supposed to be the federalisation of Europe, and above all – of Central and Eastern Europe which included Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, as well as the USSR itself, Finland, Greece, and Austria.¹

CEFYM had the following structures: General Assembly, CEFYM Council, Executive Committee, subcommittees for various issues and CEFYM branches. The head office was located in London. Branches could be founded in all non-communist countries around the world. CEFYM was a partially closed organisation – at least formally – because any young person could become a member of the organisation, but they had to be from a Central European country. Apart from the obvious recognition of the objectives and the program, additional requirements consisted of a written application with the signature of two CEFYM members and with the support of the national community. A candidate for a CEFYM member could not be a former member of a communist or fascist organisation.²

Membership requirements slightly limited chances for prospective members. For example, they did not admit those who, having found themselves in the West after their escape would, for example, have to become members of a communist organisation. From the record on the requirement to have the support of the national community, it can be concluded that CEFYM had the ambition of becoming an organisation representing the Central European nations referred to above.

The main goals of the organisation included:

- uniting young men and women from Central European countries, aged between 16 and 35, in a fight for establishing a Central European Federation and a fight for the unity of Central Europe, for freedom and liberation from the communist yoke;
- maintaining the idea of building a United Europe and a World Government on the principles of a regional federation;
- promoting the idea of the federation through the press, public meetings, radio, and cultural and social ventures;
- analysing federal and other issues related to the region of Central Europe;
- cooperating with other organisations with similar goals, such as the Council of Free Central and Eastern European Youth, Federal Central European National

¹ For more information about CEFYM/CEF, see: Arkadiusz Indraszczyk, “Central European Federalists – Federaliści Europy Środkowej wobec integracji europejskiej,” *Doctrina. Studia Społeczno–Polityczne*, no. 10 (2013): 85–102.

² “Report of CEFYM’S secretary (MR A.J. Cydzik),” *European Press. Bulletin of CEFYM*, August, 1955, 11.

Organisations, Federal Union, European Federalist Youth, European Youth Campaign, World Government Association, and others.³

In 1959, a new organisation was developed from CEFYM: Central European Federalists (CEF). In practice, CEFYM actually transformed into CEF. This is evidenced by the same organisational structure and personnel of the authorities. CEFYM remained a youth organisation. *European Press* naturally became the organ of CEF. The objectives of CEF remained the same as those of CEFYM.

The method of achieving the organisation's goals was to inform the world about the situation in the countries subjugated by the communists and propagate the idea of federalisation of Europe. The carriers of this information were to consist of the organisation's own press organ and conferences, meetings, etc. organised by it. Additionally, CEFYM/CEF paid a lot of attention to cooperation with similar organisations promoting the ideas of federalisation in Europe – that is with the entire integration movement in Europe.

Principles and the appearance of *European Press*

The aims and tasks of the magazine were laid out in its first issue by the first editor-in-chief and publisher, George Pop (from Romania). The periodical was supposed to be a place for publishing, propagating and explaining the idea of federalisation of Europe. However, G. Pop also expressed a hope that the magazine would become the “Tribune of Truth” when it comes to all problems, with open columns for both supporters and critics. Further in his preface, George Pop provided a description of his times and indicated the course of action to be taken to improve reality. According to him, the situation in the world had been deteriorating constantly since the end of the war. He blamed this on the USSR which had gone on an ideological and military offensive. He was afraid that it would succeed, which would result in a time of terror, poverty and hunger for Europe and the world. He explained that Soviet Russia had already enslaved its own citizens and began to enslave the neighbouring nations. He pointed out that this was possible because, before the war, all European nations had operated in a narrow framework of nationalism, caring exclusively for their own interests. It had been used by such oppressors as Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Joseph Stalin. He pointed out that it would not have been possible if Europe had been united. None of these dictators would have dared

³ “Statutory Commission,” *ibid.*, 14–15.

to attack a strong community. Therefore, the aim was to strive for a federation of Central European countries that would secure peace in Europe and thus in the world.⁴

The initially outlined programme of the periodical was continued until the end of its publication. However, the issue of the quality of life and events in the countries behind the Iron Curtain was also an important thematic area discussed by the authors and promoted by the editors and CEFYM/CEF. Sometimes, these topics dominated individual issues of the magazine. The third important category of information provided was CEFYM/CEF organisational matters. *European Press*, as an organ of the Movement, became an important source about the history and activities of this organisation.⁵

Editors

The data contained in individual issues of *European Press* make it possible to reconstruct, but only to a limited extent, the list of editors and publishers of the journal. The first editor, and the publisher of numbers 1 and 2 from April and May 1951, was George Pop, chairman of the CEFYM Press Sub-Committee. However, on 29 May 1951, he resigned from this function, on account of his poor health and other duties.⁶ The next combined issue (3 and 4) from September 1951 was published by Eugen T. Nadasy, vice-president of the Executive Committee of CEFYM and a member of the Press Sub-Committee.⁷

January 1953 brought a change of chairman of the Press Sub-Committee (usually referred to simply as the Press Committee) with Z. Uhlir becoming the new boss. In his appeal to the CEFYM members, he stated that one of the most important issues for the organisation's activities and goals was the creation of a federation of Western Europe. It was supposed to have a great impact on the possibility of establishing and developing the Federation of Central Europe. Therefore, he announced that there was going to be more information in the periodical on this subject.⁸

The Press Committee was composed of: Z. Uhlir – chairman, L. Ponia, M. Zimowski – members, and J. Krzysztofiak – typist.⁹

⁴ George Pop, "From the editor," *European-Press*, May, 1951, 1, 5.

⁵ Especially that there is no uniform archive of the organisation. The materials about its provenance can probably be found in the legacies of the members of its authorities. It is possible, for example, that A.J. Cydzik's collection stored at the Polish Institute and the Sikorski Museum in London, contains only issues of the magazine and individual materials related to CEFYM/CEF.

⁶ "Resignation of the Editor," *European Press*, September, 1951, 1.

⁷ *European Press*, September, 1951.

⁸ "Press Committee," *European Press. Bulletin of CEFYM*, 1953, 4–5.

⁹ "The Press Committee," *European Press*, 1954, 1.

No other information about the publisher appears in *European Press* until the issue for September–October–November 1964. It is then that information appears about W. Nowak being the Reviewing Editor. This information was provided in subsequent issues, up to the issue for the fourth quarter of 1972. Only the addresses of the editor were changed.

Then, it was not until the issue from the summer of 1978, that it was reported that A.J. Cydzik – the general secretary of CEF – was also the publisher of the journal, which would not change until the last issue from the winter of 1980. It seems safe to assume that Cydzik, as the secretary general, was also the publisher of previous issues since 1973.

Periodisation and the layout

When deciding to publish the magazine, monthly periodisation was accepted. Taking into account the conditions of emigration, it was a serious challenge. Soon, the graphic layout of the magazine testified to it.

The first issues of the magazine were published in accordance with the rules of the press release. It was printed on newsprint paper in a printing house but soon, in 1953, the layout changed and the bulletin was issued in the form of duplicated typescript. The material starting the issue, “From editors”, says that the editorial office expects the “Bulletin” to become a platform for the exchange of information on federalisation, and at the same time to be a place for discussing the problems young people encounter in places of residence and activity.¹⁰

The printed version was not reintroduced until 1964, and from then it was kept until the magazine ceased to be published. However, the return to the printed version resulted in periodisation. From that time – from the issue for April–May–June 1963 – the magazine was published at three–month intervals – as a quarterly. Sometimes, issues would come out covering a period of four months. From the summer of 1973, *European Press* was coming out every six months: in winter and in summer, although its masthead informed that it was a quarterly.

The masthead of the journal also changed. In the first issues, published in the form of a classic magazine, the masthead consisted of the large “EUROPEAN – PRESS” title printed throughout the whole page, with the “C.E.F.Y.M. PUBLICATION” note in smaller font below. Above the title, separated by a line, there were the following elements, from right to left: number, e.g. “Number Two”, type of periodisation, e.g. “Monthly”,

¹⁰ “From editors,” *European Press. Bulletin of Central European Federal Youth Movement*, 1953, 1.

month and year, e.g. “May 1951”. Below the title, between the two lines, there was information about the publisher. From right to left: “EDITOR: GEORGE POP”, address: “adm: 26 Melody Road, LONDON, S.W.18”.

After changing the layout and issuing the magazine in copies produced on a duplicating machine, the masthead was printed in purple (blue?). On the right, there was the CEFYM logo: a globe showing only the general outline of Central Europe without borders (sometimes with the names of nations), surrounded by the organisation’s name in capitals: “CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERAL YOUTH MOVEMENT” and the slogan idea: “UNITAS ET LIBERTAS” (united and free). On the right, there was the title of the magazine: “EUROPEAN PRESS” and below, in smaller font, the subtitle: “Bulletin of the Central European Federal Youth Movement”. Below, on the right, the address in a smaller font: “4. Newton Grove/Bedford Park./LONDON, W4/Chiswick 6068”.¹¹ The masthead appearance given here was not always precisely adhered to. The layout remained the same, but sometimes, on the left, there would be the publisher name,¹² the address data was also reduced, and at the end, information about the CEFYM affiliation to other European organisations was also provided, e.g. “Affiliated to the Federal Union”.¹³ The form of address notation changed – reduced only to the masthead, it was not the only one in the version produced on a duplicating machine. There were issues with a masthead in green, which consisted of a large page title: “EUROPEAN PRESS”, with the addition of “Bulletin of the Central European Federal Youth Movement” in a much smaller font. It is unknown if these were only preparatory versions or official issues. It is highly probable that they were finished, and the organisation experimented with the layout of the masthead. In the issue from March 1959, the masthead was black. The layout was kept similar, with more information about affiliation and membership of CEFYM, and the publisher’s date and address were given in the bar between two double lines.¹⁴ In the issue from May 1959, the subtitle changed to “BULLETIN OF CEF & CEFYM”, which was related to the fact that in that year, the organisation was reorganised and the new CEF developed from it (as it has been mentioned above). This masthead remained unchanged until 1963.¹⁵

After returning to publishing in the form of a magazine, a new look of the masthead and first page of the magazine was established. The masthead was black. The first part of the

¹¹ *European Press*, 1952.

¹² *European Press*, 1953.

¹³ *European Press. Bulletin of CEFYM*, August, 1955.

¹⁴ *European Press*, March, 1959. It was given that CEFYM was affiliated with: Federal Union, Young European Federation, Young World Federation, that it was affiliated with Union of International Associations, and that it was a member of the Council of the Free Central European Youth in Paris.

¹⁵ *European Press. Bulletin of CEF & CEFYM*, 1963.

title: “EUROPEAN” was written in large font across the entire page, below, on the right side, there was the second part: “PRESS”, and on the left, in a smaller font: “BULLETIN”; below, on the left, there was the month and year: “APRIL – MAY – JUNE 1964”. In the next issue, instead of the word “Bulletin”, there were the words “REUVE TRIMETSRIELLE” and in the following one: “BULLETIN & REUVE TRIMESTRIELLE”.

Initially, therefore, *European Press* was published every month. It is not known what the periodisation was when the magazine was published using the duplication method and when the name “Bulletin of CEFYM” was added as a subtitle. What is known, is that from May 1959, it was subtitled: CEFYM and CEF. Was the monthly periodisation kept? The exact date of the issue was not provided on the masthead. After returning in 1964 [?], the journal was published at quarterly (three-month) intervals in the form of a magazine. It lasted several years, however, some issues were published every four months instead of every three months. In the seventies, it was not issued regularly. Quarterly periodisation was attempted, as evidenced by combined editions, e.g. for the second and third quarters of 1972. But from 1973, the periodisation for the seasons – summer and winter – appears, so the magazine was published as a semi-annual.

It is difficult to state clearly what the cause of these publishing perturbations was because no sources are available on the subject. Using the comparative method and comparing this problem to similar ones in other subjects of political emigration after 1945 (political parties and organisations), with a very large probability, bordering on certainty, it can be said that the main reason was the lack of sufficient financial resources for publishing a monthly. Taking into account the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s, *European Press* contains quite a lot of materials reprinted from other magazines, one can conclude that at that time the editorial office did not have enough original materials for publication.

European Press stood out among the emigration press titles from 1964 with its colourful design of the first page. It contained photos of persons important to the Central European nations, religious symbols or references to historical events (shown in the table in the annex). An analysis of the data contained in the table in the annex shows that most of them referred to the Polish state, and mainly to the Jagiellonian idea of the federation of Poland and Lithuania, and the idea of federation in Central Europe. This operation was evidence of a logical reference to the tried and tested example of the political union of two countries. One can also ask whether such a large number of “Polish” examples in the magazine was to attract the Polish emigration, or whether it resulted from the fact that from 1964, it was Poles that were responsible for the publishing house – first, W. Nowak and then, A.J. Cydzik?

It should also be noted that the illustrations were meant to serve a specific idea that they wanted to propagate. And in this context, sometimes the descriptions were not entirely consistent with history. For example, in the issue from the summer of 1977, the

presented illustration of the Polish and Lithuanian parliament from 1505 was described as the beginning of the federation of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. This was not the case, because, at that time, a three-part state was not yet in the minds of the rulers. The issue of Ukraine as the third part of the Commonwealth did not appear until the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries – it was considered as an idea in the first half of the 17th century, but it was not implemented and the Commonwealth remained a two-part construct. In this case, it seems that there was the intention to convince readers that it had been once the right idea, and it should have been implemented then, especially since the Ukrainians were members of CEFYM/CEF. Such perception of the Jagiellonian Union was not deprived of historical grounds either. The government of the January Uprising used the coat of arms of a state composed of three symbols: the Polish White Eagle, the Lithuanian Pahonia and the Ukrainian Archangel Michael. This combination of symbolism was later propagated in Polish educational and patriotic activities, including reproductions on postcards, window stickers, etc.¹⁶ The idea of making the Ukrainian nation equal to the Polish and Lithuanian nations was part of most of the ideas and projects of reconstructing the Commonwealth as a union or federation put forward by Poles in the 19th and early 20th centuries.¹⁷

Similarly, in the issue from the summer of 1978, information on Poland's relations with other states was provided on the background of the gallery of Polish kings and princes, on the basis of a royal union or federation.

Poland in Royal Union with:

- 1) Moravia and Czechs (Bohemia) 863–960, 1003–1025, 1300–1305 and 1434–1526
- 2) Hungary 1370–1399, 1434–1526 and 1576–1586
- 3) Sweden 1587–1668
- 4) Saxony 1697–1763
- 5) Austro–Hungary 1772–1918

Poland in Federation with:

- 1) Lithuania 1386–1795
- 2) Ukraine 1386–1772
- 3) Prussia 1466–1701
- 4) Latvia 1561–1772
- 5) Byelorussia 1386–1795

¹⁶ These postcards, stickers and other similar materials can be found, for example, at the Museum of the History of the Polish People's Movement in Warsaw. Examples of signatures: MHPRL–8178, MHPRL–1098, MHPRL–9810, MHPRL–13502, MHPRL–13509.

¹⁷ On this subject see: Arkadiusz Indraszczyk, *Polski ruch ludowy wobec integracji europejskiej* (Warszawa: Muzeum Historii Polskiego Ruchu Ludowego, Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo–Humanistyczny w Siedlcach – Wydawnictwo, 2014).

- 6) Moldavia (Roumania) 1595–1620
- Federation of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine 1386–1795
- Was the First to Pass Habeas Corpus in 1430
- Sovereign Parliament 1505
- Federal Constitution 1569
- Act of Religious Toleration 1572.¹⁸

Although these associations, apart from the federation with Latvia, Belarus and Ukraine, did take place, only the Polish–Lithuanian union can be counted as a relationship between two integrating states. The remaining ones were firstly acts of ad hoc policy of the then rulers/states, and, secondly, they would fall apart very quickly. They were formal and only the Polish–Lithuanian union turned into reality. Pointing to the existence of a Polish federation with Latvia, Belarus and Ukraine within the framework of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth was an apologia of the “Jagiellonian idea” (unification of Central Europe). It was already in the 19th century when it was commonly realised that in order to be able to think about the reconstruction of the Republic of Poland, there was a need to convince the nations inhabiting its territories of this idea. The problem, however, was that the 19th century saw a national renaissance of the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians and the formation of the Belarusian nation, and one of its symptoms was a great sense of separateness and independence from the Poles. This was aptly described by Stanisław A. Thugutt, a popular Polish politician, one of the founders of the idea of integrating Poland and the Central European states and the Baltic republics, who wrote in 1929: “[...] in relation to smaller and weaker nations, we [Poles – AI] sometimes had such a high opinion of ourselves that it did not allow us to see that these have their own forms of life, no one knows – worse or better than ours, but certainly closer and nicer to them”.¹⁹

Discussion on the subject matter of the magazine

As it has been already mentioned, the leading themes of the magazine that were repeated in most issues included the issue of European integration, in particular, the federalisation of Central Europe; history and events from the states dependent on the USSR; information about the organisation, and other similar subjects.

¹⁸ *European Press*, Summer 1978, 1.

¹⁹ Stanisław Thugutt, *Wyznania demokracji. Publicystyka z lat 1917–1939* (Warszawa: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1986).

The most important topic included, of course, the issue for whose promotion the organisation was founded – the integration of Central Europe. In an article discussing the magazine, there is no place for a detailed presentation of this subject, which is why it will be addressed very synthetically.²⁰ As indicated by the name of the organisation, CEFYM advocated the federalisation of Europe as its future. Europe was to be federated as a whole, although the greatest amount of space was devoted to the problems of federalisation of Central Europe, which was understood not so much in geographical as in political terms. It consisted of countries lying between the Soviet Union and Germany in the east–west direction and between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, in the north–south direction. It was emphasised that the western borders of the USSR should be withdrawn and the socialist republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine should become separate, independent and, of course, democratic states.²¹ Interestingly, in the early 1950s, it was still believed that the Central European federation should be established first, followed by a federation of Western European states, which would then cooperate with each other and lead to establishing the Federal Europe States.²² However, these dreams were quickly verified by reality, and in later years, it was thought that the unity of Western Europe would be the best way to unity and freedom in Central Europe. And a united Europe was seen as a necessary guarantee of lasting and universal peace in the world.²³

While a lot was written about the need to federate Central Europe and the entire old continent, the form of political organisation of these federations was not mentioned. It was said that all members of the federation should be equal, and the constitutional order of the community should be based on the rules of a federation. This approach to the problem was a conscious escape from a troublesome issue. Federation as a political form assumes far-reaching integration with the establishment of governing bodies over the organs of federal states' authorities. This always undermines the spirit, so there was no point in going on about it if the federation could only start to develop in the future when the Central European states would be liberated from the communists and their dependence on the USSR.

In *European Press*, European (including Central European) integration initiatives were followed and analysed in terms of their suitability for the idea of a federation of either Central Europe or the whole of the continent. Understandably, the birth and

²⁰ Indraszczyk, "Central European Federalists," 85–102.

²¹ George Pop, "Communism and Federation," *European-Press*, May, 1951, 1; "Federation and Industrialisation of the Central European Countries," *European-Press*, September, 1951, 4; "APPEAL," *European Press Bulletin of the Central European Federal Youth Movement*, 1953, 1–2.

²² "Press Committee," *European Press Bulletin of CEFYM*, 1953, 4–5.

²³ Alfred Andoni, "Freedom through Unity," *European Press*, April–May–June, 1964, 2.

development of the European Communities were welcomed and seen as the beginning of the federalisation of Western Europe.²⁴

Despite the dreams about a federalised Europe, however, orthodoxy was not preserved. Other ideas that could be convergent, similar to CEF's idea, were noticed. This was the case with the vision of integration formulated by General Charles de Gaulle, or "Europe of Homelands" as a confederation. CEF members did not reject this idea, but they treated it as one of the stages, perhaps necessary, on the way to a federation. Through the analysis of the idea proposed by the French president, it was emphasised that the unity of Europe is the most important aspect. Confederacy undoubtedly would bring nations closer to this unity. On this occasion, the issue of reconciliation between various countries, including Great Britain (not yet in the Communities) and the USSR was raised. It was pointed out that unity based on federal principles must be achieved in time, and confederation would be a very favourable stage on this path. However, it was clearly stated that this was to be a stage, not the destination of the journey (that was supposed to be federation).²⁵

Along the plans of de Gaulle, more space was devoted to the unification of Germany. For CEF members, it was not a simple matter, because Germany was one of the two main perpetrators of the war tragedy in post-war Central Europe. But this necessity of German unification was understood, and it would have to be achieved if European unity was to be reached anyway. A united Germany was perceived as an opportunity for the rebirth of German power, and with it – the possibility of the re-appearance of aggressive German policy towards other European countries. And this aspect was used to render the need for a federation of Central Europe more appealing, which would become one of the factors counterbalancing a united Germany.²⁶ This issue was represented in *European Press* by publications of statements of European politicians and Central European emigrants, which was supposed to show that CEF's thought coincides with popular views on this issue. Therefore, the following people became known as journalists writing for the magazine: Georgi M. Dimitrov – General Secretary of the International Peasants' Union, member of the European Movement, one of the leaders

²⁴ "The Speakears, b) Mr A.J. Cydzik – Secretary of CEFYM and Member of the Supreme Council of the Polish Peasant Party," *European Press. Bulletin of CEFYM*, March, 1959, 7; "V. Vangelov – President of the Council of the Free Central European Youth in Paris and Member of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party," *ibid.*, 7.

²⁵ Adam Romer, "A Realistic Approach Towards European Unification," *European Press*, September–October–November, 1964, 7; Anzelm J. Cydzik, "General de Gaulle's Europe from Atlantic to Urals," *European Press*, September–October–November, 1965, 29–30; "Central European Federalists Congress Main Political Resolution," *ibid.*, 30.

²⁶ Anzelm J. Cydzik, "Germany and Central Europe in European Europe," *European Press*, October–November–December, 1966, 29.

of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the Bulgarian National Committee²⁷; Altiero Spinelli – co-founder of the Ventotene Manifesto, member and founder of the Crocodile Club, Director of the Institute of International Affairs in Rome;²⁸ Anzelm J. Cydzik;²⁹ Adam Romer – Polish diplomat, Catholic journalist, Director of the Office of Prime Minister General Władysław Sikorski, Honorary President of the CEF;³⁰ Josef Lettrich – member of the authorities of the International Peasants' Union, leader of the Czechoslovak Republican Party of Farmers and Peasants in exile;³¹ Eugen Hinterhoff;³² Karlheinz Koppe – Vice President of the European Federalist Action;³³ Vernon Dawson – Secretary General of the Liberal International;³⁴ Ernst Wistrick, one of the directors of the European Movement.³⁵

Another project that was presented in *European Press* columns was the so-called neutralisation of Central Europe. The authors of the journal distinguished here the following ideas: 1. English Disengagement Plan, put forward post-1945 as a way to implement the Yalta agreements, involving the simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Central Europe; 2. Rapacki Plan – plan of a nuclear-free zone, presented in the 1960s, involving the withdrawal of all atomic weapons from Central Europe; 3. Neutral Belt Plan with West Germany, presented by Andrey Gromyko at the opening of the conference in Helsinki in 1972, involving the withdrawal of foreign troops and the resignation from all international agreements except the UN, countries of Central Europe and West Germany; 4. Neutral Belt Plan without West Germany. The latter was a CEF idea, presented by A.J. Cydzik and Stefan Velinsky at the conference in Helsinki in 1972. It was to rely on the establishment of a neutral zone, stretching between the ethnic lands of the Russians and West Germany. In all these plans, CEF

²⁷ Georgi M. Dimitrov, "German Unification and Liberation of Communists Captive Nations," *European Press*, April–May–June, 1967, 6.

²⁸ Altiero Spinelli, "German unification," *ibid.*, 9–10.

²⁹ Cydzik, "Germany and Central Europe," 29; Anzelm J. Cydzik, "Kryzys francuski," *European Press*, May–June–July–August, 1969, 15.

³⁰ Adam Romer, "General De Gaulle's Vision," *European Press*, June–July–August, 1965, 7.

³¹ Josef Lettrich, "German Unification and Liberation of Central Europe," *European Press*, October–November–December, 1966, 4–5.

³² Eugen Hinterhoff, "Is the German Problem Insolvable?," *European Press*, December–January–February–March, 1966, 27–28; Eugen Hinterhoff, "The Eternal Question of German Unification," *European Press*, October–November–December, 1966, 5–7.

³³ Karlheinz Koppe, "Central Europe in European Federation," *European Press*, September–October–November, 1965, 23.

³⁴ Vernon Dawson, "Reunification of Germany in European Europe," *European Press*, October–November–December, 1966, 8; Vernon Dawson, "German Unification in Confederation of Europe," *European Press*, April–May–June, 1967, 8.

³⁵ Ernst Wistrick, "One Europe," *European Press*, Winter, 1974–1975, 12.

federalists saw the possibility of creating a Central European Federation. It was to be neutral and to cooperate primarily with the EEC.³⁶

The series of the Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe also found its place in *European Press*. The attitudes of political Central European emigration towards the idea and implementation of this conference were negative. It was perceived as erasing the aspirations to integrate Europe, as it was supposed to sanction the then-current shape of Europe. CEF activists and other emigrants organised campaigns against those agreements which were seen as an opportunity for the USSR to continue its political oppression of Central European countries.³⁷

Before and during the conference in Helsinki in 1973, CEF federalists were handing to European politicians the “Declaration of Tasks for the European Security Conference in Helsinki” and the “Appeal to the Governments and Nations of the Western World” drawn up for the occasion. In the Declaration, they expressed the opinion that considering the fact that 28 years after the war, two German states were recognised as sovereign and obtained full membership in the UN, it was time to restore normal relations in Central Europe. Therefore, peace and security in Europe could become possible only when all the reasons for the tension were removed by meeting the four minimum conditions. These were: accepting the declaration of the territorial neutrality of Central European countries located between Germany and the USSR – which was to be a sine qua non condition for future peace in Europe, signing an international treaty that would guarantee that there would be no intervention in the sovereign rights of Central European countries, the evacuation of all foreign armies and government agents from the newly formed neutral states, carrying out free elections in these states under the control of the UN and reconstructing state governments based on the Declaration of Human Rights and borders according to the pre-1939 division. Austria’s neutralisation was pointed out as an example of the feasibility of such a solution. A summary of the activities undertaken by the CEF against the agreement of Western states and the USSR was presented by Anzelm J. Cydzik.³⁸

The year 1976 marked the 25th anniversary of the Declaration of Liberation (“Declaration of Freedom”) which was signed in Philadelphia on 11 February 1951 by about 200 representatives of Central European emigration. Its 10th clause postulated the need to establish

³⁶ “Table Ronde Stowarzyszenia dla studiów problemów europejskich,” *European Press*, IV Quarter, 1972, 19; “Appeal of Central European Federalists,” *European Press*, Winter, 1977, 2; “CEF’s 7th CONGRESS, Main Political Resolution,” *European Press*, Winter, 1978, 25; Anzelm J. Cydzik, “Neutral Belt in Central Europe,” *European Press*, Winter, 1978/1979, 3; Anzelm J. Cydzik, “Stosunki międzynarodowe PSL i Polski,” *European Press*, Summer, 1979, 28–29.

³⁷ “Table Ronde Stowarzyszenia,” 19; “Apel do Akcji,” *European Press*, Summer, 1973, 2; “CEF’s Appeal to the Central Europeans in the Western World,” *ibid.*, 2.

³⁸ Anzelm J. Cydzik, “O wolność Krajów Europy Środkowej w Helsinkach,” *European Press*, Summer, 1975, 27.

a federation of Central and East European nations and to take part in building a united Europe. CEF activists considered it still valid and worthy of reminding and propagating.³⁹

At that time, Prof. Stefan Velinsky, a Czech member of the CEF Executive Committee and an advocate of the abovementioned ideas, to prove his position, used arguments from several areas. First of all – a historical one, typical for émigré activists, propagating the traditions of this idea in the region for many centuries. Second – economic and social one. He referred to the first great socialist ideologists: Robert Owen, Claude Henri de Saint-Simon, Pierre Joseph Proudhon and Charles Fourier, who promoted building a world based on federal principles, both in politics and in the economy. Thirdly, he pointed out that the federation would protect the region against internal conflicts, and at the same time, help to remove cultural and political barriers between nations. He believed that it was worth pursuing a federation because it would allow all conflicts to be resolved peacefully while promoting cooperation, not competition.⁴⁰

In other articles from that period, Prof. Velinsky appealed for the development of ideas and goals for the unification of Europe. He recalled the initial sentences from the Tindemans Report: “The European idea has lost much of its strength and initial momentum.” Prof. Velinsky thought that it had happened because integration processes were encapsulated only within the area of the Common Market. There was no educational policy to explain and motivate integration. He stressed that the promotion of the European Union places a lot of emphasis on technical and administrative solutions, but it is insufficient in indicating the need, tasks and goal of achieving a higher level of human development. He emphasised that the goal and idea of the European Union should be to strive to provide people with a state in which they will be creators of their own destiny and will feel safe. An important part was played by tolerance, identified with democracy. It was crucial because of the specificity of the “European society” composed of multiple nationalities and cultures. Political unification should not mean the unification of culture. The multi-culturalism and multi-nationality of Europe should be preserved, and tolerance was necessary for that. Velinsky opposed the idea that the European Federation can only be a repetition and imitation of the United States of America. He disagreed as he believed that the American society is essentially a mono-nation, while Europe consists of many nations, and it should stay that way.⁴¹

³⁹ Anzelm J. Cydzik, “25 Rocznica Deklaracji Filadelfijskiej oraz Protest CEF do Narodów Zjednoczonych,” *European Press*, Summer, 1976, 13.

⁴⁰ Stefan Velinsky, “Why Just a Federation,” *ibid.*, 8.

⁴¹ Stefan Velinsky, “European Character in Formation,” *European Press*, Summer, 1977, 13; Stefan Velinsky, “European Culture at 30th Table Ronde,” *ibid.*, 22; Stefan Velinsky, “World Mission of European Community,” *European Press*, Winter, 1977, 7; Stefan Velinsky, “European Unification on Egoism?,” *European Press*, Summer, 1978, 27.

In the following years, CEF, in accordance with its idea, continued to emphasise the need to establish the Central European Federation as a belt separating Germany from the USSR. At the 7th CEF Congress in September 1977, there were still warnings that Europe could not exist while being divided because it could not function properly without a free Central Europe. Nor could it be safe without the Central European Federation, and only with it, could Europeans create a security system for themselves.⁴²

The second thematic area in *European Press*, as has been mentioned, was information about the activities of its authorities. This information could usually be found on the last pages. It would give the details about the composition of CEFYM (and then CEF) authorities, correspondence addresses, and current organisational information. In the issues in which CEFYM/CEF congresses and conferences were reported and discussed, this information was provided on different pages of the issue. It was then the main theme of the issue. In this context, the issues of the magazine that stand out are those that were published in duplicates, or in the years 1953–1963, and those with the subtitle “Bulletin of CEFYM” and from May 1959: “Bulletin of CEF & CEFYM”. Their topics focused primarily on information from the life of the organisation, mainly on reports from CEFYM Council meetings, general assemblies and reports of the organisation’s secretary for a particular period. They are an extremely valuable source about the history of the organisation. Information about other events or typical articles that were not a report of a paper or a presentation of CEFYM and CEF bodies were rare at that time. The issue published after July 1963 (the date determined based on the content of the issue) gives some information about conferences and meetings of European organisations promoting integration in Europe, such as the European Movement,⁴³ the World Association of World Federalists,⁴⁴ Action European Federalists.⁴⁵

Authors of *European Press*

The articles and materials published in *European Press* were primarily written by members of CEFYM and CEF authorities: Georg Theodor Pop, Chairman of the Press Sub-

⁴² “Appeal of Central European Federalists,” *European Press*, Winter, 1977, 2; “CEF’s 7th CONGRESS, Main Political Resolution,” *European Press*, Winter, 1978, 25; “Deklaracja Drogi do Wolności Narodów Środkowej Europy,” *European Press*, Summer, 1978, 13.

⁴³ “The European Movement Congress in Munich June 1962,” *European Press. Bulletin CEF & CEFYM*, 1963, 9; “The European Movement Conference in Luxemburg in November 1961,” *ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁴ “The World Association of World Federalists Congress Viena, July 1961,” *ibid.*, 9; “The World Association of World Federalists Cologne Conference in September 1960,” *ibid.*, 1963, 11.

⁴⁵ “Action European Federalists Conference in Copenhagen in October 1961,” *ibid.*, 1963, 10; “Action European Federalists Meeting in Luxemburg in November 1960,” *ibid.*, 1963, 11.

committee; Alfred Andoni, President of the Executive Committee, member of the Albanian Peasant Party; Anzelm Jerzy Cydzik, Secretary–General, member of the Supreme Council of the Polish People’s Party in exile; Dr V. Dara, President of the Executive Committee; Georg E. Iliescu, former Military Attaché of Romania in London; T. Sekolec, Vice–President of the Executive Committee, member of the Slovenian Christian Democratic Party; M.J. Sokołowski, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Republic of Poland in London; Dr O. Woly nec, Chairman of the CEFYM Council, President of the Ukrainian Socialist Party; Franciszek Wilk, President of the Polish People’s Party in Great Britain and, since 1968, of the entire Polish People’s Party, a member of the authorities of the International Peasant Union in Great Britain; Prof. Stefan Velinsky, a Czech member of the CEF authorities. The name Anzelm J. Cydzik appeared among the names of authors the most often. This was because he was the secretary of the organisation and, for this reason, posted reports on the activities and his own reports as the Secretary.

In addition to CEFYM/CEF members, other authors, who wanted to write about the issue of federation in Central Europe or throughout Europe from a similar perspective, were published gladly in *European Press* as well. They included the above–mentioned ones, for example, leaders of émigré political parties. The outstanding figures of the integration movement, such as Altiero Spinesi, whose articles were reprinted rather than taken as original ones, constituted the last, smallest group of authors.

Summary and conclusions

Undoubtedly, *European Press* was an outstanding magazine among those published by political emigrants from Central Europe. Its first distinguishing feature is the subordination of the journal’s content to the purpose of the issuing organisation – propagating the federalisation of Europe, primarily Central Europe. The second factor distinguishing the magazine is the lack of any feuds between various political groups of Central European emigration. The journal was supposed to unite and not divide, show the unity of emigration and not the problems that divided it.

The variable periodisation and publishing method indicate that, like most emigre press, in particular, political press, CEFYM and CEF suffered from a lack of material funds and financial security when it comes to *European Press*. In the first year of its publication, and then from 1964 to the mid–1970s, the magazine had good editorial quality. However, in the period of publication as a duplicated Bulletin, it was apparent that the quality of the magazine was of little importance.

The sudden cancellation of the magazine related to the unexpected death of A.J. Cydzik, the secretary of CEF and the publisher of the magazine, indicates that, at that time, CEF was already a small organisation (which was characteristic of the majority of Central–European political emigration organisations), consisting of a few enthusiasts who continued their adolescent dreams. After Cydzik’s death, it turned out that no one would be willing or able to publish the magazine.

When looking at the issues of European integration from the perspective of the second decade of the 21st century and the identity problems that the integration process is encountering in Europe, it can be concluded that *European Press* and similar magazines have been underestimated by major European organisations as well as the institutions of the European Communities. Support for these organisations and institutions would help to promote the essence of European integration, building a common European identity, or all those aspects that are still missing in the EU and whose absence is an obstacle to its further development. And it cannot be denied that the EU has helped considerably in the development of many, if not all, Member and Associated States.

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Materials

Primate and General. Contacts between Cardinal Wyszyński and Władysław Anders in the Light of Their Correspondence – a Contribution to the History of the Polish Independence Emigration

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Abstract: The article takes a closer look at the relationship between Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński and General Władysław Anders between 1957 and 1970. The letters found in the Warsaw Archdiocesan Archives, complex: Secretariat of the Primate of Poland, and in the Archives of the Polish Institute and the Sikorski Museum in London show the close relationship between the Primate and the General. Although contact between them was occasional, we can observe the mutual respect and appreciation of these two leaders of “free Poland”. The former upheld Polish identity in a country ruled by communists, while also defending the independence of the Polish Church. At the same time, the latter acted as the leader of the Polish independence emigration community. Documented communication between Cardinal Wyszyński and General Anders began in 1957. It could not have taken place on a permanent basis, as the Primate feared that such relations could be a pretext for persecuting the Church in Poland – on the charge of maintaining contacts with “reactionary emigration circles”. Nevertheless, the Primate and the General met in person in Rome in May 1963, during Cardinal Wyszyński’s stay in the Holy See. The article is supplemented by an edition of correspondence concerning their mutual contacts. The text should be treated as a complementary contribution to the history of Polish emigration.

Keywords: Primate, general, emigration, patriotism

Introduction – The Primate as protector of emigration

The Catholic Church played an extremely important role among the Polish community scattered all over the world. It was noticed by the Holy See, and for this reason in 1931 Pope Pius XI bestowed the title of Protector of Polish Emigration on Cardinal August Hlond. After the Primate’s death, due to the difficult situation of the Polish Church, the aforementioned dignity was given to Bishop Józef Gawlina, who was residing in Rome, and not to Archbishop Stefan Wyszyński, Metropolitan of Gniezno and Warsaw. After the death of the hierarch in 1964, the dignity of Protector of Emigration returned to

the Primate of Poland. It was the time when Bishop Władysław Rubin was appointed a delegate for emigration by Cardinal Wyszyński, and he successfully held that position for the following years. As the Protector of Emigration, the Primate was able to influence the religiosity of the Polish diaspora in a real and wide-ranging way, e.g. with the help of the network of Polish Catholic Missions.¹

Cardinal Wyszyński's activity for the Polish community continued throughout his Primate's ministry. The hierarch was interested in the life and activities of the Church on emigration, supported it at the Holy See, and corresponded with its representatives. His role was particularly significant during the celebrations of the millennium of the Baptism of Poland. Together with Archbishop Gawlina, the Primate initiated the celebration of the millennium of Polish Christianity in all corners of the globe. Cardinal Wyszyński was supposed to personally take part in the millennium celebrations in the USA, among others, but the communist authorities did not permit his departure.²

General Anders welcomes the Primate on behalf of the Polish Community

Important for Primate Stefan Wyszyński and the entire Polish Church was his visit to the Holy See in May and June 1957 to receive the cardinal insignia. This was his first visit to the Vatican after his isolation ended in October 1956. During the journey made by rail, the Polish hierarch was greeted enthusiastically as a martyr of the Church.³ General Anders welcomed the Metropolitan of Gniezno and Warsaw on behalf of the independence emigration by sending him a letter on 10 May 1957.⁴ In the letter, he stated that he was

¹ Jan Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce 1944–1989* (Warszawa: Neriton, 2003); Jan Żaryn, "Raport o stanie badań nad dziejami Kościoła katolickiego na wychodźstwie w latach 1945–1966 (1989)," in *Polska emigracja polityczna 1939–1990. Stan badań*, ed. Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Warszawa: IPN, 2016), 472–528. Other works worth reading include Zbigniew Werra's study on the ministry to the Polish 2nd Corps – Zbigniew Werra, *Działalność duszpasterska w 2. Korpusie Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie gen. Władysława Andersa 1941–1947* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2009).

² *Obchody Milenium na Uchodźstwie. W pięćdziesiąt rocznice (1966–2016)*, ed. Rafał Łatka, Jan Żaryn (Warszawa: IPN, Senat RP, UKSW, 2016).

³ Rafał Łatka, Beata Mackiewicz, and Dominik Zamiatąła, *Prymas Stefan Wyszyński. Biografia* (Warszawa: IPN, Soli Deo, 2020), 59–61; Stefan Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. IV: 1956–1957*, ed. Michał Białkowski in collaboration with Monika Wiśniewska (Warszawa: IPN, UKSW, 2020), 216–294.

⁴ It is important to add here that in November 1956, on the orders of General Anders, parcels containing materials for a cassock, a warm winter coat, underwear, a jumper and coffee were sent to Cardinal Wyszyński. Ludwik Maria Łubiński, an employee of General Anders' office, was in charge (Letter from Ludwik Maria Łubiński to Gen. Władysław Anders, London, 28 November 1956, KGA 299, Wyszyński Stefan Kardynał, pp. 10, Władysław Anders Collection, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum – PISM).

unable to come to Rome in person, but asked to accept the homage paid by the emigration.⁵ He also assured of the affection and fidelity of the Polish people abroad to “their Archbishop and, through him, to the whole Nation, of which we remain an inseparable part”. The General also stressed that “In spite of the remoteness, in spite of the already long years of separation, our hearts beat to the same rhythm as those of our brothers and sisters, our parents and children in the Country. Like them, we do not cease to ask God to be willing, in His supreme mercy, to shorten the time of the hard trial imposed on our tormented nation.”⁶ Unfortunately, we do not know whether Cardinal Wyszyński replied to this letter; no relevant annotation has survived in the resources of the Secretariat of the Primate of Poland or in the cardinal’s *Pro memoria* diary.⁷

Return of the Jagiellonian tapestries to Poland

Cardinal Wyszyński was strongly involved in the campaign to bring the Jagiellonian tapestries to Poland. It was successfully completed in 1961 as a result of an agreement between the governments of Canada and Polish People’s Republic. The role of Cardinal Wyszyński in this respect was remarkable – due to the doubts of the Canadians, he was actually acting as a kind of guarantor of the agreement. It is significant that he did not bring his person to the fore, believing that the most important thing was that the treasures of the Wawel Castle should return to their homeland, even if the authorities of the Polish People’s Republic would propagandize as exclusively their own achievement.⁸ The Primate appreciated the evolution of views of a large part of the independence emigration circles, recognizing in it

⁵ Undoubtedly, General Anders’ personal religiosity was an important aspect of his approach to Primate Wyszyński (Zbigniew Werra, “Obraz dowódcy,” in *Bitwy Generała Władysława Andersa. Studia i materiały do dziejów 2. Korpusu Polskiego*, ed. Bogusław Polak, Waldemar Handke, Zenon Józwiak (Leszno 2007), 168–).

⁶ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, 10 May 1957, London, SPP, 14/31, Wychództwo, p. 205, Warsaw Archdiocesan Archive – AAW. A letter from Stefan Soboniewski to General Anders, containing an account of the Primate’s stay in Rome in 1957, has been preserved in the resources of PISM. The sender discussed in quite some detail the course of the ceremony of handing the cardinal’s hat to S. Wyszyński. Soboniewski stressed that the Primate was received with great kindness by Pius XII. The letter also discusses the Polish Church leader’s approach to emigration. The author rightly noted that the Primate, due to the risk of repression by the communist authorities against the Catholic Church, avoided public meetings with the leaders of the Polish emigration, even though he had a warm-hearted attitude towards them (Letter from Stefan Soboniewski to Gen. Władysław Anders, 16 VI 1957, KGA 299, pp. 12–13, Władysław Anders Collection, PISM).

⁷ Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. IV: 1956–1957*.

⁸ Stefan Wyszyński, *Dzieła zebrane vol. VI: 1960*, collective work (Warszawa: Soli Deo, 2007), 171; Cf. Stefan Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. 7: 1960*, ed. Rafał Łatka (Warszawa: IPN, UKSW, 2019).

also the merit of Anders. In his diary, he noted that this was largely due to positive statements made by the general, who publicly supported the return of the tapestries to Poland.⁹

The next contact – 1962

On 1 November 1962, Cardinal Wyszyński granted an audience to General Anders' representative, Lieutenant Colonel Marian Norbert Czarnecki, who had been staying in France since 1944.¹⁰ Czarnecki conveyed greetings from the leader of the Polish emigration.¹¹ The security apparatus of the Polish People's Republic treated this meeting as an official establishment of contacts between Cardinal Wyszyński and the "leaders of the Anders veteran group".¹²

A letter from Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki to General Anders of 1 November 1962, containing an account of the audience granted to him by the Primate, has been preserved in the resources of the PISM Archive in London. We learn from it that the meeting lasted 45 minutes, it took place in a good atmosphere, and that Cardinal Wyszyński spoke about the leader of the Polish emigration "in a very warm, cordial and loving tone". The Primate also encouraged emigration circles to speak out and regularly remind people of the persecution of the Church in Poland. He also noted that "We are not only fighting for the rights of the Church and religion; we are fighting for the nation, for the soul of the nation; in our case this fight for the nation is combined with the fight for religion [...]".¹³ The hierarch was then to add that "in the fight against the regime, he constantly puts forward the fundamental, natural rights of the individual, the human being, the family and the nation, and not only religious matters. He said that if he speaks in Poland, as he did recently in Częstochowa, he speaks on behalf of 40 million Poles, 30 million in Poland and 10 million outside the country whom we must consider an integral part of

⁹ Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. 7: 1960*, 72–264–265.

¹⁰ Barbara Toporska, "Czarnecki Marian Norbert," in *Encyklopedia polskiej emigracji i Polonii*, vol. 1, ed. Kazimierz Dopierała (Toruń: Oficyna Wydawnicza Kucharski, 2003), 362.

¹¹ Stefan Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. 9: 1962*, ed. Antoni Poniński (Warszawa: IPN, UKSW, 2020), 287.

¹² *W służbie Boga i Polski. Komunistyczna bezpieka wobec kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego*, ed. Józef Marecki, Piotr Nitecki, and Roksana Szczepyta–Szczęch (Kraków: IPN, WAM, 2014), 250.

¹³ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Lt Col Marian Czarnecki, London, 6 November 1962, KGA 299, Wyszyński Stefan Kardynał, pp. 39–40, Władysław Anders Collection, PISM. These words were consistent with Cardinal Wyszyński's general attitude to patriotism (Rafał Łatka, "Patriotyzm prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego – zarys zagadnienia," in *Kościół wobec niepodległości Polski 1918–1989. Ludzie–miejsce–wydarzenia*, ed. Krzysztof Sychowicz, Jarosław Wasilewski (Białystok–Warszawa: IPN, 2020), 388–409; Rafał Łatka, Ewa Czaczkowska, *Prymas Stefan Wyszyński a Niepodległa. Naród–patriotyzm–państwo w myśli i nauczaniu Prymasa Tysiąclecia* (Warszawa: IPN, UKSW, 2019).

the nation and constantly manifest it”.¹⁴ The issue of millennium celebrations in emigration was directly related to the aforementioned topic, as Cardinal Wyszyński reminded us that they should take place with an emphasis on the close connection of emigration with the homeland. In this regard, it is worth adding that the Primate was one of the main authors of the concept of the celebration of the millennium of Polish Christianity outside Poland, and the main executor of his vision was Bishop Władysław Rubin¹⁵. Among other threads that emerged in the conversation, it is worth noting two more important issues. Firstly, Cardinal Wyszyński stressed that some “progressive” Catholics from organizations licensed by the communist authorities were spreading the opinion that “the situation of the Church is not so bad”. Among them, he pointed to the circle of Jan Frankowski and PAX.¹⁶ Secondly, the Primate mentioned that American aid to Poland “is given in a bad manner”, because the Americans should emphasize that they would give it in the name of freedom and human rights, provided that the repressiveness of the system was reduced. The Hierarchy justified this by saying that “The nation must know that this aid is for the nation and not for the regime. Today this is not clear”.¹⁷

The accounts of the above-discussed letter concerning Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki’s conversation with the Primate are also confirmed by the materials of the security apparatus of the Polish People’s Republic. According to information obtained by the intelligence service, Cardinal Wyszyński was said to have remarked during the conversation that emigration “is an integral part of the nation,” and also to have pointed out that during one of his speeches in Częstochowa “I emphasized publicly that I was speaking on behalf of 40 million Poles – 30 million in the country and 10 abroad”.¹⁸ Judging by the content of this material, the security apparatus obtained copies of the above-discussed letter from Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki to General Anders of 1 November, as the same expressions are found therein explicitly.¹⁹

In the conclusion of the letter discussed above, Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki encouraged General Anders to address the Primate directly: “It seems to me that it would be a good idea for you to write directly to the Primate thanking him for this picture and for the blessing he conveyed to you, General, with this picture. Obviously, one must write carefully, because

¹⁴ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Lt Col Marian Czarnecki, pp. 39, Władysław Anders Collection.

¹⁵ Żaryn, *Raport o stanie badań*, 21–46.

¹⁶ The topic of the attitude of “progressive” Catholics to the millennium celebrations has already been addressed by Dominik Zamiatąła (Dominik Zamiatąła, “Katolicy koncesjonowani wobec obchodów Milenium,” in *1966 – Milenium chrztu Polski prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego: perspektywa teologiczno-społeczna*, ed. Ewa Czaczkowska (Warszawa: UKSW), 85–113.

¹⁷ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Lt Col Marian Czarnecki, pp. 40, Władysław Anders Collection.

¹⁸ Marecki, Nitecki, and Szczypta–Szczech, *W służbie Boga i Polski*, 250.

¹⁹ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Lt Col Marian Czarnecki, pp. 39–40, Władysław Anders Collection.

perhaps his mail is controlled by the communists”²⁰ This did indeed occur, and General Anders’ letter had the content suggested by his representative. Correspondence has been preserved in the resource of AAW, SPP. The letter from the leader of the Polish emigration was handed over to Cardinal Wyszyński by Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki in 1962, but we do not know when exactly this happened. The letter was dated 6 November. Analogous to his correspondence of 1957, General Anders expressed homage and filial affection on behalf of the Poles abroad. He also stressed that “With the greatest attention and a beating heart we look at the hard and sacrificial work of Your Eminence full of deep devotion to the Church and to Poland. I ask God with confidence and faith to bring the blessed gifts of this work closer.”²¹

Anders’ representative forwarded not only the letter, but also the main reflections of General Anders on the Catholic Church and the role of emigration in maintaining the Polish identity (contained in a letter he received from the General, along with the correspondence to the Primate).²² A member of the Council of Three began by thanking him for the picture of Black Madonna of Częstochowa (given by the Primate to Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki with a request to give it to General Anders). The second thought was to emphasize that Cardinal Wyszyński’s views were widely shared among the Polish emigrants. The third was to express reverence and admiration for the Cardinal’s tenacious struggle for a „Catholic and independent Poland”. The General also asked Lieutenant Colonel Czarnecki to convey that:

[...] all Poles outside the country, who are aware of their supreme duty to their homeland, want with all their heart and soul to work for Poland and the oppressed Church. In this work, we naturally expect a helping hand from our Polish priests on emigration, and there are countries of our settlement, such as Great Britain and France, where these expectations of ours may not be fully fulfilled. I trust that the earnest unity of Church and nation, to which Poles have become accustomed over the centuries of their history, will also come to life in the areas inhabited by Polish political emigrants.²³

In his reply sent to W. Anders on 29 November, the Primate expressed his thanks for the letter of 6 November and remarked:

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ AAW, SPP 14/31, *Wychodźstwo*, p. 432, Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, 6 November 1962, London.

²² The aforementioned letter was handed over in the original to Cardinal Wyszyński, probably precisely together with a direct letter from General Anders. The originals of both are today in the resources of AAW, SPP. I am specifically using these original typescripts.

²³ Letter from Gen. Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, 6 November 1962, London, SPP 14/31, *Wychodźstwo*, p. 431, AAW. A copy of this letter can also be found in the KGA 299, 41, Władysław Anders Collection, PISM.

I am pleased to hear that the General duly assesses the work of the Holy Church in Poland. Its simplest aspiration is to keep the Nation in peace, so that it can concentrate on protecting the most precious gifts of God – the treasures of soul and body. We are constantly talking about the fact that national culture can be preserved through its connection with religious life. We emphasize that sparing the Polish blood, so that it can be used in a patient will to persevere for fruitful work for the Nation, is perhaps the simplest policy for the many years of national existence still to come.²⁴

The meeting in Rome

The Primate avoided public meetings with representatives of the London government or, more broadly, with representatives of independence organizations operating on emigration. This was due to his conviction that one should not give the authorities of the Polish People's Republic pretexts for attacks on the Church in the country.²⁵ An example of this approach can be seen in the refusal to attend the ceremony planned by Archbishop Gawlina, i.e. the service for the Millennium Committee (which was scheduled for early May 1962). The reason for this was the presence of W. Anders. The Primate explained it as follows on the pages of his diary: "I refused because of the presence of General A[nders], since Warsaw would have said that I was seeking camouflaged contacts with London".²⁶ A few days later, on the morning of 13 May, Cardinal Wyszyński held a service for Polish veterans living in England. On the same day, at the Pontifical Polish Institute in Rome, he met at 5 pm with General Anders, who was accompanied by his aides. He recorded his impression in the *Pro memoria diary*. What emerges from his notes is a very positive opinion on one of the leaders of Polish emigration. Let us quote it in full: "I thank him for the speech [on] 'Monte Cassino'. [...] He makes the impression of a man well versed in the situation, still young in spirit, physically holding up well, confident, devoted to the Church".²⁷ An important accent of the meeting (according to the account of Father Eustachy Rakoczy) was the handing over of the Monte Cassino commemorative cross with the number 1 by W. Anders to Cardinal Wyszyński. The Primate

²⁴ List Prymasa Stefana Wyszyńskiego do gen. Władysława Andersa, 29 November 1962, Warsaw, SPP 14/31, Wychodźstwo, p. 434, AAW.

²⁵ S. Wyszyński, *Pro memoria 1964*, 5 May 1964, Gniezno Archdiocesan Archive – AAG.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 13 May 1964.

²⁷ *Ibid.* The security apparatus was aware that Cardinal Wyszyński had met with General Anders, but did not obtain any further information on the course of the discussion, apart from the Primate's emphasis that the activities of the emigration needed to be coordinated in order to yield adequate results (Marecki, Nitecki and Szczypta–Szczech, *W służbie Boga i Polski*, 276).

then presented it as a votive offering to the sanctuary at Jasna Góra.²⁸ As it seems, this was the only personal meeting between Cardinal Wyszyński and the General.²⁹

The security apparatus of the Polish People's Republic treated the Primate's meeting with W. Anders as one of Cardinal Wyszyński's important moves aimed at "a clear alignment" of the hierarch with "reactionary emigration groups". It was also supposed to mean that the leader of the Polish Church had "gradually abandoned the pretense of not engaging in hostile activity and was moving to the position of openly fighting the Government of the Polish People's Republic, intending to use the help of reactionary emigration in this fight [...]"³⁰

Commemorative medal for the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Monte Cassino

Five years later, on 29 October 1969, General Anders and General Bolesław Duch, on behalf of the soldiers of the Polish 2nd Corps in Italy, presented Cardinal Wyszyński with a medal minted on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Monte Cassino.³¹ The Primate accepted the gift with great affection. In his reply to the letter from the two generals, dated 29 December, he stressed that he was deeply honored to receive the medal "to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the historic victorious battle of Monte Cassino, which brought glory to the Command and Soldiers of the Polish 2nd Corps in Italy. I will keep alive and in grateful memory this token of remembrance of the Soldiers of Poland about the Primate of Poland, who fights for the spiritual freedom of the Nation". Cardinal Wyszyński ended his letter with wishes and blessings for the new year.³²

The Mass for the soul of General Anders

The last of the AAW SPP documents that could be recovered regarding relation between the Primate and the General, is the text of a speech given by Cardinal John Heenan,

²⁸ "Jasna Góra," accessed on August 20, 2021, <http://www.jasnagora.com/wydarzenie-14790>.

²⁹ No mention of other meetings between the Primate of Poland and General Anders could be found in church sources or literature.

³⁰ Marecki, Nitecki and Szczypka–Szczęch, *W służbie Boga i Polski*, 313.

³¹ Letter from Gen. Bolesław Duch and Gen. Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, 29 October 1969, London, SPP 14/123, p. 241, AAW.

³² Ibid.

Archbishop of Westminster, at the funeral mass for W. Anders on 21 May 1970 in Westminster Cathedral (nine days after his death).³³ In his speech to the Polish faithful attending the service, the English hierarch pointed to the General's achievements and exceptional life story. He drew particular attention to his role as a commander of the Polish army emerging from the Soviet Union and to the great triumph that was the victorious Battle of Monte Cassino. He also emphasized that "General Anders has become a symbol of a spurned hero, even in his own country. The Polish authorities are going to repent one day for the sin of treating Poland's noble son that way. The entire Polish nation is a symbol in itself. They are a suffering nation sustained by a hope that never dies. They are a reminder that tyranny can never survive unless the human spirit is conquered. They live on the hope of true freedom, to which General Anders had devoted his life" [back translated from Polish into English].³⁴

Conclusions

Based on preserved documentation from Church sources, Cardinal Wyszyński and General Anders were united by mutual respect and shared beliefs about the unique role of the Church in maintaining the identity of the Polish nation. In the content of the letters addressed to the Primate by one of the leaders of the emigration, the General's great admiration for the activities of the leader of the Church and his recognition of his providential role for Poles in the country and abroad are evident. The reflection that Cardinal Wyszyński made after his meeting with W. Anders in Rome proves, in turn, that the Primate highly valued the General's personality and character, as well as his attachment to the Catholic Church. What is distinctive and needs to be emphasized is that the Primate did not refer to the disputes that took place within emigration circles. Undoubtedly, the subject of the relationship between General Anders and Cardinal Wyszyński requires further research and queries in the archives of the Sikorski Institute in London.

³³ On the funeral ceremonies and the three funerals of General Anders, cf. P. Zięta, "General Anders trzy razy pogrzebany. Londyn, Warszawa, Monte Cassino," accessed August 20, 2021, <https://tygodnik.tvp.pl/47894672/general-anders-trzy-razy-pogrzebany-londyn-warszawa-monte-cassino>.

³⁴ Cardinal John C. Heenan's sermon at General Anders Requiem Mass in Westminster Cathedral on 21st May 1970, SPP 17/61, p. 1, AAW.

Appendix

Document No. 1

*10 May 1957, Letter from General Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński
Primate of Poland, London*

General W[ładysław] Anders
Princes Gate
London, S.W. 7

10 May 1957 20,

Eminence, Primate,

It was with emotion and concern that I learnt that the Primate's arrival in Rome, so long awaited by us, has now come to fruition.³⁵

In spite of the remoteness, in spite of the already long years of separation, our hearts beat as much as those of our brothers and sisters, our parents and children in the Country. Like them, we do not cease to ask God to be willing, in His supreme mercy, to shorten the time of the severe trial imposed on our tormented nation.

I am writing these words to express the thoughts and feelings of all, many very tens of thousands, Polish soldiers who, faithful to their banners, remained in the free world to demand full freedom, wholeness and independence for their Homeland.

Not being in Rome at this solemn and elevated moment of Your Eminence's arrival, I ask that at least by this means the homage we pay to the Primate of Poland be accepted.

I would like my letter to convey the deepest assurance of affection and fidelity with which Poles abroad address their Archprelate, and through him, the entire nation of which we remain an inseparable part.

In expressing my deepest reverence, I remain

Władysław Anders³⁶

His Eminence
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński,
Primate of Poland,
Rome

Source: SPP II 14/131, p. 205, typescript, AAW.

³⁵ Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński left for Italy on 6 May 1957 and returned to Warsaw on 19 June 1957. The main reason for his visit to Rome was to receive the cardinal's insignia. On the course of the visit, cf. Żaryn, *Dzieje Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce*, 176–179; Wyszyński, *Pro memoria vol. IV: 1956–1957*, XVI–XVII.

³⁶ Handwritten signature.

Document No. 2

1 November 1962, Letter of Lieutenant Colonel Marian Czarnecki to General Władysław Anders, Rome

via Lucia 19–9
Rome, 1 November 1962

Most Honourable and Dear General,

This morning I was received by Primate Wyszyński. I spent about 45 minutes in conversation with him alone. I conveyed to him from the General the expressions and assurances of filial devotion. The Primate said: “We follow the work of General Anders with great joy and value it”. He asked about the health of the General and gave me two pictures with a blessing, one for the General and one for me (I enclose this picture). He spoke of having read the *Memoirs of General*³⁷ and essentially talked about you in a very warm, cordial and loving tone. This has made an impression on me.

I explained to him our situation, that the only name that plays with us, the only person that emigration follows, is the General. All in all, I told him how things are with us. That President Kennedy³⁸ respected the General and I recognised that even more so de Gaulle,³⁹ that only perhaps the English were more indifferent. To this, the Primate said that “the English and us are indifferent, we have no sentiment for them.”

He said that we should write as much as possible, speak, explain in the West about the persecution of the Church in Poland, that it is not true, that these voices of ours can harm the Church, on the contrary, they help. He said: “We are not only fighting for the rights of the Church and religion, we are fighting for the nation, for the soul of the nation; in our case this fight for the nation is combined with the fight for religion, but, “he stressed,” we are fighting first of all for the nation. He said it is a “bloody” struggle, although no blood is being shed at the moment.

He spoke of the Millennium. He pointed out that this Millennium, celebrated in emigration, will only have value if it is celebrated in close connection with the Country. He mentioned that he had read a proclamation here, where there was not a word about the Country. “Such a notion of the Millennium loses its meaning,” he said, “because the

³⁷ It refers to W. Anders, *Bez ostatniego rozdziału. Wspomnienia z lat 1939–1946* (Newtown: Montgomeryshire Printing Co., 1949 [1st edition]).

³⁸ John Fitzgerald Kennedy (1917–1963) – American politician, US President 1961–1963, assassinated on 22 November 1963.

³⁹ Charles de Gaulle (1890–1970) – French politician and military officer During World War II, leader of the Free France movement. President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic 1944–1956, Prime Minister 1958–1959 and President of the French Republic 1959–1969.

purpose of the Millennium is to document that our civilisation came from the West, that the Polish nation is linked to the West and not to the East, that these ties are a thousand years old and unbreakable.” He said that the communists just want to tear up these ties and here lies the basis of the fight against the Church in Poland, that if the Church had kept silent about these ties, it would not have had difficulties.

He said that all Catholic missions were receiving from him a programme of the work of the Millennium in the Country, and that this programme and guidelines should be demanded of them to link our celebrations with this.

He pointed out that “in the fight against the regime, he constantly puts forward the fundamental, natural rights of the individual, the human being, the family and the nation, and not only religious matters.” He said that if he speaks in Poland, as he did recently in Częstochowa, he speaks on behalf of 40 million Poles, 30 million in Poland and 10 million outside the country, that we must consider ourselves an integral part of the nation and constantly manifest this.”

He remarked that today an increasingly damaging action is being carried out by Frankowski,⁴⁰ because he is spreading the opinion that actually the situation of the Church is not so bad. We should fight against this and exterminate his campaign – just like that of Piasecki,⁴¹ of course.

Finally, a very important thing: American aid. This aid to Poland should be sought, because the nation sees that this West, against which communism is fighting, this West is helping it. But he also said that American aid is given badly, because the Americans should emphasise more firmly that they are helping in the name of freedom and human rights, they should make this a condition, even if this condition is later not kept, they should proclaim it – but not stop the aid. The nation should know clearly what the meaning⁴² and purpose of this aid is, and today the nation does not really know whether the Americans are helping Poland because the regime is more liberal than in other countries of the Soviet bloc, or whether they are helping to win certain rights for the nation. The nation must know that this aid is for the nation and not for the regime. Today it

⁴⁰ Jan Frankowski (1912–1976) – lawyer and publicist, Catholic activist, Member of the Legislative Assembly and of the Sejm of the Polish People’s Republic 1947–1972, founder and President of the General Board of the ChSS from 1957. Deputy chairman of the compulsory management board of the “Caritas” organization in 1950. From 1952 to 1956, he belonged to the PAX Association. He left it after October 1956.

⁴¹ Bolesław Piasecki (1915–1979) – politician, lawyer. Arrested in 1944 by the NKVD, released in 1945 as a result of his declared support for communist reforms and the collaboration of Catholics with the communist authorities in Poland. In 1945, founder of the weekly magazine *Dzisiaj i Jutro* (Today and Tomorrow). Co-founder and 1952–1979 Chairman of the PAX Association. The Holy See condemned in 1955 his views contained in his book *Zagadnienia Istotne* (Essential Issues). Member of the Sejm of the Polish People’s Republic 1965–1979. Member of the Council of State 1971–1979.

⁴² The word “is” was added by hand.

remains unclear. From this I understood, although the Primate did not say it explicitly, that every time help is given, there should be a stipulation that if you do not end your persecution, you will not receive the next help.

He said that Poland was feeding East Germany and Czechoslovakia, that Canadian grain was even being sifted out of Canadian sacks and sent to Russia. But nevertheless this aid has to continue, because it is a sign that the West is not forgetting Poland, that it is not abandoning it. The nation knows that some of this grain is going elsewhere and this fact undermines confidence in the regime, which is a good thing.

He questioned me in great detail about relations in France, both Polish relations and the political situation in France.

It seems to me that it would be a good idea for you to write directly to the Primate thanking him for this picture and for the blessing he conveyed to you, General, with this picture. Obviously, one must write carefully, because perhaps his mail is controlled by the communists. He lives in the Pontifical Polish Institute, Via Pietro Cavallini 38. There is no doubt that the Primate has a great appreciation for your work. I think it is better to write directly, because I do not see anyone here who could personally hand over such a letter. Any intermediary can have one expression or another. I am already going back to Paris next week and maybe on 13 and 14 November I will be in London, because there is a convention of the International Federation of Free Journalists, I have been invited with reimbursement. I shall check in with the General. If the General had something more serious to convey to the Primate, then I am ready to go to Rome a second time later. He will certainly receive me, as I sense that he has great affection for me.

He indicated that I cannot write about what he told me, but I can announce that I was received by him. They have to do politics so that they are not shut out from going to Rome at the next sessions of the Council. I'm going to correct myself, one must write about what he said to me, only one must not cite that it was him who said it.

My deepest respect and soldierly devotion.

Marian Czarnecki⁴³

Source: KGA 299, p. 39–40, Władysław Anders Collection, PISM.

⁴³ Handwritten signature.

Document No. 3

6 November 1962, Letter from General Władysław Anders to Lieutenant Colonel Marian Czarnecki, London

General W[ładysław] Anders
20, Princes Gate
London, S.W. 7

16 November 196

Lieutenant Colonel Marian Czarnecki
Rome

Dear Marian,

Thank you so much for your letter and all the news so important to me. I am sending a letter to the Primate at your address by the same post and I would like you to deliver it personally.

In my letter, I formulate only a short expression of my deep sentiments for the Primate. I know under what unfortunate circumstances he finds himself outside Poland, and I would never want to expose him to any unpleasantness or difficulties.

From the bottom of my heart I am grateful to His Eminence, our Primate, for the blessing conveyed to me in the picture of the Blessed Virgin Mary of Jasna Góra.

The views of the Primate, so clear and far-reaching, are certainly professed by the whole nation, and are sincerely and deeply shared by us here. We possess great reverence and admiration for his tenacious struggle for a Catholic and independent Poland.

I would like to assure the Primate that all Poles outside the country, who are aware of their supreme duty to their homeland, want with all their heart and soul to work for Poland and the oppressed Church. In this work we naturally expect a helping hand from our Polish priests in emigration, and there are countries of our settlement, such as Great Britain and France, where these expectations of ours may not be fully fulfilled. I trust that the earnest unity of Church and nation, to which Poles have become accustomed over the centuries of their history, will also come to life in the areas inhabited by Polish political emigrants.

That is all, Dear Marian, please present the entire contents of this letter to His Eminence, if he so wishes. It carries to the Primate of Poland and to the illustrious leader of the whole nation the assurance of the deepest filial sentiments of mine and of all Poles abroad, on behalf of whom I know I can speak.

For you, Marian, I join a cordial soldierly handshake.

Władysław Anders⁴⁴

Source: SPP II 11/12, p. 431, typescript, AAW.

⁴⁴ Handwritten signature.

Document No. 4

6 November 1962, London, Letter from General Władysław Anders to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński Primate of Poland

General W[ładysław] Anders
20, Princes Gate
London, S.W. 7

6 November 1962

Your Eminence, Primate,

Taking opportunity of Your Eminence's stay in Rome, I would like to express, on my own behalf and on behalf of the Poles abroad, our heartfelt filial affection and homage.

With the greatest attention and a beating heart we look at the hard and sacrificial work of Your Eminence, full of deep devotion to the Church and to Poland. I ask God with confidence and faith to bring the blessed fruits of this work.

I kindly ask you to accept, Dear Primate, my deep reverence and devotion.

Władysław Anders⁴⁵

His Eminence
Stefan Wyszyński,
Primate of Poland

Source: SPP II 11/12, p. 432, typescript, AAW.

Document No. 5

29 November 1962, Rome, Letter from Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, to General Władysław Anders

Rome, 29 November 1962

N.6142/62/P

Most Honourable General,

I thank you wholeheartedly for your letter of 6 November 1962. I am pleased to hear that the General duly assesses the work of the Holy Church in Poland. Its simplest aspiration is to keep the Nation in peace, so that it can concentrate on protecting the most precious gifts of God – the treasures of soul and body. We are constantly talking about the fact that national culture can be preserved through its connection with religious life. We emphasise that sparing the Polish blood, so that it can be used in a patient will to persevere for fruitful work for the Nation, is perhaps the simplest policy for the many years of national existence still to come.

⁴⁵ Handwritten signature.

Please accept, General, my best Christmas wishes, full of hope that “the last chapter is constantly being written.”⁴⁶

Honourable
General W[ładysław] Anders
20, Princes Gate
London, S. W. 7

Source: AAW, SPP II 11/12, p. 434, typescript.

Document No. 6

29 October 1969, London, Letter from General Władysław Anders and General Bolesław Duch to Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland

⁴⁷General W[ładysław] Anders

20, Princes Gate
London, S.W. 7

His Eminence
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński
Primate of Poland

Eminence,

With deep reverence for Your Eminence, on behalf of the former soldiers of the Polish 2nd Corps in Italy to accept the Medal minted on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the victorious Battle of Monte Cassino.

With filial devotion,

Major General B[olesław] Duch
Chairman
of the Committee of the 25th Anniversary
of the Battle of Monte Casino
London, 29 October 1969

Lieutenant General W[ładysław] Anders
F[ormer] commander
of the Polish 2nd Corps
in Italy

Source: SPP II 14/123, p. 241, typescript, AAW.

⁴⁶ The letter ends with a handwritten initial of Primate Wyszyński.

⁴⁷ The letter was sent on embossed notepaper with the emblem of Poland depicted at the top.

Document No. 7

5 December 1969, Warsaw, Letter from the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, Primate of Poland, to General Władysław Anders

Rome, 5 December 1969

N. 3407/69/P

General,

I am deeply honoured by your magnificent gift – the Medal, minted to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the historic victorious battle of Monte Cassino, which brought glory to the command and Soldiers of the Polish 2nd Corps in Italy.

I will keep alive and in grateful memory this token of remembrance of the Soldiers of Poland about the Primate of Poland, who fights for the spiritual freedom of the Nation.

Please accept, General, my greetings and best wishes for the Anniversary, and my blessings for the New Year of the Lord.

Primate of Poland⁴⁸

The Most Honourable

Major General Władysław Anders

20. Princes Gate,

London, S.W. 7

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In Memoriam

George (György) Schöpflin. “I am a European of Hungarian Issue”

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George (György) Schöpflin was born in Budapest on November 24, 1939. His father Gyula, and before him his grandfather Aladar Schöpflin, were distinguished literary critics, his grandfather having been closely connected to the most important and influential literary journal in twentieth century Hungary, *Nyugat*. Their roots were in the Felvidék (Upper Hungary). Aladar was born in Maniga, Upper Hungary, in what is now Slovakia. His grandmother, Iren Maderspach, descended from a family that distinguished itself during the 1848–49 Hungarian Revolution in the defense of the White Church (Feher Templom). His mother, Katalin Eva Schöpflin (née Balazs), was educated in Prague as a family physician.

In Hungary, the Schöpflins were a cultured and refined family whose somewhat left leaning sympathies were generally overlooked by society, although in his youth Gyula joined a student cell of the then–illegal Communist Party, was arrested in 1931 and in 1932 was incarcerated for a time. After his release he worked for the Revai publishing house and then from 1938 to 1944 he worked as a clerk in a textile factory in Budakalasz. He wrote essays and short stories under a pseudonym to avoid embarrassing his father. He studied Hungarian and English literature at Eötvös College, where he delighted in annoying his professor by writing essays on [then] controversial authors such as Aldous Huxley and Virginia Woolf. His articles were published mostly in the communist–connected periodical *Gondolat* (Thought).¹

Due to his political ties, in 1945, when the post–WWII Rákosi government came into power, Gyula Schöpflin received a position at Hungarian Radio as the program coordinator. In 1948 he was appointed Hungarian envoy to Sweden with the official

¹ George Gomori, “Gyula Schopflin: Hungarian writer and translator who fled to Britain after an unhappy role in communist politics,” *The Guardian*, June 29, 2004, <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2004/jun/30/guardianobituaries.artsobituaries> (accessed June 30, 2022).

title – Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Stockholm and Copenhagen, which marked his family’s first step toward a move to the west.

In the last few months of his life, George Schöpflin recounted his earliest memories in a long interview with Péter Tulok of the Nemzeti Emlékezet Bizottsága (Committee of National Remembrance), giving us profound and detailed insight into what it was to be a child during the Siege of Budapest.² Prof. Schöpflin recounted that he remembered little before the German occupation of Hungary in March 1944, when he would have been just four and a half years old. He had some memories of the family summering in Nagymaros on the Danube Bend (when it was still called Nogradverőce), but beyond that his first real recollection was of after the October 15 putsch that put the Arrow Cross in power in Hungary. That memory was of October 16, when some “men in a jeep” came to their home on Pasaréti ut in Buda and took his father away.

His mother fled with the children to a friend’s home at Szentkirályi utca 15 in Pest, which she judged to be safer than remaining in Buda. The children often asked, “Where is father?,” and he did return to spend Christmas with them, but not to live with them.

When the bombings began soon after on December 26, they signaled the beginning of the siege of 1944–45 that was one of the longest and bloodiest city sieges of the Second World War... “In terms of human trauma, it comes second only to Stalingrad, comparisons to which were even being made by soldiers fighting at the time. The battle for Budapest raged over the heads of 800,000 non-combatants, no-one was evacuated: 38,000 Hungarian civilians perished.”³ Professor Schöpflin recalled that it was clear at the time that the civilian population was also being targeted by the siege. He also recalled the building’s housemaster being shot dead by the Germans,⁴ the shortage of food, eating horsemeat, and scavenging the chocolate factory that was next door for chocolate on which to survive. The family lived in the cellar at Szentkirályi utca until January 22, which was after the Germans blew up the bridges on the Danube and retreated to Buda. That was when they tentatively ventured out in the streets. By the end of March, the Schöpflin family returned to Buda, only to find the streets littered with the dead. It was so cold that they could walk on the frozen Danube. Looking back on his experience of the siege when he was young, Prof. Schöpflin said that these recollections had not disturbed him – “nem zavart.” Yet when he began returning to Hungary more often, in his 50’s, he came to realize the chilling and permanent effect that the air raid sirens and his

² Krisztian Ungváry, *Battle for Budapest: 100 Days in World War II* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2014), 92; Peter Tulok, Committee for National Remembrance. “Conversation with György Schöpflin.” YouTube video (in Hungarian). Published November 21, 2021. <https://neb.hu/hu/schopflin-gyorggyel-keszult-letut-jelent-meg-a-neb> (accessed June 25, 2022).

³ Ungváry, *Battle for Budapest*, XV.

⁴ Housemaster – Building Superintendent.

time in the cellar bomb shelters – indeed, the entire experience of living through the Siege – had had on him.

He made an interesting observation in the interview, namely that the Soviets, in addition to stealing anything that was removable were well aware of what was where and who was who. They had intimate local knowledge provided to them by comrades from 1919, and they used that information not only to loot more successfully in 1945, but also to control the population.

As a child, young György had no understanding of the communist vs. anti-communist movements that influenced his daily life – but life did begin again after the war's end. In the summer of 1945, he spent an idyllic six weeks with an aunt in Szigetszentmarton. Later, upon his return to Pasaréti ut, he spent his time playing with his friends on an empty lot beside their apartment building. Ironically, they played with empty shell casings expended in the street battles during the war. He noted in his interview with Peter Tulok that in his childhood there were Budai sracok in addition to Pesti sracok – making a fond reference to the classic Cold War film about the street kids of Pest.⁵

György Schöpflin's memories of Sweden, where his father's appointment as Hungarian envoy took them in 1948, were not positive. In those days the trip from Budapest to Stockholm took four days by train. His take-away as a ten-year-old was that it was very cold, the Swedes knew nothing of Hungary, and since Sweden had remained neutral during the war, they knew nothing of war. He attempted to learn the language and understand the society but was only in school there for a few months. He did remember the occasion on which his father donned a top hat and went to present his credentials to the king. Amusingly, one of his memories was that the Swedes ate sweet and savory food together, which was something very strange to any Hungarian. He said that more than anything he remained "a good little Magyar" and never learned to like Sweden.

Within a few short months, his father's diplomatic career ran afoul of the politics of the Rákosi government when he was criticized for meeting with Hungarian dissident Vilmos Böhm, who was in exile in Sweden. In Hungary the show trial of former Hungarian Politburo member, László Rajk, was staged in September 1949, and Rajk was subsequently executed for "Titoism," events that convinced Gyula that the family should go into exile in Britain. Although France was also under consideration, they chose London as the Schöpflins had family contacts in England.⁶

György – now George – Schöpflin, now age 10, arrived in London in 1950, after his father resigned from the Hungarian diplomatic service. A rather hardscrabble existence followed for the family, during which his mother, a medical doctor, became the

⁵ *Pál utcai fiúk (The Boys of Paul Street)*, 1969. Film, directed by Zoltan Fabri.

⁶ Email correspondence with George Schöpflin's widow, Piret Peiker. July 9–19, 2022.

primary breadwinner. George, the oldest of two children, had been born with a physical handicap to one of his hands that he had to overcome, in addition to finding his place in society in the UK. After all, this was the second major upheaval for his family after their short sojourn in Sweden. The family moved from London to Scotland, where it would be quicker for his mother to qualify to practice medicine. She did obtain her license to practice in Scotland and the UK, and later in life was awarded an OBE as a pioneer in family planning.⁷ Recalling those peripatetic times, George observed: “menekülés nem könnyű” – migration is not easy.

Nonetheless, their move to Scotland suited George very much, indeed, he loved the country. The family settled in Prestwick close to Glasgow, where he attended the Ayr Academy, the atmosphere of which he much preferred to that of the public school in England that he first attended. He graduated in 1957.⁸

George liked Scottish “egalitarianism, how easily he was accepted, the relative classlessness. His first friends when they arrived were the butchers son and the bakers son who lived on the same street, and nobody cared his mother was a doctor, nor that they were foreigners, nor that he had an injured hand.”⁹ Like other young people in Scotland, he worked various jobs during his holidays, the most memorable being as a van driver for a small cheese maker and as an assistant to land inspectors.¹⁰

He said of their arrival in Glasgow that no matter how well one spoke English, and as immigrants, theirs may not have been perfect, one could never understand the speech of a Glaswegian speaking English. Nevertheless, George was a good student who went on to finish school in Glasgow and then matriculated at the University of Glasgow, receiving an MA in 1960 and then a LLB in 1962. He never practiced law, but he later shared with his wife that “the pattern and dynamics of the legal type of thinking taught to him remained with him and came back to him when he was MEP [Member of the European Parliament].”¹¹

After graduation he attended a postgraduate institute of European Studies, the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium (1962–63), and spent time traveling and hitchhiking across Europe wearing his kilt. (Ostensibly it was easier to get a ride while wearing a kilt!).¹²

The early years of his career as a journalist were spent at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, then the BBC, focusing a great deal on the Soviet sphere of influence as

⁷ Naomi Marks, “Katalin Eva Schopflin, A Pioneer in Family Planning,” *BMJ*. 2003 May 10; 326 (7397): 1040. <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1125948/>. (accessed June 26, 2022).

⁸ Piret Peiker, July 16, 2022.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

well as on East and Central Europe's past and present. When Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia, he was on site as the first journalist from the West. In 1977 he published a book aimed at the western reader bringing to their attention the plight of the Hungarians minorities of Transylvania.¹³ He later accepted a teaching position at the London School of Economics, and then, from 1994 on, he held a post as a professor at the London University School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He became an expert in the integration of the nations of Europe into the EU and a respected political analyst. From 1998 until 2004 he held the Jean Monnet Chair at London University, focusing on instruction and research about the European Union, its future and its complexities.¹⁴

In 1989, with regime changes occurring in all the former Soviet satellites, new political parties with new orientations were formed within Hungary as well. George Schöpflin immediately chose to align himself with FIDESZ and its leadership, its politicians, and its intellectuals. Given his early interest in the Hungarian minorities of the successor states of Central Europe, he attended the first of many subsequent summer sessions of the Bálványosi Nyári Szabadegyetem in Tusnad, Romania – a not for profit founded to bring together the Hungarian minorities of the Carpathian Basin, especially their youth.¹⁵

When the time came for Hungary to be admitted to the European Union, George Schöpflin's unique background and scholarship made him an ideal candidate to serve as a member of the European Parliament. In the first election after Hungary joined the EU in 2004 he was elected as a FIDESZ MEP representing Hungary. Temporarily leaving academia behind, he was re-elected for three terms, serving as a member of the EU Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, as a substitute member of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and as a member of the Reconciliation of European Histories Group.¹⁶

As a youth, he remained loyal to his homeland. At the College of Europe he consciously re-taught himself Hungarian, reading Hungarian books. Later in London, he worked with the Hungarian resistance who issued samizdat papers. He recounted to his wife that during those days he had taken a suitcase of cash by train from London to Paris to fund samizdat activities. Throughout his early career, both his journalistic and university work was related to Hungary as well as the rest of the Soviet bloc. However it would be after the regime change of 1989 that he would publicly bring his talents into play on

¹³ George Schöpflin, *The Hungarians of Rumania* (London: The Minority Rights Group, 1978).

¹⁴ Emeritus Professor, George Schöpflin (1939–2021) UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies. <https://ucl.ac.uk/ssecs/news/2021/nov/emeritus-professor-george-schopflin-1939-2021>.

¹⁵ Zsolt Németh: Foreword in György Schöpflin, *A Contested Europe: Polemics, Papers and Essays* (Reno, NV: Helena History Press, 2022).

¹⁶ György Schöpflin. Wikipedia. https://wikipedia.org/wiki/Gy%C3%BGrgy_Sch%C3%B6flin (accessed June 25, 2022).

Hungary's behalf. From then until the end of his life, he devoted himself to the cause of Hungary and to that of a united Europe.¹⁷

In the fifteen years that George Schöpflin served Hungary in EU Parliament, all aspects of his unique portfolio of talents came into play. He brought to the job his intelligence, his gentle nature, and his ironic and sometimes sardonic humor, but also his Anglo–Saxon sense of fair play and gentlemanly behavior – all were exceptional qualities in the Central European theater. As he himself has stated, he never shied from “challenging established perspectives, going against the mainstream on issues like nationhood and liberalism. At the same time ... argument is based on a deep knowledge of Europe as itself and the Europe of the European Union – they are not the same – and, not surprisingly, a thoroughgoing understanding of Central Europe, not just Hungary, obviously, but the other countries and nations of the region.”¹⁸ He wrote these words to describe the essays contained in his final book, but they could be said to characterize all of his work as an MEP.

George Schöpflin's characterization of himself as “a European, of Hungarian issue” says as much about his experience as a youth migrant experiencing and suffering through the chaos of war, the trauma of migration, resettlement in different cultures, learning new languages as it does about his later, more conventional and ambitious career path in academia and as a public intellectual and political figure.¹⁹ All of his life experiences served to provide him with the unique qualifications that served him so well in every aspect of his various careers, but most especially they served the contribution he made as an MEP explaining Hungarian and Central European thinking to the politicians and bureaucrats of the European Union.

That much of Schöpflin's reasonable questioning or many of his arguments were not welcomed is clear by the way the Central European states, especially Hungary and Poland, were treated within the EU. As Schöpflin has written: “Suffice it to say, that the European polis does not welcome inputs from below unless they conform to the liberal integrationism of the elites.”²⁰

He goes on:

It will be clear from the argument of this book that the pressures on Poland and Hungary, the two primary targets of a punitive–minded EU, were not started by these states, but by the EU. There were faults on both sides, there invariably are, but the process of punishment then fed back into the EU to underpin its new identity as a site of power with the capacity to discipline

¹⁷ Piret Peiker, July 19, 2022

¹⁸ György Schöpflin. *A Contested Europe: Polemics, Papers and Essays* (Reno: Helena History Press 2022), 1.

¹⁹ “Europai Vagyok – Magyar Kiadásban”, A quotation attributed to George Schöpflin by Prof. Dr. Ferenc Mészlivetz in his eulogy at the funeral of George Schöpflin, Budapest, March 18, 2022. <http://iask.hu/hu/kosep-europai-odusszeia-tiszteletadas-schopflin-gyorgynek>.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

its supposedly erring members. Brexit enhanced this, but note that the moves against Hungary and Poland began well before 2016. In both cases, the conflict showed up the weaknesses in the polis. If membership of the polis is voluntary, and Brexit demonstrates that it is, (thanks to Article 50) then those targeted by the punitive left could reasonably conclude that something was amiss, that they were being required to conform to something to which they had not signed up.²¹

Schöpflin's points are crystal clear as he questions what the polis is, how it is to be characterized, how the EU regards and treats its member states and their desire for national identity:

Obviously, it [the EU] is not a state nor a country nor a republic nor a monarchy nor is it a commonwealth, it is neither a federation nor a confederation, though it may have some of the features of all of them. There is another possibility, namely that the European polis is beginning to resemble a liberal empire and, indeed some approve because that would sideline the demos problem, not least because the demos is too open to the attractions of nationhood. *Those who favour the Empires need some acquiescence in their rule, but the active support of the governed that democracy presupposes is superfluous.* Those who favour the empire argument do so because empires marginalize nations, and, therefore nationalism... all the same it is difficult to see how the polis as empire can be reconciled with any variant of democracy.²²

George Schöpflin chose not to stand for election again in 2019 and instead devoted his time to scholarship. He led a busy life shuttling between Tallin, Estonia, where he lived with his wife Piret Peiker, and Hungary, where he was an integral member of the Kózseg Institute of Advanced Studies, where he served as a senior research fellow. He published academic works in both English, using the first name George, and in Hungarian, publishing as György.

George Schöpflin's accomplishments deserve to be remembered and his fight to preserve the democratic nature of the EU memorialized, especially by not punishing as second-class citizens the former Soviet satellite nations that came late to membership. For the fifteen years he served as an MEP, he was a watchdog for the values that he held and that were so very clear to him. Would that those values were as clear to the rest of the political and bureaucratic elite.

His writings give us an opportunity to view him through the lens of a successful youth migrant, a denizen of many lands and many cultures who understood the nature of the polis and of democracy as well as the desire for nations and nationalities to retain their identity and values.

²¹ Ibid., 11.

²² Ibid., 16.

Recalling Schöpflin and his role as an MEP, the American journalist Christopher Caldwell wrote:

There is no one on the European political landscape as hard to categorize as the scholar–statesman György Schöpflin. As a university political scientist in England, he stands out as a particularly Central European kind of polyglot Renaissance man. As a member of the European Parliament for Hungary’s dynamic Fidesz party, he has brought to some of the bitterest recent EU battles an Anglo–Saxon commonsense and fair play. And for decades he has been writing enduring literary–political–historical essays that make complicated things clear and crooked stories straight.²³

Caldwell’s words are a fitting tribute to the memory of George Schöpflin and the contribution he made not just to Hungary, whom he represented so capably in European Parliament, but also his contribution to scholarship and education in his two adopted homelands, the United Kingdom and Estonia. He was respected by all who had the privilege to get know him. He will be sorely missed.

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²³ Endorsements for George Schöpflin’s *A Contested Europe*, received by Helena History Press, October 28, 2019.

